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PREFACE 
 
Over the past decade, issues of accountability and reconciliation in the aftermath of 
mass atrocities have increasingly dominated the field of international human rights. 
Indeed, the proliferation of international and domestic courts, truth commissions, civil 
compensation schemes, and other mechanisms for confronting the past has spawned 
its own scholarly field: transitional justice. And the sheer number and variety of 
institutional mechanisms suggests that questions of how peoples address gross human 
rights abuses and move forward into the future will continue to be a source of 
international interest as well as a site for innovation and creative adaptation. 
Much of the transitional justice discussion has centered on four types of accountability 
mechanisms that have proven to be both significant and controversial. First, the 
promise and pitfalls of international criminal justice bodies - such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) - have taken on increased importance with the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Second, the growing use of 
truth commissions, pioneered in Latin America, developed famously in South Africa, 
and now being used around the globe from East Timor to Nigeria to Peru, has elicited 
enormous interest within policy, advocacy, and scholarly communities. Third, 
transnational accountability efforts - such as Spain's attempt to extradite Augusto 
Pinochet to stand trial for torture and other human rights abuses committed in Chile 
or Belgium's application of its relatively recent universal jurisdiction law - have sparked 
vigorous debate. Finally, the use of the Alien Tort Claims Act in the United States to 
allow civil tort claims brought by victims of human rights abuses continues to be 
controversial. 
Comparatively little attention has been paid, however, to a fifth, newly emerging, form 
of accountability and reconciliation: hybrid domestic-international courts. Such courts 
are "hybrid" because both the institutional apparatus and the applicable law consist of 
a blend of the international and the domestic. Foreign judges sit alongside their 
domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by teams of local lawyers 
working with those from other countries. 
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The judges apply domestic law that has been reformed to accord with international 
standards. This hybrid model has developed in a range of settings, generally post-
conflict situations where no politically viable full-fledged international tribunal exists, 
as in East Timor or Sierra Leone, or where an international tribunal exists but cannot 
cope with the sheer number of cases, as in Kosovo. Most recently, the agreement to 
create a hybrid court in Cambodia is being implemented and is bringing about its first 
achievement in terms of accountability with past crimes and fight against impunity. 
Frequently, such courts have been conceived in an ad hoc way, the product of on the 
ground innovation rather than grand institutional design. As a result, hybrid courts 
have finally been the subject of analysis, both among scholars and policymakers who 
focus on transitional justice issues. This study seeks to identify possible lacks in 
previous analysis, focusing on concrete aspects of hybrid courts, how they work in 
practice and which role they can play in dealing with international crimes in the future, 
providing a preliminary assessment of their potential strengths and weaknesses. To do 
so, considerable information have been gathered directly from the source, and the 
availability of UN officials and colleagues of the International Center for Transitional 
Justice has been vital to this purpose. 
Interestingly, one reason the hybrid courts have received comparatively little attention 
so far may be that their very hybridity has left them open to challenge both from those 
advocating increased use of formal international justice mechanisms and those who 
resist all reliance on international institutions. For example, many supporters of 
international justice seem to fear that hybrid tribunals may be used as an alternative to, 
and possibly as a means to undermine, the use of full-fledged international criminal 
courts. Indeed, it is striking that two government officials who played key roles in 
establishing hybrid tribunals in Kosovo and East Timor have resisted the notion that 
such courts could serve as a model for the future1. Many within the human rights 
                                                 
1
 At a panel on hybrid courts that was part of the 2002 International Law Association Annual Conference, 
David Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, and Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Director 
of the Office of Humanitarian Affairs at the United Nations, both rejected the notion that such courts might 
be touted as a model for the future despite the fact that Scheffer had helped establish the special court for 
Sierra Leone and was deeply involved in the efforts to create a hybrid court in Cambodia, and Strohmeyer had 
worked to establish hybrid courts in Kosovo and East Timor as an assistant legal advisor to the UN transitional 
administrators there. 
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advocacy community have been critical of the hybrid courts as well. From the opposite 
end of the political spectrum, those who generally eschew international justice 
mechanisms - such as Bush Administration officials who have opposed the ICC - may 
see hybrid tribunals as carrying too many of the trappings of international courts. For 
example, administration officials have been wary of international involvement in 
efforts to establish courts to try those suspected of committing mass atrocities in Iraq, 
instead advocating an Iraqi led domestic process. In a sense, then, hybrid courts are 
being squeezed from both sides. 
This dual resistance to hybrid courts is unfortunate. As I argue at the end of in this 
thesis and after analyizing the peculiar aspects of the mixed tribunals , such courts hold 
a good deal of promise and may even offer an approach to questions of accountability 
that addresses some of the concerns raised in both camps. Yet, such courts need 
further study and careful examination once their work will be accomplished. In this 
work, I look at four recent examples of hybrid courts, those established in Kosovo, 
East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia to hear cases involving war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and other mass atrocities in those countries. I briefly 
address some of the advantages and disadvantages of these courts, particularly with 
regard to their perceived legitimacy (among both international and domestic 
constituencies), their ability to catalyze local efforts to establish rule of law institutions, 
and their potential to foster the development of human rights norms within emerging 
legal systems. Finally, I discuss ways in which hybrid courts might fit into the ICC's 
complementarity regime. I argue that such courts are best seen not as an alternative to 
international or local justice, but rather as an important complement to both. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the course of the last years, prosecution of international crimes has been often 
the task of international courts. This has happened in spite of the fact that it is widely 
recognized2 that the best response to these atrocities should be resort to national 
criminal courts. Indeed, in principle national courts are the most appropriate forum for 
adjudicating international crimes since they have at their disposal the coercitive powers 
needed to ensure apprehension and prosecution of suspects, reparation for victims and 
enforcement of criminal sentences. 
As a result, prosecution of crimes under international law by national courts has 
presented two major problems. The first is the national courts are often far from 
impartial, especially when they cope with international crimes that were directed 
against or committed on behalf of their own state. The second is that prosecuting 
international crimes can be a burdensome exercise, both politically and materially. So 
far, only few states have proved to be able or willing to carry out such prosecutions. 
These obstacles could lead to injustice against suspect or more frequently to impunity 
of international criminals. 
On the face of it, the new international law has demolished one of the most powerful 
bulwarks of sovereign states, the doctrine of act of state or immunity of state officials 
from prosecution in case of international crimes perpetrated while in office. Another 
considerable step forward has been made by many treaties imposing the principle of 
universal jurisdiction of state courts for large-scale offences such as grave breaches of 
Geneva Conventions, torture, and serious acts of international terrorism. 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals, established in the wake of World War II 
to prosecute German and Japanese crimes are the first example of this new ground for 
international law. It took several more decades, however, until the idea of international 
prosecution found broad acceptance, first with the institution by the UN Security 
Council of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and finally in the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
                                                 
2 In the famous Eichmann judgment the Supreme Court of Israel stated that the territorial state, that is, the state 
where crimes have been committed, is the appropriate place for adjudication. 
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Nevertheless, while representing significant progress in the consolidation of universal 
jurisdiction, ICTY, ICTR, and to a certain extent ICC were and are still far to 
represent the ideal model of international jurisdiction. Indeed, these tribunals are 
removed from the societies affected by the crimes they are supposed to prosecute. 
Proceedings take place hundreds of miles away from where the crimes were 
committed. The reconciliation role that international tribunals should play seems 
considerably more difficult under these circumstances. Moreover, these courts are 
composed of judges who are not familiar with the historical context of the country in 
which crimes were committed, or even with the legal culture of the society concerned. 
Secondly, fully international criminal bodies tend to grow in size, employing hundreds 
if not thousands of personnel with significant costs and scarce ownership and 
accountability. They are therefore inclined to become organs with their own internal 
logic, momentum and agenda, that can be influenced little by their creators, least of all 
by individual stated. Also, albeit this does not apply to ICC, purely international 
tribunals are established without relying on the (remaining) existing judicial system in 
the state where the crimes occurred, but starting from a tabula rasa, a process which is 
time -and resource- intensive. Finally, the experience with international criminal 
tribunals with primacy over national courts suggests that even if there are remnants of 
a domestic judicial system in the state were the crimes occurred, international tribunals 
operate in significant isolation from such remnants, with only a limited contribution to 
rebuild internal rule of law. 
In the struggle against impunity within this new model proposed by the international 
community, there no single option available. One of these options, which is becoming 
increasingly significant because it has addressed the weaknesses of both international 
and domestic criminal courts, is the subject of this study, the establishment of the so-
called mixed or internationalized courts or tribunals. Yet, in order to make this option 
viable and more suitable, a set of factual or legal circumstances have to be present. Fist 
of all, it is necessary for the national judiciary to be available, or partly available, so that 
to some extent one may rely on national courts. This pre-condition is linked with the 
need to assuage the nationalistic demands of the local population. This happens when 
national authorities regard the administration of justice as an essential attribute of state 
sovereignty. On top of that, another set of circumstances are needed, namely the lack 
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of the political will within the international community, or in the United Nations, to 
deal with serious international crimes by setting up an international tribunal proper.  
But what are the merits of internationalized courts and tribunals? Why they should 
become a model for bringing to trial the authors of serious crimes when the above 
mentioned pre-conditions are met? The first reason is that in providing justice, local 
prosecutors or local judges are familiar with the territory, the language, and the habits 
of the accused. The second major merit is that trials are held in the territory where 
crimes have been committed. The internationalized model expose the local population 
to past atrocities with the two-fold advantage of making everybody cognizant of those 
atrocities, including those who sided with perpetrators or alleged perpetrators, and 
bringing about a therapeutic process for the victims or their relatives through public 
stigmatization of the culprits and fair retribution. This may also contribute to the 
process of gradual reconciliation in the local community. 
The third major advantage of internationalized courts is that they have the ambition to 
produce a significant spill-over effect in that they may contribute to gradually 
promoting the democratic legal training of local members of the prosecution and the 
judiciary. This was a crucial element in the case of East Timor and reflects the 
increased practice to ensure ownership and local capacity building promoted by the 
United Nations. 
While this thesis was being drafted (2003-2007), there were four active jurisdictions of 
that kind whose aim has been to hear cases involving war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and other mass atrocities: the Serious Crimes Panels in the District 
Court of Dili (East Timor); the Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of Kosovo; the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone; and more recently the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia. 
Yet, the bodies considered in this study have not remained the only ones of their kind. 
Tribunals created in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq constitute other significant 
developments suggesting that the phenomenon of internationalized criminal courts 
will remain a recurrent theme in international criminal and transitional justice. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
INTERNATIONALIZED TRIBUNALS 
 
1.1 Introduction. 
The establishment of the ad hoc international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 brought about a proliferation of international criminal 
jurisdictions. Precursors of the International Criminal Court – an international, truly 
universal criminal jurisdiction – they have become the model upon which the second 
generation “mixed tribunals” were conceived. In the decade that followed their 
establishment, a number of countries emerging from civil wars typified by the 
perpetration of crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide on a large scale, called 
upon the United Nations (UN) to set up similar jurisdictions in their own territories. 
With their administration of justice devastated, biased or otherwise lacking the 
necessary judicial and administrative capacity, these countries sought the technical and 
financial assistance of the UN in the conduct of complex prosecutions that they alone 
were unable or politically unwilling to undertake. In their wish to put an end to a 
historic cycle of impunity, they were also motivated by the interest to give the 
prosecution of the government’s political enemies a mark of international legitimacy. 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as the parent institution of the ad hoc 
tribunals, has proved to be reluctant to replicate the experience and establish 
additional judicial organs whose administrative structure and lengthy and costly 
proceedings would have further increased the heavy financial burden on Member 
States of the Organization. On the face of the UNSC reluctance, the focus of 
expectation shifted to the UN Secretariat to develop a model similar in form, 
substance and international legitimacy to the had hoc tribunals, but one which respects 
a nation’s vision of justice, its choice of means of bringing it about, and its ownership, 
at least in part, of the judicial process. Therefore, a model of an “internationalized 
tribunals” as a nation court of mixed jurisdiction and composition was firstly 
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developed for Cambodia. It was soon followed by a sui generis, treaty-based court of 
similar jurisdiction and composition for Sierra Leone.  
Unlike the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
established as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the legal 
basis for the establishment of tribunals for Sierra Leone and for Cambodia was 
consensual, and their legal status, applicable law, composition, and organizational 
structure had to be negotiated and agreed upon between the parties. It was in the 
nature of the negotiating process that political constraints imposed different legal 
choices on questions related to jurisdiction, organizational structure, and composition 
of the mixed tribunals.  
The mixed tribunals for Sierra Leone and for Cambodia had a prominent role in the 
creation of mixed jurisdictions in East Timor and Kosovo. In analyzing the diversity 
of mixed jurisdictions from the UN standpoint, this chapter will focus on the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia, and conclude 
with a comparative analysis of the mixed composition panels in the UN-administrated 
territories of Kosovo and East Timor.  
 
1.2 Negotiating the legal framework for the mixed courts. 
1.2.1 The role of the UN Institutions. 
The negotiating process for the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers for 
Cambodia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone was conducted by the UN 
Secretariat for the most part in parallel and within the parameters determined by its 
political organs. It resulted, however, in the establishment of two very different mixed 
jurisdictions. A comparative analysis of the two legislative processes from the vantage 
point of the UN Secretariat is illustrative pf the difficulties, both legal and political, of 
applying a single model of UN "internationalized jurisdiction3 in countries and 
circumstances as diverse as Sierra Leone and Cambodia. 
More than two decades after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime, a request for 
assistance in the establishment of an international tribunal for Cambodia to prosecute 
Khmer Rouge leaders was put before the UN's political organs in 1997 by a letter 
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addressed to the Secretary General from the co-Prime Minister of Cambodia3. A joint 
request for the establishment of a UN-based tribunal was possible in the political 
circumstances of Cambodia in June 1997 when a common position against Pol Pot 
would have secures, for a brief period of time, a delicate balance of power between the 
First and the Second Prime Ministers. It was soon, however, overtaken by events, both 
in Cambodia and in the United Nations. With the July 1997 coup d'état which restored 
Hun Sen to power as the sole Prime Minister, the death of Pol Pot in April 1998, and 
the defection that year to the government's ranks of other Khmer Rouge leaders, 
notably Ke Pauk, Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea, Cambodia was disinclined to risk a 
seemingly peaceful of the Khmer Rouge with the prospects of international criminal 
prosecution. In the United Nations, as a consequence of the Security Council's 
unwillingness to react to the request, the General Assembly took the lead. 
In its resolution 52/135, the General Assembly asked the Secretary General to 
examine the Cambodian request for assistance, and if necessary, appoint a group of 
experts to evaluate the existing evidence and propose further measures as a means to 
bring about national reconciliation and address the question of individual 
accountability. The Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary General 
recommended the establishment pf an UN-based international tribunal under Chapter 
VII or VI of the United Nations Charter to try Khmer Rouge officials for crimes 
against humanity and genocide committed in the period 1975 to 1979. As neither the 
General Assembly nor the Security Council acted upon the recommendation, it was 
for the Secretary General to take the initiative and offer his good offices in establishing 
a tribunal which, while international in character, would not necessarily be modeled 
after either of existing ad hoc tribunals or be linked to them institutionally, 
administratively or financially.  
Negotiations between the UN Secretariat and the government on a "mixed 
jurisdiction" for Cambodia began in July 1999. They lasted for almost three years, until 
in February 2002 the Secretary General decided to withdraw from the negotiations. In 
the course of the negotiations many legal and institutional issues were contentious. 
They included the question of whether the majority of judges should be Cambodian or 
international; whether the Prosecutor and the Registrar should be internationally 
                                                 
3 UN Doc A/51/930-S/1997/448, Annex. 
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appointed; the validity of the amnesty previously granted; and the primacy of the 
Agreement between the United Nations and the government over the Law on the 
establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers. A conflict over the status, composition, 
and organizational structure of the mixed tribunal, it was in fact a conflict of two 
vision of justice: an independent tribunal meeting international standards of justice, 
objectivity, fairness, and due process of law, and a politically controlled judicial 
process.  
In announcing his decision to withdraw from the negotiations the Secretary General 
explained that the Cambodian mixed tribunal did not measure up to international 
standards of justice and that "as currently envisaged…it would not guarantee the 
independence, impartiality and objectivity that a court established with the support of 
the United Nations must have". The United Nations Secretariat also cited the lack of a 
clear mandate from either UN organ as inhibiting factor. A mandate was soon to be 
given; though not the one the Secretariat had expected.  
By Resolution 57/228, the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to 
resume the negotiations with the government of Cambodia to conclude an agreement 
based on previous negotiations on the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, 
consistent with the provisions of the Resolution; consistent also with the subject 
matter and personal jurisdiction of the Chambers set forth in the Cambodian Law, 
provided that international standards of justice are maintained, and the arrangements 
are made for an appellate Chamber. In approving the Cambodian Law on the 
Extraordinary Chambers as the legal framework for an UN-operated Court, the 
General Assembly gave implicit international legitimacy to the Cambodian justice 
system as a whole. The apparent contradiction between this and Resolution 57/225 
adopted on the same day, by which the General Assembly noted with concern "the 
functioning of the judiciary [in Cambodia] resulting from corruption and interference 
by the executive with the independence of the judiciary, was completely disregarded.  
In the negotiation that followed, the Secretary General attempted unsuccessfully to 
reverse the ratio between the national and international components, renegotiate the 
composition of the Chambers and their voting system, as well s obtain the 
appointment of an international prosecutor and an international investigating judge. 
They resulted in few modifications relating mainly to the organizational structure of 
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the Chambers and their reduction from a three to a two-tiered court. In concluding his 
report on Khmer Rouge Trials, the Secretary General remained unconvinced that the 
Agreement, although improved upon its previous version, would ensure the credibility 
that the Extraordinary Chambers given the precarious state of the Cambodian 
Judiciary. The General Assembly, however, did not share his concerns, and in its 
resolution 57/228B of 13 May 2003 approved the draft Agreement between the 
United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia, and urged the Secretary 
General and the government to allow the draft Agreement to enter into force and 
implement it fully thereafter.  
The negotiating process on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
was initiated by the Security Council at the request of the government. Disinclined to 
establish a Chapter VII Special Court as its own subsidiary organ, the Security Council, 
by resolution 1315 (2000), requested the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement 
with the government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court to 
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. In the negotiations which ensued between the UN Secretariat and 
the government of Sierra Leone, there was little disagreement on the principles of 
international jurisdiction, the status of the Court and its constitutive instrument, its 
composition, including a majority of international judges and international Prosecutor, 
organizational structure, and the practical arrangements for its establishment. They 
culminated two years later in the Agreement between the United Nations and the 
government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
signed on 16 January 2002. 
 
1.2.2  The role of the civil society. 
The negotiating processes for the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
and the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia were shaped by the political 
circumstances both in the countries concerned and at the United Nations, and their 
outcome was determined largely by the interaction between the various actors directly 
end indirectly involved.  
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In the case of Sierra Leone, Members of the Security Council acted jointly, 
unanimously and as coherent group in developing a common approach to the nature, 
jurisdiction, and organizational structure of the Special Court. The Security Council 
which in its Resolution 1315 (2000) initiated the negotiated process and determined its 
political and legal parameters, remained actively involved in it until its successful 
completion. In this context also, a small group of interested states composed of 
Members of the Security Council and major donors was formed almost from the 
beginning to assist the Secretary General in assessing the needs of the Special Court in 
funds and personnel. It would later be transformed into a Management Committee of 
the Special Court to oversee its efficient operation. 
The role of the civil society representatives in Sierra Leone, a particularly vibrant group 
of local and international NGOs, was unique. In its negotiations with the government, 
it was the Secretariat's policy to engage in a parallel dialogue with representatives of 
civil society to seek their views and address their concerns within the legal and political 
limitations imposed. The single most important contribution of the NGO community 
to shaping the Statute of the Special Court was in balancing the principle of judicial 
accountability of juveniles and the protection of existing child care rehabilitation 
programs. 
The constructive attitude of the government of Sierra Leone, its genuine will to see 
that justice is done and be seen to be done, at the risk of political instability, if 
necessary, is maybe the most important contributory factor to the successful outcome 
of the negotiations. In the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the 
Security Council, Member States, the UN Secretariat, the government of Sierra Leone, 
and its civil society at large, formed a partnership. This was not to be the case in the 
negotiating process for the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers of 
Cambodia. 
An early attempt to engage the Security Council in the establishment of a Khmer 
Rouge tribunal failed for a number of reasons, and notably a threat by China to veto 
and Security Council resolution to that effect. In the negotiations between the UN 
Secretariat and the government of Cambodia, the Secretary General acted within his 
general good offices mandate, but without a specific mandate from any of the UN 
organs. When in 2002, the General Assembly intervened to revive the moribund 
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negotiating process, it mandated its resumption on conditions largely dictated by the 
government of Cambodia.  
Interested Member States did not act as a coherent group with a common approach. 
With very little in common, they were loosely united by the desire to entrust the 
Secretariat with the establishment and operation of Extraordinary Chambers. In the 
negotiating process itself, however, they often intervened individually with the 
government of Cambodia to offer solutions which would then be imposed upon the 
Secretariat. In the political circumstances of Cambodia, the role played by civil society 
was marginal. While many in the NGO community questioned the credibility of a 
judicial process dominated by government appointed judges, prosecutors, investigators 
and support staff, they continued to believe that the UN engagement in the process 
was Cambodia's only hope to see justice done.  
 
1.3 Subject matter jurisdiction. 
The similarities in the nature of the conflicts and the crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, imposed a similar choice of the 
applicable law in all jurisdictions whether national, international, or sui generis, in 
character. With few exceptions, therefore, they included the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and, depending on the nature of the conflict, war crimes and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
The inclusion in the jurisdiction of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers of the 
crime of genocide within the restrictive definition of the Genocide Convention, 
presented legal and conceptual difficulties4. More perhaps than any other mass killing 
in the second half of the twentieth century, the massive scale and systematic character 
of the killing by execution, starvation, malnutrition, and disease of an estimated 2 
million Cambodians during the Khmer Rouge regime, resembled the crime of 
genocide.  
Perpetrated mostly, however, on political or social grounds by members of the same 
national, ethnic, religious, or racial group, the Cambodian so-called auto-genocide did 
not amount technically to genocide within the meaning of Article 2 of the Genocide 
                                                 
4
 See Chapter 5. 
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Convention5. The Conventional crime of genocide was nevertheless retained in the 
Cambodian Law to the extent of its applicability to minority religious and ethnic 
groups, such as Muslim ‘Cham’ and ethnic Vietnamese, Chinese, and Thai minority 
groups. 
In the Sierra Leone decade-long conflict that began in 1991, large-scale and systematic 
violations of humanitarian law, abduction, mass rape, forced recruitment of children 
and summary executions were committed by forces of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF)6. It was, however, the period following the joint invasion of Freetown by the 
RUF and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) on 6 January 1999, which 
marked the most intensified, systematic and widespread violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law against the population of the capital. For all of their 
brutality, however, the killings and mass executions were not committed on ethnic, 
religious, or racial grounds with intent to annihilate the group distinguished on any of 
these grounds, as such. They were not legally characterized, therefore, as genocide. 
While the crime of genocide was omitted from the Statute of the Special Court, two 
additional crimes were included to address the specificity of the Sierra Leone Conflict: 
(1) attacks against peace-keeping personnel involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peace keeping mission as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians 
under the international law of armed conflict7 (a reference to the hostage taking of 500 
peace-keepers in May 2000 by the RUF); and (2) conscripting or enlisting children 
under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate 
                                                 
5 The crime of genocide is defined in Art 2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide to mean any of the following: killing members of the group, causing bodily or mental arm, 
inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about the physical destruction of the group, imposing measures to 
prevent birth, or transferring children of the group, when committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such. The Conventional definition of the crime of genocide was 
replicated in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and in the Statute of the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda. At the Rome Conference, the definition of the crime of genocide 
engendered little controversy and was incorporated without change in Art 6 of the Statute of the ICC. In their 
reluctance to modify the definition and expand its scope 50 years after its adoption in the Genocide 
Convention and with the Cambodian killing fields present in their minds, Member States clearly, though 
implicitly, indicated their intention to maintain the definition of the ‘ultimate crime’ in its Conventional form 
and within the limitations established thereunder. 
6
 For a deeper analysis of the Special Court of Sierra Leone see Chapter 2. 
7 The crime of attacks against peace-keepers in Art 4(b) of the Statute of the Special Court replicates Art 8(2)(b) 
of the ICC Statute, and is based on the distinction between peace-keepers as ‘civilians’ in traditional UN 
Chapter VI operations, and peace-keepers as ‘combatants’ when, pursuant to Chapter VII mandate, they are 
engaged in combat mission, or are otherwise acting in self-defence. 
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actively in hostilities, a practice prevalent among all armed groups involved in the 
conflict8. 
As is warranted by nature of the mixed jurisdiction, both the Cambodian Law on the 
Extraordinary Chambers and the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone include 
common crimes that in the circumstances were judged complementary to the 
international crimes, and of particular relevance. 
 
1.4 Personal Jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction of a limited scope is another distinctive feature of both 
international and mixed tribunals. A definition of personal jurisdiction by reference to 
the hierarchical level of these presumed responsible of their relatively heavier 
responsibility for crimes committed, was imperative and it is inherent almost in the 
nature of any international criminal jurisdiction that it be so limited. Limitation to the 
political and military leadership alone, however, would not have satisfied the sense of 
justice and the principle of accountability of relatively low-level perpetrators. In the 
case of Cambodia and Sierra Leone, it was the understanding of the parties that while 
restrictively defined, the personal jurisdiction of the Court should be interpreted to 
include the top military and political leadership, as well as others down the chain of 
command whose crimes were particularly singled out for their magnitude, brutality, or 
heinous nature. 
A restrictive definition of the personal jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers and 
Special Court was for either government a politically imposed necessity. In the realities 
of Cambodia and Sierra Leone, where political stability was achieved through 
reintegration of ex-combatants into the regular armed forces and the society at large, 
political power-sharing and the grant of amnesties of various scope, it would have 
been the government’s preference to spare from prosecution those among the most 
responsible who had defected to its ranks, or have since participated in a coalition 
government. A selective choice of the accused, however, presented for the United 
Nations a dilemma of reconciling peace and justice, and applying uncompromising 
international standards of justice in circumstances of fragile peace. 
                                                 
8 Art 4(c) of the Statute of the Special Court. 
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The personal jurisdiction of Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia extends to “senior 
leaders and those most responsible for the crimes committed in Democratic 
Kampuchea”. At the time the definition was adopted two persons had already been 
detained in connection with the Khmer Rouge regime: Chhit Chouen, known as ‘Ta 
Mok’ or ‘The Butcher”, a Khmer Rouge army commander and member of the 
Standing Committee, and Kaing Kek Ieu, more commonly known as ‘Duch’, the 
Director of the notorious Tuel Sleng Prison. With the recent arrest of Noun Chea9, 
Pol Pot’s former Deputy known as ‘Brother No 2’, they have so far been the only 
former Khmer Rouge members under provisional pre-emptive detention in 
connection with the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Chambers. Other 
senior surviving members of the Khmer Rouge leadership10 are still leaving freely in 
the semi-autonomous region of Pailin and in the capital Phnom Penh.  
The personal jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone extends to “persons 
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law (…), including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the 
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.11 The latter 
limitation seemingly suggests that leaders of RUF who reneged on their engagement to 
peace under the Lomé Peace Agreement, were not be prosecuted, or prosecuted first. 
The leaders of the AFRC, on the other hand, who may have committed no lesser 
crimes before the conclusion of the Lomé Peace Agreement, but who have since 
joined the government and are considered to have contributed to the establishment 
and implementation of the peace process, would be spared from prosecution, or be 
prosecuted last. It has been the understanding of the Secretary General, however, that 
the reference to leaders who threatened the establishment of and implementation of 
the peace process does not describe an element of the crime, but is a guidance for the 
Prosecutor in determining his prosecutorial strategy. The commission of any of the 
statutory crimes without necessarily “threatening the peace” within the meaning of the 
Resolution, would not, in his view, detract from the international criminal 
                                                 
9 Extraordinary Chambers provisional detention order No 002 of 19/09/2007. 
10 Khieu Samphan, the Chairman of the Council of State of Democratic Kampuchea and the de facto Head of 
State since 1976, and Ieng Sary, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Democratic 
Kampuchea. 
11 Statute of the Special Court, Art 1. 
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responsibility otherwise entailed for the accused12. When on 10 March 2003 the first 
list of indictees was released, it included leaders of RUF, AFRC, and CDF, some of 
whom were instrumental in the peace process both at Lomé in 1999, and in Freetown 
in 200213. 
For all the limitations imposed on the personal jurisdiction of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, two additional categories of persons never before prosecuted in an 
international criminal jurisdiction were included in the personal jurisdiction of the 
Court: persons between 15 and 18 years of age, “children” within the definition of the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and members of UN peace-keeping or 
other UN authorized operations. 
 
1.4.1 Prosecution of juveniles between 15 and 18 years of age. 
The acts of brutality and savagery committed by children on a large scale in the last 
phase of the conflict in Freetown in January 1999 required that this unique feature of 
Sierra Leone civil war be addressed in all its horrific aspects. Mindful of the moral 
dilemma of prosecuting child-victims who were transformed into perpetrators through 
abduction, drugs, physical and psychological abuse, and slavery of all kinds, the 
Secretary General proposed that a process of judicial accountability be, in principle, 
provided for14, but the Prosecutor be instructed that in exercising his discretionary 
power to prosecute juvenile offenders, he should “ensure that the child-rehabilitation 
programme is not placed at risk and that, where appropriate, resort should be had to 
alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms, to the extent of their availability15. 
In the course of the negotiations, few issues were as passionately debated as the 
prosecutions of juveniles. For representatives of civil society and childcare local and 
international NGOs, the prospects of prosecuting children posed a threat to the entire 
                                                 
12 Letter form the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2001/40. 
13 On 10th March 2003, seven persons were indicted by the Special Court for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian law, and in particular murder, rape, 
extermination, acts of terror, sexual slavery, conscription of children into armed forces and attacks against UN 
peace-keepers. They included Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF (died of natural causes in detention). 
14 Under Art 7(1) of the Statute all necessary guarantees of juvenile justice were to be afforded. Juveniles before 
the Special Court were accordingly to be treated “with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or 
her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a 
constructive role in society, and in accordance with international human rights standards, in particular the right 
of the child”. 
15 Statute of the Special Court, Art 15(5) 
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rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. For the Secretary General and the 
government of Sierra Leone, it was a question of striking a balance between justice to 
victims, accountability of perpetrators, and the risks that large scale prosecution of 
juveniles might entail for the ongoing rehabilitation and childcare programmes. For 
the Security Council, it was ultimately a question of finding a political compromise  
between the principle of judicial accountability for all, including juveniles, and its 
impracticality in the circumstances. In the letter of the President of the Security 
Council to the Secretary General, members of the Council opted for the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as the alternative non-judicial accountability mechanism to 
handle the plight of children, both as victims and perpetrators16. 
While it was ultimately a prosecutorial choice not to indict children who committed 
crimes, but those who forced children to commit crimes, the statutory provision on 
prosecution of juveniles framed the issues of the debate on the role of children in the 
Sierra Leone conflict, and brought it to the fore of Sierra Leone national 
consciousness. 
 
1.4.2 Peace-keepers 
While in a number of peace keeping operations, and notably in the DRC, Somalia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mozambique peace-keepers are known to have 
committed violations of international humanitarian law, no member of a UN peace-
keeping operation has ever been prosecuted for any of these crimes before an 
international criminal jurisdiction. In the realities of Sierra Leone conflict, however, 
where members of ECOMOG, the military wing of ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African States), allegedly committed summary executions, the 
possibility of prosecuting peace-keepers had to be addressed. In introducing, by 
analogy from the ICC Statute, the principle of complementarity, the Statute of the 
Special Court provides that peace-keepers who transgressed will first be subject to the 
primary jurisdiction of their sending state, and may be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Special Court only if the sending state is unwilling or unable to investigate or 
prosecute, and if the Court is authorized by the Security Council to exercise such 
                                                 
16 UN Doc S/2001/95. 
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jurisdiction on the proposal of any state17. The authorization in itself, however, would 
not guarantee the prosecution of those presumed responsible, if, in the absence of a 
surrender agreement between the Special Court and the sending state, or a Chapter 
VII Resolution, the unwilling or unable state would refuse to surrender the accused to 
the jurisdiction of the Special Court. 
 
1.5 Temporal Jurisdiction 
A determination of the temporal jurisdiction of any UN-based tribunal, whether 
international or mixed, is a time-frame put on the subject matter, personal, and 
territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal. For the United Nations, such a determination 
required a choice inclusive of the most notorious crimes in scale or heinous nature, the 
persons most responsible for their commission, and most distinctive geographical 
areas. Within the limitations imposed, the choice was to be balanced, objective, and 
impartial to avoid the perception that the exclusion of any groups of crimes, persons, 
or geographical areas was intended as a political statement.  
For the relevant government, however, the determination of the temporal jurisdiction 
was a question, primarily, of the historical truth. In the establishment of all UN-based 
tribunals, with the exception of ICTY, the governments concerned requested the 
extension of the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal to put the events in historical 
perspective. For this reason, the government of Rwanda asked the Security Council 
that October 1990, rather than 1 January 1994, be determined as the commencement 
date of the temporal jurisdiction of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) to ensure that the massacres of 1991, 1992, and 1993 which preceded the 1994 
genocide to be included in the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR. For this reason also, 
the government of Cambodia proposed that the temporal jurisdiction of the 
Extraordinary Chambers commence at 1971 to encompass the period of the US 
bombing campaign in Cambodia, and the government of Sierra Leone requested that 
the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court be backdated to 1991, the beginning of 
the Sierra Leone conflict. 
In both Cambodia and Sierra Leone, the demands of the governments were put 
forward at a relatively late stage of the negotiations, and in the case of Cambodia as a 
                                                 
17 Statute of the Special Court, Art 1(2) and (3) 
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negotiating strategy. In both cases, the temporal jurisdictions remained as originally 
agreed: in Cambodia, from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979, the period of Khmer 
Rouge regime, and in Sierra Leone, beginning at 30 November 1996, the date of the 
Abidjan Peace Agreement18. 
 
1.6 The Organizational Structure of the Mixed Tribunals. 
Just as in the case of the ad hoc international tribunals, the mixed tribunals for Sierra 
Leone and Cambodia are conceived as "self-contained entities", with the Chambers, 
Prosecutor's Office, and the Registry forming part of one and the same structure. 
Unlike the former, however, they are distinguished by their mixed composition of 
national and international judges, prosecutors, and administrative support staff. 
The organizational structure of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is simple and 
minimalist in nature. It is composed of a Trial Chamber of three judges, of whom two 
are international, an Appeals Chamber of five judges, of whom three are international, 
and an international Prosecutor and a Registrar. A Management Committee consisting 
of the major donors to the Special Court was formed, though not as part of the 
institutional structure of the Court, to "assist the Secretary General in obtaining 
adequate funding and provide advice and policy direction on all non-judicial aspects of 
the operation of the Court, including questions of efficiency".19 
The Extraordinary Chambers, as conceived under the Agreement, is a two-tiered court 
composed of a Trial Chamber and a Supreme Court Chamber, with an additional Pre-
Trial Chamber constituted ad hoc to deal with eventual disagreements between the co-
prosecutors and the co-investigating judges. Both the Trial Chamber and the Pre-Trial 
Chamber are composed of five judges each, of who two are international, and the 
Supreme Court Chamber is composed of seven judges, of whom three are 
international judges20. The investigations are directed by two co-investigating judges: 
                                                 
18 The choice of the commencement date was justified by the Secretary General on the grounds that it would 
put the Sierra Leone conflict in perspective without unnecessarily extending the temporal jurisdiction of the 
Special Court and creating a heavy burden for the prosecution. 
19 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, Art 7. 
20 The numerical majority of Cambodian judges in the two Chambers and the likelihood of a decision-making 
process along nationality lines, created a need for a qualified, so-called "super-majority" vote, in which at least 
one foreign judge should have participated. An affirmative vote of a majority of judges plus one was, 
accordingly, required for any decision of the Trial Chamber and the Supreme Court Chamber, with the result 
that decisions which acquire a simple majority only would not be conclusive. Decisions on conviction, in 
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one Cambodian and one international, and the prosecution, by two co-prosecutors 
similarly composed. The Registry, or the Office of the Administration, is headed by a 
Cambodian Director and an international Deputy Director. 
In comparison to the skeletal structure of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the 
Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia, though less convoluted and heavily staffed 
that originally conceived, are layered with deadlock-breaking mechanisms designed to 
achieve an artificial balance between the national and international components, while 
maintaining the numerical majority of the former. With a majority of Cambodians 
judges and prosecutors, however, the Extraordinary Chambers are less credible, 
especially on the face of the weak and corrupted Cambodian justice system. 
 
1.7 The Relationship between the Law of the Mixed Tribunals and the Law 
of the Seat. 
With the establishment of the mixed tribunals in the state of the seat and the 
concurrent operation of an international and national jurisdictions, questions of 
conflict of laws were bound to arise. In Cambodia and Sierra Leone, the single most 
important question was the validity before the mixed tribunal of the amnesty granted 
under national law, and the extent of its applicability to the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.21 
 
1.7.1 Cambodia: the amnesty to Ieng Sary 
By a 1996 Decree signed by King Sihanouk, Ieng Sary was granted amnesty in respect 
of his conviction in 1979 trial on the charge of genocide, and for the crime of 
membership in the Khmer Rouge in violation of the 1994 Law on the Outlawing of 
the Democratic Kampuchea Group. 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular, adopted by a simple majority would be insufficient to convict, yet not enough to acquit, and in the 
circumstances would require the release of the accused. In the Pre-Trial Chamber, however, the situation is 
reversed, and on decisions to "investigate or prosecute", a "super majority vote" would be required to block an 
investigation or prosecution. In other words, a decision by a simple majority would have the effect of allowing 
the investigation or prosecution to process. 
21 In the case of Sierra Leone, the concurrent operation of both jurisdiction raised, also, the question of the 
relationship between the Special Court, an international law-created institution, and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, a national law-created body.  
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Refusing to revoke the amnesty on grounds of its constitutionality,22 the Cambodian 
government has undertaken in the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers not to request any further amnesty or pardon for persons falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Chambers.23 It thus implicitly sanctioned the validity of the amnesty 
already granted. For its part, the United Nations maintained that while the grant of 
amnesty is a matter of national sovereignty, its effects cannot expand to international 
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. It proposed that in 
addition to the future-oriented undertaking, it be stipulated in the Law that amnesty 
granted in respect of any of the international crimes falling within the jurisdiction of 
the Extraordinary Chambers shall not pose an obstacle to prosecution. The Law, as 
promulgated, contained no such provision. In reproducing Art 14 of the Law, the 
language of Art 11 of the Agreement refers to the single amnesty granted to Ieng Sary 
and provides that “the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia agree 
that the scope of this pardon is a matter to be decided by the Extraordinary 
Chambers”. Amnesty was thus recognized, in principle, subject to the court 
determination of its scope, validity, and applicability in the circumstances.  
 
1.7.2 Sierra Leone: the amnesty to Foday Sankoh and the membership of the RUF 
Under the Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999 concluded between the government of 
Sierra Leone and the RUF, “absolute and free pardon” was granted to Foday Sankoh 
in person, and to the collectivity of combatants and collaborators “in respect of 
anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives”. In that connection also, the 
government has undertaken not to take any legal action against any member of the 
rebel group “in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives” since 
March 1991 and until the signing of the Agreement24. The Special Representative of 
the Secretary General who signed the Agreement as witness on behalf of the United 
Nations, appended a disclaimer to his signature which stated that the amnesty 
provision under the Agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, 
                                                 
22 Arts 27 and 90 of the Consitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia state, respectively, that the King has the 
right to grant amnesties and the Assembly, the power to approve amnesty laws. 
23 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers. 
24 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra 
Leone, Lomé, 1999 UN Doc S/1999/777, Art IX. 
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crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of humanitarian 
international law25. This position was later endorsed by the Security Council in its 
resolution 1315 of 2000. 
With the incorporation of the Lomé Agreement in the Sierra Leone Special Court 
(Ratification) Act 1999, the amnesty clause it contained became part of the law of the 
land. In the Statute of the Special Court, however, it was explicitly invalidated in 
respect of the international crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court.26 A dual 
approach was thus adopted to the question of amnesty and its validity depending on 
the nature of the crimes, the time of their commission, and the jurisdiction before 
which they would be prosecutable. Accordingly, amnesty would bar the prosecution of 
any crimes, whether national or international, before the national courts of Sierra 
Leone; it would also bar the prosecution of the Special Court of common crimes 
committed before 1999. Amnesty, however, would not bar the prosecution before the 
Special Court of international crimes committed at any time within its temporal 
jurisdiction, and of common crimes committed after 1999. 
In the negotiations on the establishment of the Special Court and the Extraordinary 
Chambers, the United Nations sought to define in retrospect the lawful contours of 
the amnesty granted and limit its effect to common crimes and crimes against the state 
(e.g. insurrection and coup d’état). It sought above all to establish legal and moral 
standards for UN cooperation in the establishment of any UN-assisted mixed 
jurisdiction. Its success or otherwise, in any given case, would be a test of the strength 
of its negotiating position. 
 
1.8 The UN-Administrated courts in Kosovo and East Timor. 
At the time when the UN Secretariat was negotiating the establishment of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia, the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) established the 
"Panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences"27, and the United 
                                                 
25 Report of the Secretary General, S/2000/915. 
26 Art 10 of the Statute provides: “An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to 
prosecution”. 
27 On the Special Panels in East Timor, see Chapter (…) 
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Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) introduced throughout 
the courts of Kosovo a system of mixed composition of judges, prosecutors, and 
defense counsel.28 
Commonly associated with the mixed tribunals for Sierra Leone and for Cambodia 
because of the apparent similarities in their mixed jurisdiction and composition, the 
UN-administered courts in Kosovo and East Timor were significantly different in the 
circumstances of their establishment and the legislative process by which they were 
born. 
The UN Administration for Kosovo and East Timor were established almost in 
parallel by Security Council Resolution 1244 and 1272 of 1999 to administer in 
circumstances of post-conflict societies, the territory of Kosovo pending a final 
determination of its status, and the territory of East Timor in transition to 
independence. The UN Administrations, entrusted with a comprehensive mandate for 
humanitarian, governance, economic reconstruction, and sustainable development, 
were endowed with all embracing legislative and administrative powers, including the 
administration of justice. In the case of East Timor, in particular, UNTAET was also 
required by Resolution 1272 to bring to justice those responsible for serious violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in East Timor in the 
aftermath of the 30 August 1999 popular consultation. The UN Transitional 
Administrations inherited in both territories a virtually non-existent, devastated 
administration of justice, left practically decapitated with the massive flight of core 
members of the legal profession, judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and court 
administrators of Serb and Indonesian origin, respectively. 
 
1.8.1 The Special Panes of Judges in East Timor 
Faced with the challenge and inspired by the model of the mixed tribunals for 
Cambodia and Sierra Leone, UNTAET promulgated Regulation 2000/15 ("On the 
Establishment of Panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious offences"). The 
Regulation establishes mixed panels of judges within the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals in Dili, with exclusive jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, war crimes, 
                                                 
28 On the internationalized courts in Kosovo, see Chapter 4. 
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and crimes against humanity29, and a selected number of common crimes committed 
between 1 January and 25 October 1999. Each Panel is composed of three judges, of 
whom two are international and one are East Timorese, and a panel of five judges 
composed of three international and two East Timorese may be established in the 
Appeals Courts in cases of special importance or gravity. The prosecution is 
conducted by the Serious Crimes Unit – a mixed composition unit operating as part of 
UNTAET and its successor mission UNMISET (United Nations Mission of Support 
in East Timor) under the authority of the General Prosecutor. No separate Registry 
was envisaged for the Special Panels, which like the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals are serviced by the existing court management. Established by UNTAET 
Regulation, the "Special Panels of Judges" were part of the existing court system of 
East Timor throughout the transitional period and post-independence. 
 
1.8.2 Mixed composition of judges and prosecutors in the courts of Kosovo 
The attempt by UNMIK to establish a Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court 
("KWECC") as a special court of mixed composition and excusive jurisdiction over 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and other ethnically motivated 
crimes, failed for a number of reasons. However, the prospects of conducting complex 
prosecution or war crimes and crimes against humanity in a post-conflict Kosovaran 
society before ethnic Albanian dominated courts - in an atmosphere of fear and 
intimidation threatening the impartiality and independence of the judiciary - compelled 
the introduction into the existing court system of an international component of 
judges and prosecutors. It would have been their task to train and monitor the local 
judges, enhance the existing standards of justice, and remedy a widely spread 
preoccupation of a biased judicial process. 
International judges and prosecutors were, accordingly, appointed or assigned on an 
as-needed basis or at the request of the prosecutor, the defense, or the accused to take 
part in a judicial or prosecutorial process of serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law under the applicable Kosovo Criminal Code. A mixed 
                                                 
29 The definition of the crimes, with the exception of the crime of genocide, incorporates almost literally the 
definition of the crimes Ander the ICC Statute (Arts 7 and 8), not in force at the time of their alleged 
commission. It pays little relevance in the realities of East Timor, or their customary or conventional 
international law nature. 
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composition of international judges and prosecutors was first introduced through 
UNMIK Regulation 2000/6 in the district court of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica as a response 
to the ethnic violence in the divided city. It was further extended throughout the 
courts of Kosovo by Regulation 2000/34 on the Appointment and Removal from 
Office of International Judges and Prosecutors. Regulation 2000/64 on the assignment 
of International Judges and Prosecutors, empowers the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, upon a petition by a prosecutor, an accused, or defense counsel, to 
appoint an international prosecutor, an international judge on Assignment of 
International Judges and Prosecutors, empowers the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General, upon a petition by a prosecutor, an international judge, or a panel 
of three judges, of whom at least two are international (the so-called "Regulation 64 
Panels"). 
The success of the Kosovo "mixed courts" was only partial. The limited number of 
international judges, their sporadic allocation to cases, and their marginal influence on 
decisions taken by a majority of local judges led in many cases to unequal treatment of 
defendants, and contributed little to the professional quality of the judicial process or 
its standards of justice. Their very presence in the courts of Kosovo, however, 
dispelled, in part at least, a perception of bias and judicial partiality.30 
 
1.9 The diversity of mixed tribunal: the search for a model of jurisdiction. 
For all the similarities between the mixed tribunals in their subject matter jurisdiction, 
their mixed international and national composition, and their linkage to the United 
Nations, no single model of internationalized jurisdiction has yet emerged. Different in 
the historical-political circumstances of their establishment, the mixed tribunals differ 
mainly in their legal nature and the nature of their founding instrument. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, by far the professed model of any UN-assisted 
mixed jurisdiction, was established by Agreement between the United Nations and the 
government of Sierra Leone, having the legal status of an international treaty-based 
organ. The Extraordinary Chambers were established by law, and although technically 
within the existing court system of Cambodia, they are, in fact, a self-contained court 
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with a separate organizational structure of judges, prosecutors, and court managers, 
whose operation is conditioned in its entirety on the implementation of the Agreement 
between the United Nations and the government. The mixed composition panels in 
the UN-administered territories are established by law or Regulation having the same 
effect. Operating under national law and as par of the existing court system, their legal 
status is that of national courts, their mixed composition and jurisdiction 
notwithstanding. 
The choice of the founding instrument, in the case of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia, was political. In the negotiating 
process on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Council 
Members, the Management Committee, the UN Secretariat and the government were 
united by a vision of an international law created mixed tribunal, of substantial 
international component, operating in full respect for international standards of justice. 
In the case of Cambodia, a divided approach made it possible for the government to 
impose a national-law created tribunal composed predominantly of Cambodian 
nationals having a majority vote in all organs of the court, yet funded in its entirety by 
international funds. In the case of the UN-administered territories, the choice of the 
founding instrument was imposed by the nature of the UN Administration acting as 
the de facto government. No negotiating process preceded the establishment of the 
mixed composition panels for East Timor and Kosovo, and no political constraints 
inhibited the sole judicial discretionary power of the UN Transitional Administrator.  
The diversity of mixed jurisdictions imposed by the specificities of each post-conflict 
situation has shifted the focus on the discussion from a search for a model jurisdiction 
to setting the benchmarks for UN cooperation in the establishment of a mixed 
jurisdiction. While the terms of the UN mandate and the choice of the constitutive 
instrument is ultimately a political choice, it remains the Secretariat's preference that a 
UN-assisted mixed jurisdiction be established as a treaty-based organ, whose 
applicable law and rules of procedure and evidence are primarily international, whose 
organizational substantial with a majority of international judges, an international 
component is substantial with a majority of international judges, an international 
Prosecutor, and a Registrar. Should a national law containing the same international 
features be chosen as the mixed-tribunal founding instrument, it should be annexed to 
 32 
the Agreement and made an integral part thereof to ensure that it is not unilaterally 
amended by the government. 
But whatever may have been the legal nature of its constitutive instrument, the success 
of any mixed tribunal will ultimately depend on the readiness of the government to 
comply with its orders and requests, and on the cooperation of third states their 
willingness to sustain its operation through funds and personnel. For the community 
of donors, however, to be willing to contribute, it must be convinced that the mixed 
tribunals is independent, free from political interference, and affords guarantees of 
fairness, objectivity, and impartiality of the legal process. For the United Nations, the 
success of any mixed tribunal established in partnership with the national 
administration of justice will be measured also by its legacy of enhanced international 
standards of justice and a generation of skilled judges and prosecutors trained in the 
principles and procedures of international criminal justice. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE UNDER SCRUTINY 
 
2.1 Brief history of the conflict 
In 1991, a partly indigenous rebel group invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia and 
plunged the country into a decade-long civil war. When a cease-fire was finally 
declared at the end of January 2002, Sierra Leone had seen a bloodless and popular 
military coup in 1992, elections in 1996 with much of the country still in rebel hands,a 
violent and bloody military coup in 1997, a partial restoration of the government in 
1998, and multi-faction violence until the end of disarmament and the official 
declaration of peace.  
Several theories have attempted to explain the brutal conflict in Sierra Leone:  
 
1. Some argue that Sierra Leone had become a “failed state,” or that the conflict 
was a crisis in government mainly driven by years of one-party rule and a small 
ruling elite’s exploitation of the country, widespread corruption and lack of 
accountability, and the disempowerment and militarization of youth.  
2. Some believe that the conflict was driven by various internal factions wanting 
control of the country’s rich diamond mines.  
3. Some postulate that the conflict was a proxy war driven by the personal political 
agendas of Charles Taylor, then-president of Liberia, and Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, 
presidentof Libya.  
4. Some feel that the war was a subtle ethnic conflict betweenthe Mende-
dominated Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the Temne-dominated All 
People’s Congress (APC).  
 
All of these factors likely contributed to the conflict. 
Sierra Leone is a small West African nation that occupies 71,740 square kilometers 
between Guinea and Liberia. Although no census has been conducted recently, the 
population is approximately 5 million, with an under-five mortality rate of 284 per 
1,000 and a life expectancy of merely 34 years. The country has exceptionally rich 
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diamond mines in the Eastern district of Kono, near the Liberian border. First named 
“Sierra Leone” by Portuguese explorers in the  fifteenth century, the British 
subsequently designated Freetown, the area that became the nation’s capital, as a 
location for resettling freed slaves following the abolition of slavery in 1807. The main 
ethnic groups are descendants of the freed slaves - the Krios (10%), based largely in 
Freetown; the Temne (30%), based mostly in the North; and the Mende (30%), based 
primarilyinthe South. The country is predominantly Muslim (60%), but the Krios are 
mostly Christian, and many throughout the country also maintain traditional religious 
beliefs. While English is the official language, Temne and Mende are the main 
vernacular languages and nearly everyone understands Krio. The territory was held as a 
British colony until 1961, when independence was declared and power was transferred 
tothe Sierra Leonean people. 
On March 23, 1991, about 100 fighters calling themselves the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) crossed the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone. The RUF was led by 
FodaySankoh and allegedly acted in concert with Charles Taylor, then warlord and 
later president of Liberia. It has been suggested that Taylor backed the RUF financially 
to gain access to Sierra Leone’s diamond reserves and destabilize the country. But 
some suggest that he was motivated by Sierra Leone’s support of the Nigerian-led 
ECOMOG offensive against his forces in 1990, which thwarted his claims on 
Monrovia. Taylor infamously declared in 1990 that “Sierra Leone would taste the 
bitternessof war”. 
For the next decade, Sierra Leone was split into various faction alignments, all of 
which engaged in systematic war crimes. The National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC) kept the RUF from reaching Freetown, but lost and failed to win back 
substantial regions of the country, including the diamond and mining areas. The war 
rarely involved pitched battles or traditional troop manoeuvres, but mainly consisted 
of factions trading off control over villages, which resulted in massive human rights 
abuses against civilians. On some occasions, individuals served as soldiers“fighting” 
the rebels during the day and looting with them at night. This phenomenon was 
common enough to make the term “sobel” (a combinationof “soldier” and“rebel”) 
part of common parlance. The NPRC hired mercenaries from abroad who, with the 
help of citizens’ militias, managed to weaken much of the RUF’s military strength. In 
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1996, the country had its firs tmultiparty elections in decades, but the occasion was 
marked by brutal violence, including forced amputation of limbs to deter voting. The 
SLPP won the elections and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became president. In November 
1996, Kabbah and the RUF signed the Abidjan Peace Accord. However, violence 
escalated almost immediately, and within a year the peace had collapsed completely. In 
May 1997, Kabbah was overthrown in an exceptionally violent coup by breakaway 
army officers who freed Corporal Johnny Paul Koroma (in prison for an attempted 
coup), installed him as the new leader, and made him head of the recently formed 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). After years of blurring the distinction 
between soldier and rebel, the AFRC had close relationships with the RUF, and one of 
Koroma’s first acts was to invite the RUF to come to Freetown and join his 
government. The new regime was deeply unpopular with the majority of the 
population, and the international community never recognized it. In February 1998, a 
combination of Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops and civilian militias restored Kabbah’s 
government to power in the Western Area, even though much of the country 
remained in rebel hands. The government formalized the citizens’ militias, based 
loosely on traditional hunting societies, into the Civilian Defense Forces (CDF), which 
was put under the charge of Chief Sam Hinga Norman. While the CDF committed 
fewer atrocities than the RUF and was less likely to  resort to sexual violence, Human 
Rights Watch and other groups documented rising incidences of systematic abuses 
from all factions as the war continued. 
The war went on as a standoff for much of 1998, but in January 1999 the rebels and 
ex-soldiers, led by the AFRC, returned to Freetown in “Operation No Living Thing,” 
which became one of the bloodiest weeks of the decade, leaving 5,000 dead and much 
of the city destroyed. This invasion  was turned back by Nigerian ECOMOG troops, 
who in turn committed atrocities. After six more months of fighting throughout the 
country, all factions agreed to a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, in July 1999. The 
Lomé Peace Agreement remains a matter of controversy. Some feel it was a diplomatic 
failure in which international actors allowed Charles Taylor to dictate the terms of the 
peace, despite his close links to the RUF. Others argue that it was the only option in a 
desperate situation. In any case, the final agreement included an amnesty for all 
fighters from all factions for all crimes, 18 as well as a power-sharing agreement in 
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which Foday Sankoh was made Chairman of the Strategic Mineral Resources 
Commission, granting him formal authority over the country’s diamonds and other 
natural resources. The agreement also required that all Nigerian troops leave Sierra 
Leone, even though they had presented the key barrier to RUF advances. Within days 
of the last ECOMOG troop departures in May 2000, the RUF took hostage 500 UN 
peacekeepers and confiscated their weapons. Weeks later, rebels closed in on 
Freetown, and 800 British paratroopers were deployed to evacuate citizens and secure 
parts of the Western Area. The British eventually freed the hostages, and the last ones 
were released by August. The May 2000 incidents signalled the return to low-intensity 
conflict throughout the country, which lasted until a newcease-fire was reached in 
November, but human rights violations continued. The RUF controlled much of the 
country, including strategic diamond regions, and had their headquarters in Makeni, 
less than 200 kilometers from Freetown. However, by spring 2000, the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) had been established, 22 and it was to become 
the largest peacekeeping force in the world, with 17,500 personnel at its height and an 
eventual budget of approximately US $ 700 million per year. UNAMSIL’s mandate 
included disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). By the second half of 
2001, UNAMSIL’s DDR program had processed more than 45,000 combatants, and 
by January the war was officially declared over pursuant to a weapon-burning 
ceremony. Four months later, the country witnessed peaceful and relatively fair 
elections in which the Kabbah’s SLPP captured 70 per cent of the vote, while the APC 
won 20 per cent.  
While these developments raised hopes for lasting peace, security experts in the region 
noted that the root causes of the conflict remained. Charles Taylor retained power in 
Liberia with the same incentives to launch proxy wars, despite being hampered by 
international sanctions and an internal war. The army remained largely oyal to Johnny 
Paul Koroma, who received more than 90 per cent of the military personnel vote in 
the May 2002 elections. Chief Sam Hinga Norman retained the loyalty of the 
Kamajors (traditional hunters), the core group of the CDF, and was rumoured to be in 
close contact with President Conte of Guinea and a major recruiter for the Liberian 
rebel faction, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy. At present, Sierra 
Leone has not fully stabilized, despite second presidential elections were held in (…) 
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2007. Large numbers of ex-combatant youth remain disempowered and without 
economic opportunity while becoming ever more militarized, and the SLPP shows few 
signs of progress on corruption or non-ethnic governance. As a result, foreign 
investment in Sierra Leone remains minimal. The economy, much of which had built 
up around donor assistance and an expatriate community in Freetown, is suffering 
significant difficulties and inflation.  
 
2.2 Nature of the atrocities 
A number of groups documented atrocities in Sierra Leone throughout the 1990s, 
including Human Rights Watch, the Campaign for Good Governance, and other non 
governmental organizations. Although there is general agreement that the crimes in 
Sierra Leone do not amount to genocide, they did constitute serious violations of the 
laws and customs of war and crimes against humanity. During the war, more than two 
million people were forced to flee their homes, collecting in crowded internally 
displaced person camps around Freetown or in dangerous refugee camps along the  
volatile Guinean and Liberian borders. Forced displacement was the most prevalent 
violation during the war. Sexual and gender-based violence was the most reported 
form of human rights abuse in Sierra Leone. Even before the establishment of the 
Special Court, Human Rights Watch concluded that sexual violence in Sierra Leone 
amounted to crimes against humanity. Of more than 1,800 victims of sexual violence 
who sought medical attention from Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without 
Borders) between 1997 and 1999, 55 per cent reported being gang raped and more 
than 200 were pregnant. Human Rights Watch has also documented patterns of 
abduction, molestation, sexual slavery, and insertion of foreign objects into genital 
openings. According to Physicians for Human Rights, more than half the women who 
came into contact with the RUF suffered some form of sexual violence. Charges 
against all factions, but particularly against the RUF and AFRC, include rape of girls 
and women of all ages, and sexual slavery where women were forced to travel with 
armed factions; suffered regular rape; and bore the euphemistic title “bush-wife.” The 
sexual violence was intended to keep the civilian population in fear and destroy 
traditional community norms and systems of order.  
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Killings were also widespread. It is estimated that perhaps up to 100,000 people were 
killed during the conflict. Execution was used to install terror and obedience among 
the civilian population and within the forces themselves. The Sierra Leone conflict is 
also known for the widespread use of child soldiers in the AFRC, RUF, and CDF. It is 
estimated that up to 7,000 children fought in this war. UNICEF estimates that more 
than 300,000 children were actively involved in armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa 
during the late 1990s. Moreover, many of these children (and many adults) were 
forcibly conscripted. In the most common scenario, combatants stormed into a home, 
killed one family member, and forced a young male to kill another relative. The 
combatants were often drugged on a regular basis, particularly before going into battle, 
with a substance locally known as “brownbrown” that is thought to be a combination 
of heroin and cocaine or gun powder. The goal was to eradicate a sense of family or 
community to which young men could return, so that their only means of survival was 
with the faction and commanders, who became like surrogate parents or  community 
elders. Another notorious atrocity in Sierra Leone was the intentional amputation of 
hands and feet or arms and legs. The RUF and the AFRC committed most of these 
crimes. Most of the victims, estimated by the International Coalition for the Red Cross 
(ICRC) at 4,000, died from their injuries, but approximately 1,000 survived. Other 
forms of mutilation, including cutting off  noses, ears, and lips, were also common, 
and acts of cannibalism, particularly by the Kamajors, have been documented. The war 
also resulted in the large-scale destruction of property, including the RUF’s ransacking 
of Eastern Freetown in 1999. Kono and Kailahun suffered the most destruction. 
 
2.3 Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The Lomé Peace Agreement granted anamnesty for crimes committed by all parties 
and referred to the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission(TRC). 
Although the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General present at the 
signing was not a party to the Agreement, he later appended a handwritten reservation 
to the amnesty stating that the UN would not recognize amnesty for “international 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations 
of international law.” For a while, it seemed as if the proposed TRC would be the only 
transitional justice mechanism available to address the human rights violations 
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committed during the conflict. Civil society activists strongly supported the 
Commission as a way to ensure a measure of accountability. Legislation governing its 
establishment was passed in February 2000. The TRC was mandated to create an 
impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international 
humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone; ... to address impunity, 
to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to 
prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered31. Preparatory activities 
began in March 2002, and commissioners were sworn in during July. The TRC worked 
for about two years and handed over its final report to the president in October 2004. 
However, shortly after the Lomé Peace Agreement, fighting re-erupted. In course of 
the attempted rescue of the UN peacekeepers taken hostage in May 2000, RUF leader 
Foday Sankoh was taken into custody. The government feared that a national trial of 
Sankoh and his co-conspirators would aggravate the conflict and fuel RUF desires to 
move on Freetown to disrupt the proceedings. Accordingly, on June 12, 2000, 
President Kabbah wrote to the Secretary-General requesting the assistance of the 
international community in creating a court to try senior RUF officers. The Security 
Council viewed the taking of the peacekeepers hostage as a direct attack on the UN 
and felt obliged toassist in the prosecution of the perpetrators. However, the Security 
Council and the Secretariat took strongly opposing views on how to accomplish this in 
light of the ICTY’s and ICTR’s financial drain on UN resources.  
For example:  
• The Secretariat supported assessed funding, arguing that voluntary contributions 
would be dangerously uncertain, while the Council insisted the opposite;  
• The Secretariat argued in favour of granting the Special Court enforcement powers 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while the Council did not;  
• The Secretariat wanted personal jurisdiction over “those most responsible,” rather 
than the narrower “those who bear the greatest responsibility” proposed by the 
Council. 
Negotiations came to a standstill, but eventually it was agreed that the Special Court 
would be established by treaty rather than by resolution so that it could proceed 
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without committing UN members to funding. The Court would function 
independently from the UN bureaucracy, be subject to the oversight of a 
“Management Committee,” and have to raise its own funds. With this financial 
compromise, the Court’s operations were significantly scaled down and the Security 
Council prevailed on each of the above points of disagreement. InAugust, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1315, requesting the “Secretary-General to negotiate an 
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special 
court consistent with this resolution [ . . .].32” While the Resolution “reiterate[s] that 
the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security in the region,” unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court was not 
established according to the Council’s Chapter VII authority, but by an international 
agreement whose negotiation was requested by the Security Council. After 17 months 
of negotiations, in January 2002, the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone finally 
signed the Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(Special Court Agreement), including as anannex the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. This signing took place two days before President Kabbah declared the 
official end of the war. In January 2002, the Secretary-General sent a planning mission 
to Sierra Leone to discuss with the government, non governmental organizations, and 
other groups arrangements for the creation and operation of the Special Court, 
including the selection of the premises; the structure, functions, and staffing; and the 
Court’s relationship with the TRC. In its report, released in March 2002, the mission 
concluded that the local resources needed for the Court’s operation were either “non-
existent or extremely scarce.33” The mission noted, however, that while “not 
experienced in the relevant fields of international criminal law,” the local members of 
the legal professions “could render an important contribution to the work andsuccess 
of the Special Court” with training. The mission proposed that, according to the 
Statute, the Special Court would be staffed by international and Sierra Leonean judges 
and personnel. The report also argued that given the limited duration and budget and 
voluntary financing, the Court would need “an exceptionally clear and well-defined 
prosecutorial strategy.”  Three months later, in accordance with the Statute, the 
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Secretary-General appointed Robin Vincent from the United Kingdom as Registrar 
and David Crane of the United States as the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor and Registrar 
arrived separately inJuly and August 2002 with less than half a dozen staff to begin 
setting up the offices. On July 26, 2002, the Secretary-General announced the 
appointments for the three trial and five appellate judges, three of whom were 
nominated by the Government of Sierra Leone. 
As a result, the Special Court emerged from a unique convergence of a government 
eager for justice in the wake of a failed amnesty, yet unable to conduct the trials itself, 
and an international community anxious to stabilize the region by removing those who 
threatened the peace. The international community also wanted to implement a new 
model that would serve as an alternative to the ad hoc tribunals. Despite these 
serendipitous factors, the Special Court faced challenges. The strong U.S. presence at 
the outset was difficult, as general anti-American sentiment around the world 
intensified due to foreign policy developments in Iraq and elsewhere. Concerns over 
this subsided with time and with a reduction of the U.S. role in the Office of the 
Prosecutor. In addition, some within the UN felt that the Court presented a challenge 
for UN oversight. Currently the Court is more likely to be evaluatedon whether it 
delivers viable justice to the satisfaction of Sierra Leoneans and the international 
community. The criteria that will guide this evaluation are discussed below. It is worth 
noting that one of the main motivations behind the Special Court’s establishment was 
a desire by the Government of Sierra Leone and the international community to 
stabilize the country. The government wanted the RUF leadership tried without the 
instability that would result from national trials. The international community wanted 
to prosecute those responsible  for attacks on UN peacekeepers. While the evaluation 
criteria have since changed to encompass notions of legacy and promoting the ruleof 
law, the Special Court was originally conceptualized as central to redressing security 
concerns. 
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2.4 Legal framework 
2.4.1 Jurisdiction 
The Agreement on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as concluded by the Sierra 
Leone Government and the UN, was formally signed by both parties at a ceremony in 
Freetown on January 16, 2002. The most notable feature of Court is a reference in its 
Statute to investigating and trying only “those who bear the greatest responsibility,” 
which has become a catch phrase of public discourse in Sierra Leone. As mentioned 
above, the Secretariat initially wanted the Court to have jurisdiction to prosecute 
“those most responsible,” but the Security Council wanted to limit the Court’s scope 
and demanded a change. This aims to focus the prosecution on the key players, rather 
than lesser actors. This phrase has not been more clearly defined and opens the door 
to considerable prosecutorial discretion. Under Article 6(2), no official position, 
including that of Head of State, exempts a person from criminal responsibility or 
punishment. The Special Court has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity34, serious 
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions35,  intentional direction of 
attacks against humanitarian or peacekeeping personnel36, conscription of children into 
armed forces or groups37,  and a few select aspects of Sierra Leonean law relating to 
the abuse of girls and arson38. The Report of the  Secretary-General explains that 
genocide was not included because of lack of evidence that killing was perpetrated in 
Sierra Leone “against an identified national, ethnic, racial or religious group with an 
intent to annihilate the group as such.39” Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1948 are also excluded, largely because the conflict was seen as domestic and grave 
breaches apply only to international conflicts. The inclusion of domestic crimes in the 
Statute has been attributed to various factors. In part it is an attempt to legitimize and 
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revitalize the existing domestic legal system, which many saw as complex and 
inaccessible40.  It has also been attributed to gaps in international criminal law 
regarding arson and crimes against girls and an attempt to ground the Court in the 
specific circumstances of the Sierra Leone conflict. Some suggest that including 
domestic crimes was a diplomatic gesture to the Sierra Leone legal profession. 
However, the decision not to include  violations of domestic law in the indictments 
may be pragmatic in view of potential complications arising out of, for example, the 
Lomé Peace Agreement and adjustments to the rules of procedure and evidence that 
may have been necessary for prosecutions under domestic law. 
The territorial jurisdiction of the Special Court is limited to trying “crimes committed 
in the  territory of Sierra Leone,”  but this has been interpreted to include acts planned 
or instigated outside Sierra Leone, the effects of which are felt within the territorial 
jurisdiction. The Special Court enjoys primacy over domestic Sierra Leonean courts, 
although, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, this primacy does not extend to courts of other 
states. The Court’s temporal jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed after 
November 30, 1996, the date of the Abidjan Peace Accord. Several dates were 
considered and this was the earliest, although most Sierra Leoneans find it strange that 
the jurisdiction does not stretch to 1991, when the war began. However, some policy-
makers argued that going back to 1991 would make it difficult for the prosecution to 
produce solid evidence for decade-old crimes and impossible for the court to complete 
its work in three years. The truncated time frame leaves out the NPRC regime and the 
foundational period of the RUF, but most of the key individuals involved in the  early 
1990s remained criminally engaged after 1996. One problem is that most crimes were 
committed in the provinces, and the conflict reached Freetown only in 1997. The 
worst of the crimes in the provinces were committed earlier, and some have argued 
that it “sends the wrong signal” that the crimes under scrutiny affected the people of 
Freetown41. The temporal jurisdiction includes periods of time covered by the amnesty 
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of the Lomé Peace Agreement, namely crimes committed prior to July 1999. 
Moreover, there is an express provision in the Statute asserting that amnesty shall not 
be a bar to prosecution with respect to international crimes (Art 10). The prosecution 
of crimes under domestic law covered by the Lomé Peace Agreement is generally 
considered impossible, but to date this has not been tested (although a challenge to the 
amnesty under domestic law could be envisaged, none has been mounted to date). 
More generally, the Prosecutor has  chosen not to exercise his power to prosecute 
under domestic law. The Special Court can prosecute any person “who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparationor execution” of the international crimes mentioned above42. The category 
of “aided and abetted,” coupled with public statements from the Prosecutor, fuelled 
early speculation that financiers, including diamond or arms dealers, could face 
indictments under the Special Court. For example, the indictment against Charles 
Taylor involved charges including profiting from the war and allegations of command 
responsibility43. However, no one has been indicted only for financing the war. 
 
2.4.2 Rules of Procedure 
The applicable Rules of Procedure and Evidence are based on those of the ICTR, with 
amendments that were made over the judges’ subsequent plenaries. The Statute (Art 
14) specifies that the judges may be guided in amendments by the Sierra Leone 
Criminal Procedure Act 1965, but most of the amendments seem to have been 
motivated by a desire to expedite the procedures of  the ad hoc tribunals, rather than 
being based on domestic law. The system operable before the Special Court has cut 
out some of the civil law–oriented amendments that were made in the rules of the ad 
hoc tribunals; thus, it is essentially closer to the common law. Most of the judges have 
common law backgrounds and have resisted certain practices, such as reliance on 
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written statements in lieu of oral testimony44. In general, the emphasis has been on 
witness testimony rather than documentary evidence.  
Major points of difference include allowing the Court to exercise its functions away 
fromSierra Leone, a rule used frequently by the Appeals Chamber (Rule 4); a rule that 
allows for closed sessions for national security or the security of the Special Court 
(Rule 79); the deletion of the prima facie standard of proof for confirmation of the 
indictment(Rule 47); a general reduction of time limits for filings (Rule 50 on 
preliminary motions, Rule 111 on appeals); a rule that allows the accused to be 
handcuffed in court (Rule 83); some differences in the rules of disclosure, such as less 
duty for the Prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence (Rule 68); abbreviated rules of 
evidence, without a Rule for the Chamber to call its own evidence; and more reliance 
on oral evidence.  
One controversial change was to make the Appellate Chamber in effect the court of 
first and last resort on all preliminary motions raising serious jurisdictional issues45. 
This provoked condemnation from human rights groups, including Amnesty 
International, on the grounds that it deprives the accused of their right to appeal (most 
other aspects of the rules have not provoked any serious criticism). The rules are more 
streamlined than those of the ICTY and ICTR and may become a reference point for 
future courts. They were initially relied on as the framework for Rules for the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal, although these subsequently took a different direction. On the other 
hand, the Special Court relies heavily on eyewitness testimony, and its rules are less 
elaborate than those of other tribunals in terms of how to deal with voluminous 
documentary evidence. 
 
2.4.3 Jurisprudence 
The Special Court has already confronted several significant legal questions, most of 
which relate to motions that challenge jurisdiction.  
• Relationship with domestic law. Defence Counsel brought preliminary motions 
questioning whether the establishment of the Special Court violates the Sierra Leonean 
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Constitution. The Appeals Chamber dismissed the motions, holding that as its creation 
was based on a valid treaty, the Special Court is acting under international law and 
independent of Sierra Leonean domestic law, as made clear in the report of the 
Secretary General, and hence the Constitution does not apply. An important result was 
demonstrating that judges consider the Special Court to be entirely international. 
Nonetheless, a challenge to the Court’s legality was subsequently filed before Sierra 
Leone’s Supreme Court, but was dismissed.  
• Recruitment of child soldiers a crime under customary international law in 1996. On May 31, 
2004, the Appeals Chamber held that the recruitment or use of children under the age 
of 15 was a crime under international law in 1996 and that defendants are subject to 
individual criminal responsibility for this offence during the entire period covered by 
the court’s jurisdiction46. The Court relied on international instruments such as the 
1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. The Court noted that by 
1996 Sierra Leone had ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which call for the 
protection of children under 15 from the effects of war, as well as two Additional 
Protocols of 1977 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which 
prohibit the recruitment of child soldiers47. It also held that violation of these 
fundamental guarantees leads to individual criminal liability. A dissenting judge argued 
that the prohibition on recruitment of child soldiers emerged later, when the Rome 
Statute of the ICC came intoforce.  
• Head of state immunity in Taylor case. On May 31, 2004, the Appeals Chamber ruled that 
heads of state are not immune from prosecution before an international criminal 
tribunal or court, unanimously rejecting Charles Taylor’s preliminary motion to 
challenge the validity of his indictment on the grounds that he was president of Liberia 
at the time it was issued. In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that the Special 
Court is an international criminal court because of the UN’s role in its creation48. This 
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brought it within the exception to sovereign immunity laid out in DRC v.Belgium 
(Yerodia)49.  
• Invalidity of the amnesty in respect of international crimes. According to the Appeals 
Chamber, the amnesty granted under the Lomé PeaceAgreement does not bar the 
Court from prosecuting international crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
before July 1999. The Appeals Chamber ruled that the amnesty applies only to national 
criminal jurisdiction and cannot cover international crimes, over which states may 
exercise universal jurisdiction50.  
It remains to be seen how far other courts will rely on these decisions, as the legal 
reasoning has not always been elaborate and has been criticized by some legal experts. 
So far the Appeals Chamber has often relied on common law precedent, as most of 
the judges derive from common law jurisdictions, but jurisprudence from the other 
international tribunals has also been used, as was anticipated in the Statute51. In its first 
year the Court’s decisions were not widely available or posted on its website. 
Important decisions are now readily available, although motions from the parties, such 
as the pre-trial motions, are still not posted. It is also difficult to systematically track 
the development of certain legal issues. In this respect, the Special Court has not 
performed as well as the other ad hoc tribunals in terms of transparency. 
 
2.4 The Judges of the Special Court 
The Special Court was originally composed of two Chambers - a Trial Chamber of 
three judges and an Appeals Chamber of five judges. A second Trial Chamber has now 
been established, at the request of the President, in accordance withthe Statute52. The 
Trial Chambers each comprise two judges appointed by the Secretary-General and one 
appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Appellate Chamber contains three 
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judges appointed by the Secretary-General and two by the Government of Sierra 
Leone53.  
The judges hail from Sri Lanka, the UK, Nigeria, Cameroon, Austria, Canada, Uganda, 
Samoa, Northern Ireland, and Sierra Leone. The national and international appointees 
were hired at the level of Under-Secretary-General of the UN for three-year terms and 
are provided with transportation and close protection officers. Currently three are 
women and five of the eleven judges are African, including two Sierra Leoneans. 
However, the Sierra Leonean government chose to nominate two internationals out of 
its four nominations. This has contributed to the  perception that the Special Court is 
mostly international, rather than a true hybrid institution.  
Recruitment via the Office of Legal Affairs in New York has often been slow. In fact, 
when the Special Court requested a second Trial Chamber in March 2003, it took a full 
year for the chamber to be established. It has also been difficult to get quality 
candidates to apply, despite the fact that the salaries in Sierra Leone are much higher 
than in Timor-Leste or Kosovo, where other hybrid courts are in operation.  
Several legal motions have been filed regarding recusal of judges. For example, defense 
counsel in the RUF case brought a motion for the recusal of Judge Robertson on the 
basis of his book, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice. Counsel 
argued that Robertson had prejudged certain central issues in the case and that the 
book read like a verdict before trial54. Moreover, it was argued there would be the 
appearance of bias if Robertson sat on RUF cases because he had an interest in finding 
them guilty, as determining otherwise would raise doubts about the accuracy of his 
book. Controversially, the Prosecution agreed with the Defence that there maybe a 
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perception of bias. After Judge Robertson had not recused himself, the remainder of 
the Appeals Chamber heard oral argument and decided to disqualify him from sitting 
in the RUF case. All of this occurred when the Court was about to open for the first 
trial, and the issue received considerable attention from the international media. The 
disqualification of Judge Robertson was detrimental to the Special Court, partly 
because the matter of his prior publications should have been elucidated at the time of 
his appointment.  
The following issues have been raised by observers of the Chambers:  
(1) Efficiency. When the judges of Trial Chamber I began sitting, they averaged 1.5 hours 
per sitting day, which caused considerable concerns regarding their efficiency. 
However, gradually their sitting hours increased. Nonetheless, Trial Chamber still 
deferred the opening of the defense case in the CDF trial from the end of the summer 
break until January 2006. Certain motions were decided only after many months. Also 
controversial was the choice to start with the CDF, rather than the RUF, trial. 
Although this case may have been most trial ready, many Sierra Leoneans view CDF 
members as war heroes. Also, the same Trial Chamber is trying the two largest cases, 
RUF and CDF, whereas a second Chamber is trying the AFRC case, which is much 
smaller.  
(2) Control over the court room. There are concerns regarding the initial proceedings 
relating to confusion from the bench about rules and procedure.  When the trials 
began, judges did not display sufficient experience in controlling the courtroom. Some 
gave too much leeway to the parties or individual defendants (particularly Chief Hinga 
Norman), or were not adequately sensitive to witnesses. Conversely, there were 
concerns that the Appeals Chamber was too interventionist and occasionally adopted 
an inquisitorial approach. Human Rights Watch has noted some improvements over 
time, but significant delays in two of the three trials remain a problem.  
(3) Insufficient legal support for the Chambers. For most of the first year the judges did 
not have any senior legal assistance, although this unit was subsequently augmented. 
Nonetheless, some still believe there are insufficient legal advisors to the judges.  
(4) President absent and inadequate Appeals Chamber time in Freetown. In order to 
reduce spending and attract high-quality candidates, the Appeals Chamber judges still 
do not sit permanently in Freetown. This also holds true for the President of the 
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Court, who does not reside in Freetown. Although this is a useful provision in terms 
of judicial economy, the time allocated for visits to Freetown has been too short. In 
particular, the absence of a President leaves a leadership vacuum in the Chambers. 
(5) Interaction with local judiciary. Given the mixed nationality of the panels, the 
Chambers could make a positive contribution to the legacy of the Special Court. The 
two Sierra Leonean judges are well-respected members of the local profession and 
connected authorities in the national legal community, and several judges have 
expressed an interest in working with Sierra Leone judges. Although some efforts were 
made to reach out to the Chief  Justice of Sierra Leone, there was little response and 
few formal programs have connected the Special Court judges with the local judiciary, 
and this potential may not be fully realized. A complicating factor has been an 
application on the legality of the Special Court’s jurisdiction pending before the 
Supreme Court of Sierra Leone. 
 
2.5 The Office of the Prosecutor 
The first Prosecutor of the Special Court, David Crane, was serving as a senior 
Inspector General in the U.S. Department of Defence, had taught international law 
and has a degree in West African studies. Backed aggressively by the United States, 
Crane’s nomination was challenged by a candidate advanced by the UN, Ken Fleming, 
an Australian lawyer who had served as Acting Chief of Prosecutions for the ICTR. 
While many international law advocates had misgivings about an American adopting 
such a prominent position in the Court, a clear advantage would be continued political 
and financial support from the United States.  
Crane quickly became one of the most recognized figures in Sierra Leone. Although 
opinions about him vary, he has received accolades for efficiency and producing quick 
results, including issuing the first seven indictments within nine months of his arrival. 
He placed great emphasis on making himself available to the general public 
throughout the country and did a lot of early outreach for the Court. However, his 
military background and rhetorical style, most apparent during his opening statements, 
also alienated some. The Deputy Prosecutor, appointed by the  Government of Sierra 
Leone, was Desmondde Silva, a Queens Counsel currently of the United Kingdom 
and formerly of Sri Lanka. He practiced law in the United Kingdom for four decades 
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and was admitted to the Sierra Leone bar in 1968, when he acted as defense counsel in 
the  country’s first treason trial. In July 2005, Desmondde Silva took over the Chief 
Prosecutor’s position.  
De Silva’s original appointment as Deputy Prosecutor triggered significant resentment 
from the Sierra Leone Bar Association, as the Statute required the government to 
“appoint a Sierra Leonean Deputy Prosecutor to assist the Prosecutor.” Whereas the 
Special Court Agreement allows the government to fill judicial positions with people 
of any nationality, the Deputy Prosecutor position was explicitly designated as 
national. The government amended the agreement through an exchange of letters and 
quietly had the Parliament amend the language of  the implementing legislation in 
order to allow for their selection. The Sierra Leonean Bar Association objected to the 
implicit suggestion that its government deemed none of their members as qualified. In 
retrospect, the decision to exclude Sierra Leoneans from this post and as judges has 
been deleterious to the hybrid nature of the Court and resulted in the alienation of 
many Sierra Leonean legal professionals.  
At the height of its operations, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) had a professional 
staff of approximately 65 Sierra Leoneans comprise more than one-third of the 
professional staff, the largest percentage by nationality. Nearly half the professional 
posts and almost everyone of the senior ones are occupied by people from the Global 
North (mostly Americans and Canadians). The OTP benefited greatly from hiring 
internationals that already had expertise on the ground. Also, a small cadre of Sierra 
Leone police officers joined the investigations team within the first two weeks of 
operations and have provided invaluable insights throughout the process. During 
particularly tense and delicate moments, such as the initial arrests, these senior officers 
were the essential bridge that helped those operations to succeed. The Prosecutor also 
hired a number of persons with extensive human rights experience in Sierra Leone to 
assist in investigations, including of gender crimes. This resulted in the inclusion of 
unique “forced marriage” charges in the indictments. The OTP has received praise for 
its attention to sexual crimes, including the  creation of a specialized capacity on 
gender crimes, but women are under represented in its leadership. 
 The OTP’s robust approach toward investigations has generated criticism. For 
example, there was much controversy around the unsealing of the indictment against 
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Charles Taylor while he was in Ghana in June 2003 to attend UN-sponsored peace 
negotiations on Liberia. Many international policy makers viewed this actionas taken in 
isolation of other objectives that the international community was seeking 
toaccomplish. The Ghanaians, who claimed they did not have adequate  notice of the 
indictment, provided a plane for Taylor to fly back to Liberia. This incident sparked 
much international debate about whether the indictment constituted an inappropriate 
interference in internationally supported efforts to secure peace in Liberia. 
Nonetheless, in August 2003, an agreement was brokered that enabled Taylor to leave 
Liberia for asylum in Nigeria. Subsequently, the Office of the Prosecutor has been able 
to mount considerable pressure on Nigeria to reconsider, including issuing an 
INTERPOL red notice, but there has yet to be a  reversal in Nigeria’s position.  
Another controversial incident involved impounding the plane of the Secretary-
General’s Special Representative to Liberia in Togo. The Chief of Investigations had 
borrowed the plane to interview a high-profile, insider Liberian potential witness, 
Benjamin Yetan, and did not log a flight plan. When he showed up in Togo to 
interview the witness, accompanied by police, the witness fled. Observers have also 
expressed concern that evidence was insufficient at the time of confirmation and that 
additional investigations were needed. There isa reduced level of judicial review over 
this process because unlike in indictments before the ICTY and ICTR, there is no 
requirement for a case to meet the prima facie standard at the confirmation stage. 
Finally, a controversy arose at trial, where the defense alleged that OTP payments to 
witnesses and offers of witness relocation were incentives that rendered witness 
testimony unreliable. This motion was dismissed, but similar issues may arise in other 
poverty-stricken contexts.  
In terms of national-international intra-office dynamics, reports have been mixed. The 
top-down approach taken in most substantive decisions usually excludes national 
voices because few Sierra Leoneans hold senior positions. A number of senior Sierra 
Leonean lawyers have left the Office of the Prosecutor in discontent.  
Nevertheless, an exemplary model of national-international teamwork was found in 
the investigations unit. Investigators from the domestic Sierra Leone system have been 
involved in planning some of the most important operations to date, and they serve in 
key roles in almost every team that goes into the field. In addition to long-term 
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secondments, the OTP has set up a system of rotating Sierra Leone police officers on 
90-day assignments, exposing them to complex criminal investigations and evidence 
handling. Some human rights observers have expressed concern privately about police 
involvement, given the negative track record of the police during the conflict, but in 
general the officers conducted themselves well and generated no complaints. Two of 
the officers who spent extended time working with the OTP have returned to top 
positions in the police, one as the third-highest ranking member of the office and 
another as director for the Eastern District.  
As with all sections of the Court, the OTP has seen a high rate of turnover, although 
this may not be a negative reflection of the office. However, burn out (as well as staff 
illness) has taken a toll, and toward the end of the Court’s life a number of senior 
departures are beginning to pose a serious challenge, particularly for the OTP, where 
in-depth knowledge of particular cases can be accumulated only over time. The Special 
Court has the most extensive practice among international tribunals in dealing with 
children as potential witnesses. A consultant with a background in juvenile justice was 
hired to draft guiding principles that would secure the collaboration of child protection 
agencies in the provision of psychosocial support and identification of potential 
witnesses. This led to the adoption of a protocol that included a vulnerability test and 
provided for confidentiality and security measures. Potential witnesses were 
interviewed by a specialized investigator, and about 20 were selected to testify at trial, 
although only a handful eventually did so. Although these  witnesses were both over 
18, they continued to benefit from special measures for children. This included 
granting pseudonyms and other measures to protect their identity. Closed circuit 
television was used to avoid confrontation in the courtroom and risks of re-
traumatization (although some preferred to testify in the courtroom).   
 
2.7 The Registry 
The Registry’s scope of work is broad and made even more challenging by the Court’s 
short anticipated life span and the general lack of infrastructure. The Registry is 
responsible for managing the budget, personnel, infrastructure, andall non-judicial 
operations. In addition, it has set up the Defence Office, supported Chambers, and 
run the Court’s outreach and press sections. The Registry remained under staffed for 
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much of the first year but expanded its presence in the second. The first Registrar, 
Robin Vincent of the UK, had 40 years of experience of working in Court 
Management in the domestic English legal system and has been praised for his 
leadership style and ability to support the Court efficiently and basically within tight 
time frames and budgets. His appointment illustrates the benefit of having a senior 
administrator in the post of Registrar, rather than a lawyer or judge, as has been 
common with the other Tribunals. However, the Office of Legal Affairs was not able 
to find a replacement within six months of Vincent’s departure and appointed an 
Interim Registrar while recruiting for a permanent replacement. Most recently, 
Lovemore Munlow, formerly Deputy Registrar at ICTR, has been appointed to the 
post.  
The Registry experienced some diplomatic setbacks in the first year. For example, 
there were considerable efforts to secure an agreement with the ICTY to hold certain 
accused in the tribunal’s custody after arrest to avoid political instability and security 
difficulties in Sierra Leone. However, at the last minute the Dutch government 
determined that it could not extend this cooperation. In the confusion of this 
potentially volatile situation, the location of Hinga Norman’s detention was withheld 
from the public until after his initial hearing. This fuelled rumours that Hinga Norman 
had not been treated well. Another major setback was Ghana’s decision not to accept 
former RUF leader Foday Sankoh for medical treatment and examination. 
Negotiations over his transfer faltered after the unsealing of the CharlesTaylor 
indictment, and Sankoh died in a hospital in Sierra Leone. Although there were no 
public suggestions of an unnatural death, this was problematic for the Court. In 
general, negotiations over medical care have faltered due to third-party states’ concern 
that the accused may try to claim political asylum. Negotiations over the enforcement 
of sentences have likewise been difficult to conclude. Finally, the controversy 
surrounding the unsealing of the indictment against Taylor involved the Registry, as 
Ghana alleged that it had not been properly notified.  
All of these incidents speak for the need for posts in the Registry and other parts of 
the Court for individuals with experience interacting with international and regional 
organizations, as well as foreign governments. More recently, the Registry has made 
considerable progress on securing funding and negotiating international agreements, 
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such as international arrangements to host protected witnesses abroad55. It is currently 
working on agreements with other states on the location of prisoners upon conviction.  
Building the Court on time and within budget was also a considerable challenge. The 
planning mission had determined that there was no suitable site for the Court, so it 
was built on a rocky patch of ground, donated by the government of Sierra Leone, in 
the center of Freetown. The Court building has run beyond the anticipated time table 
and costs exceeded early budgetary estimates. However, Sierra Leone will in herit 
$6million worth of real estate and a state-of-the-art court with two courtrooms after 
the Special Court finishes its work. The unique architectural designof the court itself, 
which is built exclusively from local materials, has also been praised but questions 
remainas tot he sustainability of maintaining the facility over the longterm.  
Those accused in Special Court proceedings are detained in a special Detention 
Centre, located within the Special Court compound. Complaints about treatment 
voiced by family members of the accused were responded to by inviting inspections by 
human rights organizations. Prison conditions have come under some local public 
criticism for lenience, as they include satellite  television, a well-balanced diet regularly 
tested and approved by the ICRC, a basketball court, and free medical care (as 
required by international norms), most of which are unattainable luxuries for most 
Sierra Leoneans. These issues present a key challenge for running a Court up to 
international standards in one of the world’s poorest countries.  
Although the security section is affected by the withdrawal of UNAMSIL in late 2005, 
a continued security presence in the form of a limited number of troops (currently 
from Mongolia) has been negotiated for the Court through UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Security has been a particular concern during the 
presidential elections of 2007, because of the risk of an upsurge of instability.  
The Special Court operates a witness-protection program that seeks to meet victims’ 
and witnesses’ needs, including psychological assistance, before, during, and after trial. 
Most witnesses before the Court benefit from protective measures. There is currently 
at least one contempt proceeding pending for disclosure of the identity of a protected 
witness. Some witnesses have required relocation, either to neighbouring countries 
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(usually under informal arrangements) or overseas. It has been difficult to find 
countries willing to conclude formal arrangements to host witnesses and their relatives, 
particularly so-called “insiders.” Also unclear is what will happen to such discretionary 
arrangements in the long term. 
Virtually all of the leadership positions in the Registry are occupied by internationals, 
including all chiefs of sections, with the exception of Outreach and Information 
Technology. The Court has established some policies to encourage Sierra Leonean 
applications for professional positions, including a system that classifies posts, rather 
than individuals, as national or international. There is also a policy of short-listing 
Sierra Leonean applicants for interviews. Although the Courth has a  majority of Sierra 
Leoneans, at about 60 percent, many national staff members are in non professional 
posts (drivers, close protection officers, cleaners, etc.). On occasion, behaviour of 
some Special Court employees has caused tensions with the local population, and 
eventually a Code of Conduct was passed to regulate such issues. Such Codes should 
form part of any future hybrid tribunal and should be passed at the outset. In the case 
of the Special Court, a senior member of the OTP was charged with sexual 
misconduct before a domestic court. He voluntarily submitted to the domestic 
jurisdiction and was detained in Pademba Roadprison. He was later acquitted on 
appeal. 
 
2.8 The Defence and Fair Trial standards 
One of the most innovative aspects of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is its 
Defence Office, which may be a promising new model for defence services in 
international tribunals. The system combines a core group of in-house defence counsel 
with the traditional system of a listing of individual lawyers who can be assigned to 
each defendant. The Defence Office is intended to provide a degree of institutional 
support to the Defence as a whole, while still allowing for qualified teams of lawyers, 
often comprising both internationals and nationals, to represent individual defendants. 
Under this system, as soon as someone is arrested, the Defence Office provides legal 
advice through Duty Counsel, which is always available at the Detention Facility. The 
defendant can subsequently choose his own counsel, who must file a power of 
attorney with the Registrar; otherwise, a Duty Counsel will “advise and assist the 
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defendant, as well as provide initial legal representation if the defendant so chooses.56” 
The Defence Office also ensures that a list of eligible defence counsel is available and, 
on request, can assist defendants in choosing from this list57.  
The Defence Office attempts to impart to the Defence some of the “repeat player” 
benefits normally confined to the Prosecution. The office has developed expertise and 
experience on motions filed to date, background to the conflict, and patterns of 
atrocities, all of which it can share with assigned Defence Counsel. The Registry has 
committed substantial resources to this new arrangement, including a Chief and 
Advisor position, three Defence Associations, and financial and administrative support 
staff. 
Indigent defendants are provided with assigned counsel. A capping system ensures 
that counsel can spend only a certain amount on each stage of the defense, but the cap 
can be exceeded if justified by the complexity of the case. This is a departure from the 
rules of the ICTY and ICTR and has proven popular. It has ensured that defense 
teams, including nationals and internationals, have chosen diverse structures to 
maximize efficiency. A number of international counsels are experienced 
ininternational criminal law, having taken cases before the ICTY or ICTR. There are 
also provisions to prevent fee-splitting - the cause of several scandals at the ad hoc 
tribunals - that have been successful. 
One controversial issue that arose in the first year was that of communication with 
counsel. Many Defence counsel, at least before the start of trials, were based in 
Europe and did not have ready access to their clients. This was a problem when 
detainees were being kept in Bonthe, where, according to reports, the telephones were 
positioned (albeit unintentionally) so that conversations could be overheard, raising 
confidentiality issues. To remedy this, detainees were given mobile phones. This raised 
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considerable concern, as there were rumors that Chief Hinga Norman was using his 
phone to stir up trouble involving the Kamajors. Mobiles have since been withdrawn. 
Sierra Leonean nationals are well represented in both the Defence Office and the 
Defence teams. Three out of the 10 teams are led by Sierra Leoneans. The Defence 
Office has made a considerable effort to include local lawyers on the teams, whether as 
co-counsel or legal assistants. In one case, a single counsel represented two clients. 
Although the Defence Office attempted to have him removed from representing one 
client, the judges upheld counsel’s motion and he continued to represent both clients. 
The Defence Office represents a considerable improvement over approaches in other 
criminal courts, where the defense has typically suffered a lack of institutional support 
and the trials have been plagued with issues of inequality of arms. Current 
international observers agree that in general terms, the trials before the Special Court 
are in compliance with fair-trial standards, which is largely due to the Defence Office’s 
role. Although there have been valid complaints regarding late disclosure of materials 
by the Prosecutor (including revealing the identity of a witness 21 days before he was 
called), insufficient funding for investigators and experts, and problems of 
performance by individual Defence counsel58, steps have been taken to address some 
of these concerns. 
 
2.9 Prosecutorial Strategy 
2.9.1 “Those bearing the greatest responsibility” 
The governing standard of prosecutorial discretion at the Special Court has been 
“those bearing the greatest responsibility.” This has enabled the Prosecutor to focus 
his attention on only a few select cases, which has been crucial to the goal of  
“delivering justice within a politically acceptable time frame.” Thirteen accused are 
currently indicted. Although it is not widely known how this issue was approached, the 
following may have played a role in focusing the investigations. 
1. Much time went into planning the investigations and deployment of the office, even 
before the Prosecutor came to Sierra Leone. While this contributed to efficiency, it 
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may have detracted from local ownership. It also gave rise to rumors that a “list” 
existed from the outset.  
2. There was pre-existing documentation, including a mapping exercise of violations 
that the Office of the High Commissioner for HumanRights carriedout for the TRC, 
and a further mapping project carried out by No Peace Without Justice.  
3. Consultations were held to discern which names were parts of the public discourse 
on who bears responsibility. When members of the public were asked who was 
responsible, the responses were fairly consistent. Consultations were also held on the  
concept of “forced marriage.” However, the Prosecutor has been discreet in 
elaborating his investigations strategy, much of which has rested on demonstrating 
that the various accused participated in a joint criminal enterprise, be it the RUF, CDF, 
or AFRC. 
A first round of indictments was issued in March 2003 and included the chief-in-
command of all three major factions in the war, the RUF (Foday Sankoh and Issa 
Sesay), the AFRC (Johnny Paul Koroma), and the CDF (Sam Hinga Norman). This 
batch of indictments also included the indictment of CharlesTaylor, althoughit was 
kept under seal. These arrests were known within the OTP as “Operation Justice.” 
Further arrests were made in June and September 2003. 
The indictments largely matched predictions and expectations of most national and 
international experts. Even those defending Hinga Norman recognized that his 
indictment as a senior commander of the CDF was likely, given the Special Court’s 
mandate. Also, many in Sierra Leone see Charles Taylor as the person most 
responsible for the war and violations of international law. 
The 13 indictments have resulted in 11 arrests. Two indictments have been withdrawn 
because of the deaths of Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie. With the recent arrest of 
Charles Taylor59 only Johnny Paul Koroma, stay at large from justice since he allegedly 
took refuge in Liberia. 
• Each of the indictments includes charges under international law, including inter alia 
serious violations of Common Article 3 of theGeneva Conventions and crimes against 
humanity. All include charges relating to the recruitment of child soldiers.  
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• The indictments include fewer than 20 charges each. The Prosecutor has noted that 
the ICTY Prosecutor and her staff strongly advised him to focus his indictments 
rather than follow their tradition of including numerous cumulative charges.  
• In January 2004 the Prosecution filed amended indictments in all cases. These 
expanded the time frames of crimes charged and added a new charge of forced 
marriage. This charge has been criticized by gender advocates, who argue that it 
contributes to stigmatization of victims and that it could be adequately subsumed by 
existing legal concepts such as enslavement and rape. They believe that this constitutes 
bad precedent. The OTP argues that the decision was taken pursuant to consultation 
with women’s groups in Sierra Leone and is sensitive to the particular cultural context, 
and that the charges form part of its vigorous approach in investigating and 
prosecuting gender violations. The Trial Chamber deemed the changes permissible for 
the RUF and AFRC cases in a decision issued in May 2004 but denied permission to 
amend the CDF indictment on the ground that this was filed too late60.  
• The Trial Chamber also upheld a Prosecution motion to join various cases in January 
2004, with the result that the cases of the nine defendants currently held in detention 
were grouped into three trials of three defendants each61. Accordingly, the Court’s case 
load is grouped into one trial each for the RUF, AFRC, and CDF. 
Throughout, the OTP has refused to estimate the number of indictments it will issue. 
As of 2007, it is presumed that the Prosecutor will not bring additional indictments 
after Charles Taylor came into the Court’s custody. Although the original indictments 
were expeditious, periods of pre-trial detention were longer than initially anticipated, 
and the first trial (of the CDF) got under way 15 months after the indictments were 
issued. The intervening time was taken up by a variety of motions, including 
jurisdictional issues and allowing the Defence to conduct its investigations. 
Original predictions of numbers of witnesses that the OTP would call ranged in the 
hundreds; however, these numbers were cut back. In the CDF trial, for example, the 
Prosecutor has called 78 witnesses. Since the start of trials in June 2004, considerable 
progress has been made in at least two of the cases (CDF and RUF), but these trials 
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are not necessarily being conducted at a faster pace than those before the ICTY. The 
Prosecution has concluded presenting its case in the  CDF trial and has finished its 
cases in the RUF and AFRC by early 2006. The Court will likely need at least five years 
to finish its work. 
 
2.9.2 Perceptions of Prosecutorial Strategy 
Several concerns have emerged about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in Sierra 
Leone.  
Some fear that the Special Court is prosecuting only few perpetrators. There is a 
widespread public perception that the “greatest responsibility” standard will allow too 
many key actors to remain at large and, of particular concern, in the army. Court 
officials have noted repeatedly that many are eager to see more individuals held 
accountable for the suffering. Civil society groups have also questioned the amount of 
effort and expense that is going into the prosecution of a handful of individuals. Also, 
the Prosecutor has discussed the role of those who financed the war, and some are 
eager to see the Special Court test the limits of liability for profiting from commodity 
conflicts. However, indictments are likely to come from the Special Court itself. While 
Charles Taylor has been charged with financing the war, he is not charged with 
profiting from it. But the Prosecutor has assisted the Dutch authorities in the 
prosecution of Gus van Kouwenhoven, the Dutch businessman accused of breaching 
the arms embargo in Liberia.  
A related concern is that given the limited number of accused, a significant number 
will never be tried, including the most notorious perpetrators, such as Foday Sankoh, 
Sam Bockarie, and Johnny Paul Koroma. Some would argue that the  Court is 
rendering symbolic justice to the figure heads of factions without regard to their post-
war conductor whether they continue to pose an ongoing threat.  
Some have complained that some potential indictees may be shielded for political 
reasons. For example, some have questioned why President Kabbah has not been 
indicted, given that he acted as Minister of Defence during the war while Hinga 
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Norman was only Deputy Minister of Defence62. President Kabbah fueled debate on 
this issue during an appearance before the TRC when he refused to take responsibility 
for any of the crimes committed by the CDF or the Army that helped restore him to 
power. Others have wondered why Blaise Compaore, president of  Burkina Faso, was 
not indicted for his alleged links to the violence, and some have speculated that he was 
spared in part because of his allegiance to the United States in the war on terror. 
 
2.10 Issues of State Cooperation 
2.10.1 Host Country Cooperation 
Sierra Leone is often cited as an example of positive political will in terms of 
government support for the Court. The Sierra Leonean government compares 
favourably to a number of other governments that have interacted with hybrid or 
international tribunals. However, the government has been careful to distance itself 
from the Special Court’s work. The government is represented on the Management 
Committee in the form of Ambassador Kanu, but other senior government officials 
often decline to comment on the Court, arguing that doing so would have implications 
for its independence. However, while it would be inappropriate for political leaders to 
comment on the particularities of cases or ongoing trials, the government’s “hands-
off” attitude has contributed to the perception that the Special Court is imposed and 
run by internationals, which has diminished its relevance. 
On the other hand, in certain crucial matters, such as executing its warrants of arrest, 
the Special Court has benefited greatly from close cooperation with the Sierra Leonean 
police, including the  arrest of five suspects within a matter of hours in March 2003. 
This cooperation stems from the Special Court Ratification Act, which incorporates 
into domestic law the obligation to assist the Special Court wherever possible63. 
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UNAMSIL peacekeepers have also been vital in facilitating arrests, such as those in 
July 2003. 
 
2.10.2  Cooperation by Other States  
One of the central issues relating to State Cooperation has been the Court’s lack of 
Chapter VII powers. While Chapter VII powers alone do not secure state cooperation 
(and the early experiences of the ICTY attest to this), having such powers would allow 
the Court to use legal, in addition to political, grounds to rally support for enforcement 
of indictments. 
Before his definitive arrest and transfer to the Hague for custody in March 200664, the 
most dramatic lack of state cooperation with the Special Court was the failure of 
Ghana, and then Nigeria, to surrender Charles Taylor. Taylor accepted asylum in 
Nigeria on August 11, 2003, under the condition that he was to leave Liberian politics 
forever. Although INTERPOL has issued a red notice, this has to be considered more 
a political instrument than a legal measure to force Nigeria to hand him over, as such 
notices do not have powers to require enforcement. Moreover, unlike the  ICTY, 
which has a procedure that allows for evidence to be given in public in the course of  
review of an indictment, the Special Court’s rules of procedure do not enabled the 
Court to try him in absentia or to hear evidence in the absence of the accused65. Some 
feel this is unfortunate: the open airing of such evidence could have put political 
pressure on authorities to hand Taylor (or another indictee) over to the Court before. 
Other circumstances in which the absence of Chapter VII powers was detrimental to 
the Court include attempts to secure medical treatment abroad for ailing rebel leader 
Foday Sankoh, and attempts to create an agreement with the ad hoc tribunals to 
temporarily house detainees. 
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2.11 Conclusions 
Questions will linger about whether limiting the number of accused renders justice 
that is pragmatic and satisfactory, or whether it is ultimately incomplete. The Special 
Court’s narrow mandate is widely hailed as a new model for international justice and 
has been followed by the ICC. Within Sierra Leone however, many feel that the 
Court’s mandate is too narrow and that many lower-level perpetrators remain free in 
the communities. The fact that many argue that the Court should have prosecuted 
more people may in a sense be seen as an endorsement of its work. However, others 
argue that the low number of accused does not justify the cost and that funds should 
have been allocated elsewhere. 
In terms of legitimacy, a reduced Sierra Leonean role has meant that the Court is 
perceived predominantly as international. This has posed questions regarding its local 
relevance and leaves the Court in danger of being perceived as a “spaceship 
phenomenon”; i.e., a Court that is perceived as an anomaly but not as a feature of 
permanent change on the domestic level. All these  factors have implications for 
longer-term restoration of the rule of law, and establishment of trust in judicial 
mechanisms inSierra Leone. On the other hand, a proactive approach to outreach and 
civil society interaction have ensured visibility for the Court, and civil society has 
generally interacted more with the Special Court than with domestic courts. This may 
lead to indirect benefits in terms of a “demonstration effect”, which may still positively 
impact on the long-term legacy of the Special Court. 
Internationally the Court’s credibility hinges on its ability to complete its core mission 
in a focused and efficient manner. So far it has succeeded in keeping down thecosts 
through a more focussed approach in the numbers and scope of indictments, although 
trials have not moved significantly faster than elsewhere. Some may argue too much 
deference has been given to the international policy makers who wanted to avoid high 
costs, and that there has to be an acceptance of what is realistically involved in 
conducting trials of mass crimes up to international standards. 
The question of cost and efficiency is predominating at the UN, and the Special Court 
has been called a “victim of the experience” of ad hoc tribunals. But the Special Court 
should not be included in that category, as its overall annual costs remain at a fraction 
of those of the ICTY and ICTR. 
 65 
The Special Court has enjoyed certain advantages by being outside of the UN system, 
but there have also been disadvantages to that arrangement. The disadvantages of the 
absence of Chapter VII powers or a link to the Security Council has on occasion been 
acutely felt by the Special Court, which continues to receive its main financial and 
political support from a few select member States. 
The system of voluntary contributions for funding has placed the Special Court in a 
difficult position for most of its life. Although voluntary contributions were sufficient 
in the first two years, pledges were not redeemed, and in the second year the Court 
had to borrow against third year pledges and approach the UN for a subvention grant. 
All of these issues have complicated planning and tied up senior officials in 
fundraising. On the other hand, freedom from UN rules has given the Court 
flexibility, particularly in recruitment.  
The Special Court has had the advantage of largely existing as a microcosm that is 
insulated from problems affecting Sierra Leone’s legal system. As a result, it has been 
able to enforce its own standards and is generally considered to have conducted 
proceedings that comply with international standards of fairness. Defense counsel 
have generally enjoyed a higher level of institutional support than at any of the other 
tribunals, although they still point to certain shortfalls. 
While the Special Court is still underway, the question of creating similar stand-alone 
tribunals has been held in a beyance. The current tendency is to encompass rule of law 
issues within the peacekeeping mandate, which has been the approach taken in places 
such as Liberia and DRC, and not to create further tribunals. However, this has to date 
not resulted in an alternative approach to prosecuting mass crime in countries that are 
not otherwise under UN administration. While it is probably too early to be able to 
determine the impact of the Sierra Leone model, this chapter suggests that overall the 
model should not be dismissed prematurely, and still has much promise for the future. 
While there certainly are areas that could be improved in implementation, particularly 
in terms of ownership and legacy, ultimately the Special Court has proved able to fulfill 
many of its objectives.  
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2.12 Last developments of the Special Court 
(…) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE SERIOUS CRIMES PROCESS IN TIMOR LESTE 
 
3.1 Brief histrory of the conflict 
Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony for almost 500 years, albeit a relatively neglected 
one in terms of development and colonial presence. In the 1960s the United Nations 
rejected Portugal’s claim on Timor-Leste and placed it on the list of non–self-
governing territories under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. The Portuguese 
Government, following political shifts in its own territory in 1974, accepted this 
situation and preparations began for a process of self-determination. Newly formed 
political parties split over preferences for full independence, continued relations with 
Portugal, or integration with neighboring Indonesia. The two major parties took 
opposing views, with UDT (Democratic Union of Timor) favoring progressive 
autonomy within Portugal, and FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front of Independent 
Timor-Leste) favoring immediate independence. The much smaller APODETI 
(Timorese Popular Democratic Association) supported integration with Indonesia. 
Fighting soon erupted between the political parties, and the Portuguese administration 
withdrew. This was followed by the Indonesian invasion of the territory onDecember 
7, 1975. The UN never recognized Indonesia’s purported annexation of Timor-Leste 
as its “27th Province” in July 1976, and continued to regard Timor-Leste as a non–
self-governing territory of Portugal. Indonesia’s occupation was the beginning of 
almost a quarter-century of immense atrocities and human rights abuses, during which 
almost one-third of the population of Timor-Leste, some 200.000 people, lost their 
lives. 
In the five years immediately following the invasion, the Indonesian armed forces 
(TNI) conducted a series of intensive military offensives against FALINTIL (Armed 
Liberation Forcesof Timor-Leste), the military wing of FRETILIN. It is estimated that 
100.000 people died in the resulting violence. A significant proportion of these deaths 
is attributed not only to the massive military assaults against unarmed civilians, but also 
to forced starvation and disease. Much of the population fled to the harsh 
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mountainous interior to escape the invading forces and the widespread use of napalm 
and other defoliants. FALINTIL continued a small but irrepressible guerilla resistance 
for more than two decades. In addition, in the face of the extreme military repression 
inflicted by the Indonesians, a clandestine popular resistance movement developed 
and was increasingly supported by an international solidarity network, despite the 
severe restrictions imposed on external communications and freedom of movement.  
The continuous human rights violations perpetrated in Timor-Leste ranged from 
torture of suspected resistance members and suspected FRETILIN supporters, 
disappearances, confiscation of land for migrant settlers from other parts of Indonesia, 
rapes, forced marriages and forced sterilizations, and general intimidation of the 
population66. Periodic massacres continued, such as the killing of hundreds of 
unarmed protesters during a funeral procession to Santa Cruz Cemetery inthe capital 
city of Dili in November 1991, which increased both state oppression and further 
clandestine resistance toit. The cruelty of Indonesian policies such as “encirclement 
and annihilation” spared none. Particularly illustrative was the “fence of legs” 
operation in 1981, in which 80.000 men and boys were forced to form human chains, 
scouring the country for pockets of resistance. Those caught in their path were 
slaughtered. 
During these years the international community largely turned a blind eye to the plight 
of Timor-Leste. Many nations voted withIndonesia against General Assembly 
Resolutions on Timorese self-determination. Others sold arms or gave military 
equipment to Indonesia. 11 However, dramatic changes occurred in late 1998, during 
the economic crisis in South east Asia and when increased support for democratization 
saw the fall of Indonesia’s longstanding President Soeharto. The resulting political 
instability in Indonesia created a brief window of opportunity for Timorese self-
determination. The new President, BJ Habibie, agreed in late January 1999 to hold a 
popular consultation on an autonomy package for the territory, to be supervised by the 
UN in August of that year.  
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However, the Indonesian military did not support this policy, and during the months 
leading up to the popular consultation, the Indonesian military (a.k.a. the TNI) and 
civilian administrations in Timor-Leste stepped up their attempts to control the 
civilian population through increased persecution of pro-independence organizations 
and intimidation of the general populace. Central to this strategy was the creation of 
Timorese militias, largely composed of young men who were trained, armed, paid, and 
supervised by the regional commands and often incorporated as village or district-level 
civil administrators. These local paramilitaries were not a new invention, as they were 
used at varying stages during the preceding years.  
 
3.2 Nature of the Atrocities 
The campaign of intimidation included a range of human rights abuses, many of which 
were an intensification of violations that occurred throughout the occupation. These 
crimes were perpetrated despite the presence of (unarmed) UN civilian police 
accompanying the UN mission to organize the vote. Many of the worst mass killings 
occurred before the UN’s arrival, while the negotiations between Indonesia, Portugal, 
and the UN were still under way. Mass abuses included the massacres of dozens of 
civilians taking shelter in churches in Liquiça and the attack after a large militia rally on 
the house of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao in Dili, where many people 
fleeing the militias had sought refuge. Local militias carried out these acts under the 
clear direction and with overt support of the Indonesian military and police67.  
Despite the widespread violence, by virtue of an agreement with the UN concluded on 
May 5, 1999, responsibility for security during the process remained with the 
Indonesian police and military authorities, many of whom were vehemently opposed 
to the radical change in policy toward Timor-Leste.   
On August 30, 1999, an estimated 98 per cent of the Timorese voting population 
turned out to cast their ballots in the popular consultation. Their experience of two 
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decades of Indonesian occupation had taught many to foresee what was to come, and 
large numbers fled straight to the mountains after voting. When it became clear on 
September 4 with the results of the ballot that most Timorese were overwhelmingly 
opposed to an ongoing autonomy arrangement within the Indonesian republic, the 
Indonesian military began a campaign of vengeance against those who supported 
independence. As almost 80 per cent of the population had rejected autonomy within 
Indonesia, few were exempted.  
In the days following the referendum, the TNI and Timorese militias embarked on a 
scorched-earth policy, burning down Dili and other towns and killing hundreds, in 
addition to committing many other types of atrocities. This was a well-planned attack, 
involving all levels of civil and military administration, that resulted in the 
displacement of more than 50 per cent of the population (at least 400.000 people), 
many of whom were expelled to Indonesian West Timor. The violence left at least 
1.300 people dead and many more raped or seriously injured, and resulted in a near 
total devastation of the territory’s property and infrastructure. FRETILIN forces 
under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão remained cantoned so that it would be clear 
that the TNI was the sole source of the violence. 
Particularly notorious massacres included the killing of a group of nuns near Los Palos 
and the mass murders of large groups of civilians sheltering in the Suai Church 
compound, the Maliana police station, and the attack on the house of Nobel Peace 
Laureate Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo. At least 70 per cent of all buildings were 
burned or destroyed and property completely looted. The intimidation extended to 
foreign media covering the ballot, who - together withalmost all UN staff - were 
evacuated when the violence reached its crescendo, allowing the rampage to continue 
unchecked and out of sight of the international community, while the departingforces 
deliberately destroyed crucial evidence. Among those killed were UN national staff 
members. 
However, some international media witnessed the extreme violence, which provoked 
an outcry and calls for an intervention. In response, the UN sent an Australian-led 
military force (INTERFET) to Timor-Leste on September 21 to restore order. Under 
increasing international pressure, including the threat of economic sanctions, 
Indonesia ceded control of Timor-Leste to the UN on September 27, 1999. After the 
 71 
Indonesian withdrawal, the UN Security Council placed Timor-Leste under the control 
of the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), with the objective 
of preparing the territory for independence68. UNTAET was endowed with a mandate 
of almost unprecedented breadth, the only comparable mission being the UN Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK), from which many UNTAET staff hadcome. The Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Transitional Administrator, 
Sergio Vieira de Mello, was given full legislative and executive control. As such, 
UNTAET’s task included managing the initial post-conflict humanitarian emergency 
of a largely homeless population; establishing the groundwork for developing basic 
state infrastructure, including governance institutions and a  public administration; 
disarming FALINTIL and managing relations with Indonesia; and facilitatin gthe 
return of the large numbers of displaced people still in camps in West Timor under the 
control of militias69. The UN was therefore acting as the government of Timor Leste 
until elections. 
Prior to full independence, the next two years saw the political transition progressed 
from early informal consultation with CNRT(National Council of Timor-Leste 
Resistance), to a  council of national representatives appointed by the Transitional 
Administrator to advise on major policy decisions, to a Transitional Government in 
which some portfolios (including justice) were handed over to appointed Timorese 
“ministers.” A constitution was drafted by a popularly-elected Constituent Assembly, 
and on May 20, 2002, the first President of the Republic of Timor-Leste, former 
FALINTIL leader Xanana Gusmão, declared the new nation’s independence. 
FRETILIN has an overwhelming majority in the new parliament. Portuguese has been 
adopted as the new national language and there is a strong political preference for links 
with other Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) nations, a position that is much criticized 
by the younger, Bahasa Indonesia–speaking population. The nation remains heavily 
dependent on international donors, both financially and in terms of technical expertise, 
and there is frustration with the slowpace of reconstruction and development since 
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independence. While a proportion of former FALINTIL fighters were recruited into 
the newly established armed forces of Timor-Leste, many former veterans of the 
conflict have become vocal critics of the new administration. The transfer of 
sovereignty to Timor-Leste on May 20, 2002, initially had few practical implications 
for the operation of the serious crimes process. The personnel essentially remained 
unchanged, as did the balance between nationals and internationals. Formally, 
however, the relationship with the UN altered significantly. The UN mission 
established after independence was formally responsible only for assisting the 
Timorese government and continually downsized. As a matter of law, judicial matters 
were under the authority of Timor-Leste. UNTAET was transformed into the smaller 
(but still sizeable) UN Mission of  Support for East Timor (UNMISET) which had a 
mandate until May 2005, and which in turn has been succeeded by the much smaller 
UN Office inTimor-Leste (UNOTIL)70.  Another factor that has had more serious 
implications for the serious crimes process is that since independence, the political 
emphasis of the Timor-Leste government has increasingly shifted to restoring 
relationships with Indonesia. As a result, a bilateral Commission on Truth and 
Friendship was formed, which is discussed below. 
 
3.3 The establishment of the Serious Crimes Process 
3.3.1 Recommendations from Commissions of Experts 
Immediately after Indonesia’s withdrawal from the territory, Timorese demands for 
justice focused on the establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, such 
as those  created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. A UN fact-finding mission 
conducted by three Special Rapporteurs appointed by the UN Human Rights 
Commission in November 1999 echoed these calls71. Although the matter had been 
discussed informally in the Security Council after it sent an emergency delegation to 
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visit the destroyed territory in mid September 1999, the question of an international 
tribunal was not pursued further. This was partly the result of donor fatigue and 
sustained criticism of the ICTY and ICTR over the lengthy duration of trials and the 
tribunals’ perceived lack of results.  
With the creation of UNTAET, the implication was that a preferable approach would 
be a “twin-track” of national action in Indonesia and under UNTAET, given the still-
fragile state of post-Soeharto Indonesian democracy. This position was reflected in the 
resolution adopted by the Commission on Human Rights on September 27, 1999, in a 
Special Session convened to addresst he situation. The Commission requested that the 
Secretary General establish an International Commission of Inquiry, which he did 
shortly thereafter72. The establishment of a parallel commission of inquiry (KPP 
HAM) by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) was seen as a 
particularly encouraging sign. 
The release on January 31, 2000, of the reports of both the UN and Indonesian 
commissions of inquiry into the violence of 1999 confirmed the need for specific 
prosecutions of those responsible. Both reports found that the TNI was responsible 
for serious human rights violations. The Indonesian report named 33 individual 
perpetrators, including several high ranking military officials. But whereas the 
Indonesian report called for national prosecutions within Indonesia, the report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry proposed an international mechanism.  
The suggestion that the perpetrators identified in the reports should be the subject of 
further investigation and prosecution in Indonesia evoked considerable skepticism 
among human rights observers, both internationally and within Timor-Leste. Many did 
not believe that relying on Indonesia to provide accountability was a feasible solution, 
particularly due to the power that the Indonesian military still exercised. As the three 
UN Special Rapporteurs noted in December 1999: “The record of impunity for human rights 
crimes committed by Indonesia’s armed forces in East Timor over almost a quarter of a  century 
cannot instill confidence in their ability to ensure a proper accounting. Nor, given the formal and 
informal influence wielded by the armed forces in Indonesia’s political structure, can there, at this stage, 
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be  confidence that the new Government, acting in the best of faith, will be  able to render that 
accounting”. 
Neither did the Special Rapporteurs believe that a national process within Timor-Leste 
offered a viable alternative: “The questions of the full documentation of the crimes and human 
rights violations and the definitive establishment of the scope and level of TNI responsibility will need 
to be answered by a sustained investigative process. The East Timorese judicial system, which still 
needs to be created and tested, could not hope to cope with a project of this scale”. 
The UN Rapporteurs therefore recommended that unless the Government of 
Indonesia’s seeds of action quickly bore fruit, “the Security Council should consider the 
establishment of  an international criminal tribunal for the purpose.” The UN International 
Commission of Inquiry likewise concluded that accountability was a matter of 
international collective responsibility because the violations during 1999 constituted 
crimes against humanity directed against the Security Council’s decision. In its report, 
the Commission stated that: “The United Nations, as an organization, has a vested interest in 
participating in the entire process of investigation, establishing responsibility and punishing those 
responsible and in promoting reconciliation. Effectively dealing with this issue will be important for 
ensuring tha tfuture Securit yCouncil decisions are respected.  
Nevertheless, Indonesia indicated that it would not cooperate with an international 
tribunal and that it was willing to institute domestic prosecutions. According to 
anecdotal reports, the political environment in the Security Council gave considerable 
weight to Indonesia’s undertaking to deal with the question of accountability at a 
national level, and other Asian nations also supported this stance73. The UN agreed to 
this course of action, but the Secretary General stated that the Security Council would 
reserve the right to pursue the matter further in the event that Indonesian trials did not 
satisfy international standards74.  
The trials that were eventually held before Indonesia’s Ad Hoc Human Rights Court 
for crimes committed in Timor-Leste have been widely denounced by international 
commentators, including the recent further UN Commissionof Experts in early 2005. 
In general, the trials were perceived to shield perpetrators, rather than seek genuine 
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accountability. Although the details are beyond the scope of this study, 18 defendants 
were tried, some of whom were high ranking within the TNI. The Court’s jurisdiction 
was delimited to cover only three of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts, and followed upon 
only three of the 13 cases mentioned in the KPP HAM report. The prosecution did 
not pursue a coherent strategy and failed to present relevant and available evidence, 
and the judges were consistently intimidated by a large presence of TNI in the 
courtroom. Judgments misapplied legal principles and standards. Eventually, only six 
accused were convicted in the first instance and five had their convictions overturned 
on appeal75.  
 
3.3.2 Early UNTAET Investigations 
UNTAET was deployed to Timor-Leste with a number of urgent tasks. Among these 
was the task of preserving evidence of the serious crimes, detaining those suspected of 
participating, and setting up a justice system from scratch that would also handle 
current crime and general law and order76.  To fulfill these disparate and ambitious 
aims, UNTAET had a civilian staff of more than 1.000 backed up by a large 
peacekeeping force. The Mission’s structure included a Judicial Affairs Office and a 
Human Rights Unit (HRU). 
Despite the breadth of the UNTAET mandate to govern the territory and prepare it 
for independence, the resolution covering its mandate did not contain any specific 
reference to creating an accountability mechanism for those responsible for the serious 
human rights violations that occurred77. Nevertheless, the key decision-makers within 
UNTAET saw a clear “moral imperative” for the UN to make some arrangements to 
this end. In October 1999, INTERFET forces began gathering evidence, such as 
securing mass graves and detaining those accused of participating in the violence. 
Furthermore, the Secretary General told the General Assembly in late 1999 that 
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“accounting for the violations of human rights which occurred in the aftermath of the 
consultation process is vital to ensure a lasting resolution of the conflict and the 
establishment of the rule of law in East Timor.78” Investigations into recent atrocities 
were commenced by the HRU during late 1999. 
 
3.3.3 Locating Timorese  Judicial Personnel 
Simultaneously, UNTAET began to turn its attention to re-establishing the justice 
system in general, particularly given the pressing number of people held in detention 
on suspicion of committing atrocities and ongoing crimes. This required building a 
new judiciary and legal system almost entirely from scratch. All physical infrastructure, 
suchas court and prison buildings, books, and records, was completely destroyed 
during the “scorched-earth” campaign during the withdrawal of the TNI and militias. 
A far greater problem was the lack of human resources. Judges, prosecutors, and the 
majority of lawyers and court staff mainly comprised Indonesians who had fled the 
territory. During the Indonesian occupation a small number of Timorese gained legal 
qualifications, generally from Indonesian universities, but they had been systematically 
discriminated against for judicial appointments or were reluctant to participate in a 
judicial system that was an instrumental arm of state oppression, particularly in relation 
to arbitrary detentions and show trials for political offences.  
Despite creative efforts, such as dropping leaflets by air to seek legal personnel, 
UNTAET was able to identify only a limited number of qualified Timorese lawyers, 
few of whom had any relevant practical experience79. Several had trained as lawyers but 
had never practiced. Others were recent law graduates without any work experience or 
minimal paralegal experience in human rights organizations or legal aid in Indonesia. 
Although there were a small number of the returning Timorese diaspora who did have 
legal or judicial experience, from countries such as Portugal or Mozambique, these 
people were mostly assuming the developing political leadership of the country.  
UNTAET appointed a small group of Timorese judges and prosecutors on a 
provisional basis in early 2000, although it was several more months before a 
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regulation was promulgated to create a transitional court system within which these 
judges could operate80. Initially the appointment of international judges was rejected 
on the basis that it would undermine local ownership of the justice system, whereas 
using Timorese professionals would minimize the need for translation, facilitate the 
transition process, and - most importantly - encourage the participation of local jurists, 
which would have political and symbolic significance.  
While this decision was subsequently criticized, at the time there was no difference in 
process between appointing judicial personnel to deal with current or past crimes, nor 
was there consideration for whether different political issues might apply. The newly 
appointed Timorese judges felt it was their responsibility to deal with past crimes. 
However, the key UNTAET judicial policymaker at the time has since noted that the 
lawyers were “so inexperienced as to be unequal to the task of serving in a new 
Timorese justice system,” and that the “prosecution and trial of legally and factually 
complex criminal offences such as crimes against humanity...should not be left solely 
to largely inexperienced lawyers, however committed they may be”. 
 
3.3.4 Establishment of the Special Panels 
While the national judges were left to deal with ongoing ordinary crimes on their own, 
in mid-2000 UNTAET took steps to establish Special Panels of the Dili District Court 
to try cases of “serious criminal offences” that had occurred in 1999. The panels were 
composed of one national and two international judges81. International judges were 
also appointed to the Court of Appeal, which as the superior court in the transitional 
system heard appeals from both the ordinary and serious crimes jurisdictions. 
The creation of the hybrid Special Panels was entirely the initiative of the international 
staff within the UN administration, and Timorese judges, who were expecting to 
                                                                                                                                                 
79
 Hansjörg Strohmeyer, “Policing the Peace: Post-Conflict Judicial System Reconstruction in East Timor,” 
University of New South Wales L.J.24:171–182, 2001, at175. 
80
 UNTAET Reg. 2000/11, March 6, 2000, initially established eight district courts, although this was soon 
revised by Reg. 2000/14, May 10, 2000, to just four, with a single Court of Appeal. For further detail, see 
Suzannah Linton, “Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice Systemin East Timor,” 
Melbourne U. L.R. 25: 122–180, 2001; Sarah Pritchard, “United Nations Involvement in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Efforts: New and Continuing Challenges in the Case of East Timor,” University of New South 
Wales L.J. 24:183–190, 2001. 
81
 Regulation on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, June 
6, 2000, UNTAET/REG/2000/15. 
 78 
handle such cases themselves, reacted with some hostility. Local NGOs and judicial 
personnel reported that there was no real consultation prior to the establishment of 
the Special Panels. Members of the legal and human rights organization, Yayasan 
HAK, which was instrumental in documenting human rights abuses during 1999, 
noted that UNTAET informed them after the decision was made and tried to sell it as 
a “back-door” international tribunal. 
The inspiration for the Special Panels was drawn from UNMIK, which at the time was 
planning to establish a specialized mixed War and Ethnic Crimes Court, although the 
proposal did not proceed. As was the case in Kosovo and unlike Sierra Leone, the 
possibility of creating a hybrid court by treaty did not arise, as there was no 
independent national government with whom to contract. Therefore, the creation of 
the Panels was simply accomplished by “national legislative action,” i.e., by means of a 
Regulation issued by UNTAET.  
While the lack of consultation seems inexcusable, given the well-organized civil society 
that developed out of the clandestine independence movement, many local NGO 
leaders were dealing with the ongoing humanitarian crisis that enveloped Timor-Leste 
or had not yet returned to the territory. The absence of any meaningful consultation 
between UNTAET and the Timorese authorities - namely CNRT - at the time 
probably contributed to the Transitional Government’s lukewarm support for the 
Special Panels. 
 
3.3.5 Establishment of the Serious Crimes Unit 
When the Special Panels were established in mid-2000, UNTAET also created a Public 
Prosecution Service that included a specialized unit to prosecute serious crimes. At this 
point, the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) was transferred from the HRU to the 
Prosecutor-General of Timor-Leste and became a sub unit of the general prosecution 
service.  
The creation of the Special Panels and what became the SCU was not an integrated 
process based on any prior planning; it was a series of ad hoc responses to a crisis 
situation. The two developed separately and never functioned as a single institution. 
UNTAET approached funding and staffing of each invery different ways, and they 
were eventually accorded differing levels of resources. To this extent, the SCU was not 
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simply an organ of the court, such as the Office of the Prosecutor at the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, as it basically operated as a quasi-separate institution. In contrast to 
the HRU, the initial personnel brought in to staff the SCU have been widely criticized 
for their failure to involve Timorese individuals and groups in their work, in particular 
some of the national human rights organizations that had extensive documentation 
and information about the violations. Unlike the new SCU staff, which was largely 
composed of police investigators, many HRU officers had both local language skills 
and long standing connections with local NGOs, advantages which were lost once the 
responsibility for the investigations was transferred. The new investigators were either 
unaware of the level of expertise available within the community or were suspicious of 
offers of assistance. Yet this lack of early consultation and respect led to these 
organizations refusing to cooperate when approached later, a situation that severely 
hampered community relations and the progress of investigations.  
Although this caused many difficulties, it also brought certain benefits, such as closer  
cooperation with peacekeepers in securing evidence and assistance from the UN 
civilian police in investigation and arrests. These may not have been forthcoming if the 
SCU had been part of the fledgling national institutions. The Special Panels, on the 
other hand, formed a part of the national structure of the Dili District Court. As 
discussed in more detail below, this disjuncture and lack of cohesion had significant 
implications for the varying perceptions accorded the two institutions, as well as their 
mixed levels of success. 
 
3.4 Analysis of the Special Panels 
3.4.1 Recruitment of International Judges 
The Special Panels for Serious Crimes and the Court of Appeal were each composed 
of one Timorese judge and two international judges. Prior to independence, the means 
of appointment for the Timorese judges was by the UN Transitional Administrator on 
the recommendation of the Transitional Judicial Services Commission82. 
Appointments were problematic, and for a significant amount of time only one Panel 
was functioning. The Court of Appeal, staffed by two UNMISET-funded international 
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judges and one national judge, became operational in July 2000 and handed down its 
first appeal decision in October 2000. The Court of Appeal dealt with a number of 
cases in the early life of the serious crimes regime. However, as a result of departures 
of international judges from the Court of Appeal and a subsequent shortage of 
international judges, there was a substantial period during which appeals could not be 
heard. 
The international judges were appointed through the standard UN recruitment process 
for peacekeeping a mission, which does not involve targeted advertising of vacancy 
notices. As a result, there was a lack of qualified candidates. Furthermore, the political 
relationship between UNTAET and the Timorese authorities prioritized approval of 
international candidates by the Timor-Leste Minister of Justice, who reduced the 
available pool even further by insisting on considering only candidates who spoke 
Portuguese and were from civil law jurisdictions. The Special Panel Judges’ posts were 
rated between P3 and P5 level on the UN salary scale, which is substantially less pay 
and prestige than the Under-Secretary General level posts in the ICTY, ICTR, and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. UNTAET had already hired the first international 
judges to serve as judicial affairs officers, and then appointed them to the new courts. 
Throughout the years, the international judges who sat on the Special Panel came from 
a variety of national jurisdictions, including Burundi, Uganda, Italy, Portugal, Brazil, 
Cape Verde, Germany, and the United States. Only two came from superior courts in 
their home countries. The remainder of judges were from courts of lower jurisdiction 
or even non criminal jurisdiction. None had specific prior experience in the application 
of international criminal or humanitarian law, despite the requirement set out in 
UNTAET Regulation 2000/1583. UNTAET initially recruited the President of the 
Court of Appeal, a Timorese judge who has spent most of his life in Portugal, as an 
international judge. 
Except for a brief periodinlate 2001, until mid-2003 there were only enough judges to 
constitute one panel at a time, although a second and a third started functioning 
subsequently. Delays in recruitment of international judges, combined with high 
turnover of staff, poor management of recreational leave, and an average contract 
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length of 6 to 12 months, caused repeated delays in the Special Panels’ operation. As 
mentioned above, the Court of Appeal was unable to function for more than a year. In 
2003, several partly heard trials had to be restarted because of the departure of a judge 
on the Panel. Gender balance has not been ideal. While two of the three Timorese 
judges have been women, only one of the 11 international judges has been female.  
The difficulties in appointing judges hampered the Panels’ work, but it is not clear who 
was responsible for the inexplicable delays. UN officials have pointed to government 
obstruction, including requirements on language issues that did not seem strictly 
necessary. Government sources, on the other hand, have accused the UN processes of 
being unwieldy and slow. Lack of flexibility within the UN peacekeeping recruitment 
procedures, as well as a lack of awareness of what skills are required, also hindered the 
process. Better targeting of candidates could have helped, but would also require an 
improvement in conditions of service  in order to successfully attract candidates from 
other tribunals. Alternatively, longer-term seconding from other institutions or 
governments could have alleviated some of the problems. 
None of the Timorese judges had any prior judicial experience, except the President of 
the Court of Appeal, who was a judge in Portugal. Generally, the interaction between 
the international judges and their three Timorese colleagues reportedly functioned 
relatively well and the Timorese judges report that they have learned a great deal from 
the experience. Nevertheless, language barriers were a significant problem, with no 
interpreters available for judicial discussions.  There was also some frustration among 
the Timorese judges, who felt they were not treated as equals, highlighted by the vast 
differential in salaries, as well as the fact that the international judges are UN 
employees with administrative support and leave entitlements.  
Independent observers noted early occasions where international judges demonstrated 
patronizing attitudes to their national colleagues, citing instances where a national 
judge’s questions of anaccused were cut short by the Presiding Judge, despite the fact 
that they related to specific details of the context that may not have been apparent to 
internationals, such as Indonesian military structures. On another occasion, the 
dissenting opinion of the national judge was not published.  
There were also occasions in which a Timorese judge dissented on the basis of 
particular national experiences, although this did not rise to the level of suggesting any 
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political bias. For example, in the only case to date against a member of the pro-
independence guerrilla force, FALINTIL, the Timorese judge argued for both a lesser 
conviction and sentence84. In 2003, the Timorese judge on the Court of Appeal 
published a strong dissent on a  controversial decision on whether Portuguese or 
Indonesian law was still applicable, in which she confirmed the general understanding 
that Indonesian law could be applied. 
Integration of international judges into the national context was allegedly less than 
satisfactory. International judges sometimes demonstrated a lackof awareness of 
Timorese cultural behaviors and historical background, particularly in the questioning 
of witnesses. With the exception of a general induction provided by the UN mission, 
no specific cultural awareness training was ever provided. One public defender 
described the international judges as operating in a professional, social, and cultural 
vacuum. A UN report published in 2003 noted that international advisors’ reluctance 
to learn local languages contributed to the poor rate of skill transfer from 
internationals to nationals85.  
In addition, beyond the three Timorese judges who were involved in hearing serious 
crimes cases at either trial or appellate hearings, there was virtually no social or 
professional interaction between the international and national judges in the courts of 
ordinary jurisdiction.  
 
3.4.2 Training for the Judges 
Training provided to Special Panel judges, although well-intentioned, was haphazard 
and poorly coordinated86. Judicial training sessions were generally conducted only for 
national judges, despite a demonstrated lack of consistency between the decisions of 
international judges, further exacerbated by the absence of a functioning superior 
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court to standardize jurisprudence. Lack of adequate translation was also an ongoing 
issue, with early training conducted in English and later inPortuguese, despite the fact 
that most of the judges’ legal education was in Bahasa Indonesia. Many of the training 
programs, including the major ones run by the UN Development Program and the 
International Development Law Institute reflected a lack of proper needs assessment 
from the outset. These programs often presumed a level of basic legal knowledge that 
did not necessarily exist. Although training occurred while the judges assumed new 
professional responsibilities, it was not designed to ensure  smooth functioning of the 
new court system, and many judges resented the interference with their work. For 
example, a training program instituted during 2001 involved taking all Timorese judges 
to Portugal for two months, and most described the exercise as poorly organized and 
administered. 
It would have been more effective to precede seminars on highly specialized areas of 
law with skill-development programs on more basic legal fundamentals. Areas that 
could have  benefited from such an approach include legal reasoning and decision-
writing, as well as more detailed and practically focused education on the applicable 
law that the judges were expected to use in the cases before them, rather than the 
courses on comparative education on family law in Portugal or contract law in Macau. 
Although those judges working in the Special Panels were expected to apply 
international criminal law, they received minimal training in this area, especially at the 
outset. During 2003, Washington University’s War Crimes Research Office conducted 
seminars with both international and national judges. A few Timorese judges have also 
been increasingly exposed to international programs, such as the Justice in Times of 
Transition Project at Harvard University, and a project held in September 2004 and 
organized by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on developing tools for 
transitional justice.  
Much of the training funded and conducted by the UN was not effective, due to poor 
communication between trainers and trainees, as well as inadequate funding 
resources87.  Moreover, the official training programs did not reach many recipients, as 
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they were mainly conducted in Portuguese at the insistence of the Timorese 
government. Some will undoubtedly point to the failure of all 22 judges, both from the 
Special Panels and the ordinary courts, in recent legal examinations, as an indication 
that capacity-building efforts among the local judges have failed. Training provided to 
local SCU staff by other organizations was also criticized for poor coordination, which 
resulted in overlap. 
 
3.5 Analysis of the Serious Crimes Unit 
Throughout its existence, the SCU was dominated by internationals. Recruitment took 
place through UNTAET and the post of Deputy General Prosecutor was not 
permanently filled until early 2002. Before that, a series of short-term acting 
appointments affected the early strategic direction of the office. From 2002 until the 
closing of the SCU in May2005, the unit was headed by a Deputy General Prosecutor 
for Serious Crimes, who reported to the Timorese General Prosecutor and Attorney-
General.  
While initially there was little coordination between investigations and prosecutions, 
the SCU was subsequently divided into four integrated teams, each of which focused 
on cases from two districts of Timor-Leste, with an additional team dedicated 
to“national” and “historical” crimes.Throughout, the unit lacked criminal analysis 
capacity, and the CIVPOL investigators seconded to the unit were insufficient in 
number and lacked experience in investigating complex crimes such as crimes against 
humanity. The unit was also lacking in forensic capacity. 
 
3.5.1 Prosecutorial strategy 
Many view the initial period of the SCU operations as inefficient and badly 
organized88. The Commission of Experts notes that at the early stages of its operation 
the SCU decided to focus on the events of 1999 (although it did conduct some 
investigations into pre-1999 incidents). Early SCU investigations were criticized for 
failing to focus on the systematic nature of the violations that had occurred during 
1999 and the role played by the Indonesian military apparatus, focusing instead on 
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treating them as individual criminal cases, which was reflected in the fact that initial 
indictments included only ordinary domestic charges of murder, rather than crimes 
against humanity89. 
When the SCU was established in mid-2000, the international General Prosecutor 
identified 10 “priority cases” involving 202 accused, at least 183 of whom remained at 
large90. The decision was made to focus the investigations and prosecutions on those 
cases involving murder (there were approximately 1400 such cases), selected based on 
the following criteria: the number and type of victims, the seriousness of the crimes 
and their political significance, and the availability of evidence91. Five further cases 
were identified that involved widespread national patterns of atrocities.  
However, due to resource and management constraints, as well as the limited progress 
of the major investigations, the first cases selected for indictment and trial related to 
individuals already held in custody. Most of the  early indictees - including some 
Timorese TNI members - were indicted alone and often only on ordinary murder 
charges. One or two of these cases even related to murders from 1999 that were most 
likely unrelated to the broader violence. 
The determination of what should have been prioritized was not as difficult a 
challenge as it might appear. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission (Komnas 
HAM) had already presented its report outlining the main incidents of violence 
throughout 1999 as a result of a mandate from the Indonesian Government. The UN 
International Commission of Inquiry had likewise reported  on the major crimes that 
took place. Furthermore, local human rights groups carried out a number of less 
comprehensive but reliable studies. Also, the HRU developed a significant 
investigation into the violence that followed the same conclusions of the other 
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principal investigations. The general universe of cases, therefore, was established with 
a fair degree of precision by the time the SCU began its work. 
Yet, despite improvements with the arrival of Norwegian Siri Frigaard as Deputy 
General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes, the Commission of Experts’ Report concluded 
that the SCU did not “function with a prosecution strategy designed to maximize 
limitedresources92,” and that “the lack of an effective prosecution strategy and policy 
from the outset supports to some extent the criticism that the SCU and [Special 
Panels] have only succeeded in prosecuting low-level Timorese perpetrators.” The 
report also commented that: “Since the focus of the SCU was on murder cases, other serious 
crimes such as destructio nof property, deportation and unlawful transfer case swere not investigated 
thoroughly. Investigations into cases involvin grape and torture remain incomplete. For this reason, the 
SCU is not able to establish a comprehensive and complete documentation of the divers enature of the 
crimes committed during 1999.” 
However, the majority of the later indictments for crimes against humanity included 
charges of murder as well as persecution, unlawful population transfer, and torture. In 
terms of the historical record, more stark is the fact that the crimes between 1975 and 
1998 remained uninvestigated. While some within SCU saw this period as outside its 
temporal mandate, it is probably more accurate to recognize that these cases were not 
prioritized because of limited resources. 
Another factor of the difficulty faced by the SCU in its investigations was the lack of 
cooperation ensured by the Indonesians authorities. The majority of the suspects were 
beyond SCU jurisdiction in Indonesia. In order to overcome this obstacle, UNTAET 
and the Indonesian Government agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding on 5 
and 6 April 2000, for cooperation in legal, judicial, and human rights–related matters. 
This stated, among other things, that the parties would ensure that warrants of arrest 
would be enforced and that accused persons would be transferred. The MOU never 
had any practical effect because the Indonesian authorities later claimed that it had to 
go through national procedures to be ratified, and thus noassistance  was forthcoming. 
The MOU was also temporally limited to the period of the UN administration of 
Timor-Leste. The net result of the lack of cooperation with Indonesia has been 
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devastating. Out of 391 persons indicted, 309 accused remained outside the 
jurisdiction of Timor-Leste. 
 
3.6 Jurisdiction and Legal Framework 
3.6.1 Substantive Law 
The end of Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste left a vacuum in terms of a legal 
framework. The first regulation promulgated by the Transitional Administrator 
declared that the transitional applicable law in Timor-Leste would be that previously in 
force (i.e., Indonesian law), subject to any inconsistency with international human 
rights law and any laws subsequently made by UNTAET93. Several Indonesian laws 
were deemed inapplicable from the outset, such as the notorious anti-subversion laws 
and the death penalty, yet there was no comprehensive review of which laws were 
inconsistent with international human rights law. Although this decision was later 
criticized, at the time it was not seen as especially controversial, as all Timorese lawyers 
had trained in Indonesia. 
UNTAET Regulation No.2000/15 provided the Special Panels of the Dili District 
Court with exclusive jurisdiction in relation to“serious crimes”; i.e., war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity, regardless of when or where the crimes were 
committed or the nationality of the victim (based on universal jurisdiction)94. Torture 
was later added. In respect of murder and sexual offenses, the court was provided with 
exclusive jurisdiction only insofar as the crimes were committed between January 1, 
1999 and October 25, 199995. The Special Panels enjoyed primacy over the ordinary 
national courts for offenses within their exclusive jurisdiction. In practice, genocide 
and war crimes were not charged before the Special Panels; hence, all the charges 
involved either crimes against humanity or domestic law. The reasons for this are not 
entirely known, but may lie in the fact that prosecutors preferred to charge the crimes 
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of 1999 as a widespread campaign against a civilian population than as crimes in the 
context of an armed conflict. 
The applicable law for the Special Panels essentially incorporated the international law 
provisions in respect of war crimes and genocide and used the definitions for crimes 
against humanity found in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 
(ICC)96. While it is doubtful that another approach would have been deemed legitimate 
in the circumstances, the importation of such laws was extremely ambitious. Even 
though the quality of the decisions coming from the court improved over time, on 
some occasions the judges demonstrated a lack of comprehension of these laws. The 
lack of training and support to the judges and defense lawyers led to inaccurate 
application of the elements of crimes in cases dealing with crimes against humanity97.  
Although in the early years, there was limited reliance on substantive jurisprudence or 
procedure from the ICTYor ICTR98,  the Special Panels came to rely at least to some 
extent on international human rights standards and on the jurisprudence  of the 
international tribunals over the years.  
Nonetheless, the quality of the jurisprudence remained subject to criticism. Detailed 
analyses can be found elsewhere, but a few examples illustrate some of the difficulties. 
As mentioned, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Panels also included murder 
and sexual offenses if such crimes were committed between January 1, 1999 and 
October 25, 1999. The limitation was temporal, but there was no specific territorial 
restriction on the jurisdiction over murder and sexual offenses. However, unlike the 
international crimes, these national crimes were not the subject of universal 
jurisdiction, and if committed before January 1, 1999, would have to come before the 
Indonesian courts. If committed after October 25, 1999, the date of the Indonesian 
pullout, these cases could be brought before ordinary Timorese courts. Furthermore, 
by implication the Special Panels held that such crimes fell within their 
jurisdictiononlyif committed within the territory of Timor-Leste. Crimes committed by 
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Timorese in West Timor, including rapes and murders in the camps, were held to be 
outside the jurisdiction of the Special Panels99. Neither could these crimes be tried by 
the ordinary courts, as their jurisdiction was only deemed to have commenced on 
October 25, 1999, when UNTAET was established. Moreover, the definitions of the 
national crimes did not comply with international standards, as a number originate 
from the Indonesian Penal Code, which includes problematic concepts in relation to 
sexual offenses, such as the criminalization of adultery, limiting the definition of rape 
to female victims, and making rape inapplicable in the context of marriage.  
The national dimensionof the Special Panels’ legal framework caused the greatest 
confusion in application. For example, in the decision in July 2003 of the Court of 
Appeal in the case against Armando dos Santos, rendered more than two years after 
the Special Panels began functioning, a majority of the Court held that Portuguese – 
and not Indonesian – law is the default subsidiary law to be applied in the absence of 
applicable UNTAET regulations or new national legislation100. The decision, which 
caused widespread confusion and protest within the Timorese legal community, most 
of whom were trained in Indonesia, also held that the application of international 
crimes under UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 violated the new constitution’s 
prohibition on retroactivity. As a result, the Court of Appeal, in deciding on the 
prosecution’s appeal against an acquittal relating to crimes against humanity charges, 
instead convicted Dos Santos of genocide under Portuguese law. This called into 
question a number of verdicts from the Special Panels.  
The National Parliament has since clarified that Indonesian law continues to apply as 
the default subsidiary law, but the Dos Santos conviction for a crime under Portuguese 
law has not been overturned101. Throughout this confusion, the Special Panels 
continued to apply Indonesian law where appropriate, thereby declaring that they were 
not bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal 
has reverted to the application of Indonesian law but has not revisited the question of 
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how this impacts serious crimes cases, including the potential implications for those 
already convicted.  
 
3.6.2 Procedural Law 
In terms of criminal procedure, in September 2001 Transitional Rules of Criminal 
Procedure were introduced by UNTAET, which apply to both serious and ordinary 
criminal proceedings. The Rules constituted a combination of civil and common law 
practices as well as elements from the ICC Statute102. They were only replaced by a 
new criminal procedure code in January 2006. 
The application of these relatively complex and unfamiliar procedures caused major 
difficulties in practice. First, they were generally considered incomplete. While 
amendments to provide greater detail were contemplated, they were never created. In 
particular, the Rules provided little guidance on the role of the Investigating Judge, an 
office that did not exist under the Indonesian criminal justice system. As a result, there 
have been ongoing difficulties of procedure affecting both ordinary and serious crimes 
suspects. A common problem involved excessive use of pretrial detention ordered by 
investigating judges, even on occasions where the prosecution indicated that it would 
not be proceeding with charges. (The Special Panels ruled against such practice in a 
habeas corpus motion.)  
Second, there were major problems in the Special Panels’ application of the Rules. 
Section 29 follows the ICC statutory safeguards for the admission of confessions, 
although this provision experienced problems in its application, particularly in relation 
to guilty pleas103. Similarly, while rights to a public trial and access to interpretation 
facilities were guaranteed under the Rules, these were regularly violated through a lack 
of public accessibility to information about the processes and inadequate translation 
services104. In other areas, there has also been a notable lack of consistency in how the 
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Rules were interpreted. Both SCU and defense lawyers have complained of this in 
relation to such issues as admission of witness statements, issuing of arrest warrants, 
and illegal detention. The absence of a functioning Court of Appeal for more than a 
year meant that appeals from interlocutory decisions to resolve many of these 
inconsistencies did not proceed.  
It is also unclear whether the Special Panels have been able to add to the development 
of law at the national level, particularly given the limited interaction between the 
Special Panels and judges of the ordinary national courts. It remains tobe seen how the 
ordinary courts will deal with serious crimes cases, but indications are that suspects 
simply will be processed under domestic criminal law. Although the heavy reliance on 
international standards and practices had the potential to introduce such concepts at a 
national level, such standards are predicated on the existence of fully functioning 
justice systems and assume a certain skill level within the legal profession. The absence 
of these elements, together with the absence of any staged handover plan, seems to 
indicate that this potential has not been realized. In retrospect, it may have been 
preferable to devise a simpler procedural code for both the Special Panels and the 
ordinary courts, coupled with dedicated practical training for Timorese judges and 
lawyers in how to apply the code. 
 
3.6.3 Legal Implications  of Independence 
The Constitution of Timor-Leste, which became applicable at independence on May 
20, 2002, contains transitional provisions that allowed for the continued application of 
these UNTAET regulations, including the Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
until replaced by new legislation. The Constitution further provides that: “The 
collective judicial instance existing in Timor-Leste, composed of national and 
international judges with competencies to judge serious crimes committed between the 
1st of January and the 25th October 1999, shall remain operational for the time 
deemed strictly necessary to conclude the cases under investigation”105.  
The provisions also suggested that once the work of the Special Panels is concluded, 
serious crimes will be dealt with by the ordinary courts, or any international court that 
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may be created with appropriate jurisdiction: “Acts committed between the 25 of April 
1974 and the 31 of December 1999 that can be considered crimes against humanity of 
genocide or of war shall be liable to criminal proceedings with the national or 
international courts”.  
There is also a potential discrepancy between this provision and the unrestricted 
temporal jurisdiction of the Special Panels in relation to international crimes, although 
all cases focused on crimes committed during 1999, so the issue did not arise. 
In short, the Special Panels did not produce jurisprudence of a standard likely to have 
significant impact on the development of international law. One prosecutor lamented 
missed opportunities, such as the chance to clarify the law on command responsibility 
for non-state actors and the ICC definition of rape, neither of which has been 
explored. On the other  hand, another prosecutor has pointed to the following 
achievements inthe jurisprudence: (1) the establishment of an historical record of what 
happened in Timor-Leste in 1999, with a focus on murder cases; (2) the demonstration 
of an orchestrated campaign between the militia and Indonesia’s civilian 
administration; (3) the setting of precedent, such as legal precedent in decisions on 
persecutory intent; and (4) taking judicial notice of the International Commission of 
Inquiry report.  
 
3.7 Relationship with the CAVR 
The Serious Crimes Regime co-existed with another transitional justice mechanism, 
the Commission for Reception Truth and Reconciliation (in Portuguese, the Comissão 
de Acolhimento, Verdade, e Reconciliacao, or CAVR) established by UNTAET 
Regulation 2001/10 of 13 July 2001. The CAVR, which completed its report in 
November 2005, had a broad mandate to establish the truth regarding human rights 
violations in Timor-Leste between 1974 and October 1999, but it also included a novel 
provision for the establishment of Community Reconciliation Procedures (CRP). This 
envisaged a process where by people accused of relatively less serious crimes, such as 
theft, minor assault, arson (other than resulting in death or injury), and the killing of 
livestock or destruction of crops could seek to take part in a local hearing, modeled to 
some extent on traditional justice lines, known as adat. This part of the truth 
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commission’s procedure was intended to complement the functioning of the serious 
crimes regime. 
In order to take part in the CRP, a candidate was required to submit a statement 
disclosing his involvement in crimes. The statement went to the SCU, which reserved 
the right to prosecute if the crimes disclosed fell within its subject-matter jurisdiction. 
If the SCU did not deem the crimes to be serious, the individual could be referred to 
the CRP. 
The process was a matter of concern to the SCU since the wording of Regulation 
2001/10 originally stipulated that no serious crime could form the subject matter for a 
CRP. The SCU felt that this wording effectively fettered its discretion, as their 
determination on receiving the statements was not whether they were likely to 
prosecute, but simply whether the facts could be viewed to constitute a serious crime; 
i.e., war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and murder, torture, or sexual 
offenses committed between January 1, 1999, and October 25, 1999. Many forms of 
involvement in the widespread violence could technically be classified as persecution 
as a crime against humanity, which added to the difficulty.  
The SCU insisted that, regardless of the likelihood that none or few of those making 
statements would be prosecuted, they were nonetheless bound to prevent these cases 
from being referred to the CRP. Consequently, although Regulation 2001/10 originally 
provided that “in no circumstances shall a serious criminal offence be dealt with in a 
Community Reconciliation Process” it was since been amended by UNTAET 
Directive on Serious Crimes No. 2002/9 of May 18, 2002, to read “in principle, 
serious criminal offences, in particular, murder, torture and sexual offences shall not 
be dealt with” by a CRP. This language was more acceptable to the SCU. 
However, in practice the SCU was not able to investigate or prosecute the vast 
majority of perpetrators, even those who had participated in the 1999 violence. As a 
result, (1) less persons reported to the CRP than otherwise might have been the case in 
the absence of a credible threat of prosecutions and (2) those who did submit to the 
CRP felt resentful because perpetrators of more serious crimes remained outside the 
scope of either process. In essence, this created an “impunity gap” that should have 
been foreseen from the outset and avoided by better planning.  
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On the other hand, a relatively good relationship developed between the CAVR and 
the SCU in terms of cooperation. There was an open relationship between the 
DGPSC and CAVR staff, as well as UNTAET officials, to resolve the initial issues 
concerning the CAVR mandate and to establish operational procedures to make the 
process work as smoothly as possible. However, it is doubtful that the CRP made a 
significant contribution to the SCU investigations. The SCU was not always able to 
process all applications as quickly as would have been ideal106. Also, although the 
relevant regulations allowed for the SCU to request information from the CAVR, no 
equal access was granted to the defense.  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
When the serious crimes process was established on June 6, 2000, at least part of the 
attraction in establishing this model was that it would not be another ad hoc tribunal. 
However, despite the outrage expressed internationally as the fires raged in Timor-
Leste in September 1999, the appetite for justice was short-lived. The regional 
significance of Indonesia compared toTimor-Leste made the prospects of international 
insistence on justice unlikely. Part of the lessons from Timor-Leste may be to do with 
the inadequacy of hybrid tribunals in terms of dealing with international conflict. In 
retrospect it is rather difficult to discern precisely what the UN expected the serious 
crimes regime to deliver. Effective prosecutions hinged on the cooperation of 
Indonesia. To have developed a structure based on such a hope was on any view of it 
optimistic. In the event of the relatively predictable failure of the MOU with 
Indonesia, a clear opportunity was presented to revisit the whole scheme. This was not 
taken. Instead it was decided to wait for the results of the so-called “human rights 
trials” in Jakarta. This too turned out to be a failure. It is clear that stark choices had 
tobe made, but the situation raises the difficult issue of whether it is worth embarking 
on something that is likely to deliver very poor results in all the circumstances.  
Had nothing at all been done, it is true that it would have been viewed as entirely 
unacceptable by human rights organizations. At the same time, around $20 millions 
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have been spent on a venture that no one in retrospect could seriously have expected 
to deliver  meaningful results, and nor has it had much of a lasting legacy in terms of 
the domestic justice system.  
Whether or not the UN is willing to fully acknowledge these shortcomings for future 
action remains in doubt. In the Commission of Experts Report, the finalan alysis 
states: “[T]he serious crimes process in Timor-Leste has ensured a notable degree of accountability for  
those responsible for the crimes committed in 1999. Investigations and prosecutions by SCU have 
generally conformed to international standards. The Special Panels have provided an effective forum for 
victims and witnesses to give evidence. The number and quality of some of the judgments rendered 
is also testimony to the ability of the Special Panels to establish an accurate historical record of the 
facts and events of 1999 during the short duration of its work. In general, the decisions of the Special 
Panels will assist in establishing a clear jurisprudence and practice for other district courts dealing with 
serious crimes in the future. In addition, the Special Panels have developed their own jurisprudence, 
departingfrom the law of other international criminal tribunals whenever appropriate. The serious 
crimes process has also significantly contributed to strengthening respect for the rule of law inTimor-
Leste and has encouraged the community to participate in the process of reconciliation and justice. The 
existence of an effective and credible judicial process, such as the Special Panels, has also discouraged 
private retributive and vengeful attacks107”.  
Although the Report goes onto acknowledge that the lack of ability to gain custody 
over  indictees in Indonesia; lack of resources; and lack of independence on behalf of 
the Office of the General Prosecutor vis-à-vis the government have all been problems, 
this assessment still seems overly positive and fails to recognize problems that the UN 
itself could have rectified earlier. If the UN is not willing to recognize these failures 
openly, it will be doubtful if the political momentum can be gathered to initiate 
another mechanism for Timor-Leste.  
The main failures in Timor-Leste relate to the fundamental choices made at the 
political level (internationally and in Indonesia) rather than to the strategic choices or 
technical abilities on the ground in Dili. It would be wrong, however, to trace the 
difficulties only to the political decisions made at the UN level. Indonesia bears state 
responsibility for what occurred and Indonesians bear individual criminal 
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responsibility. Its failure to cooperate and the flawed trials held in Jakarta  represent 
nothing more than adding insult to a most grievous injury inflicted not only in 1999, 
but for the previous 25 years as well.  
Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the results of the trials that resulted in 70 
convictions and their impact on the family members of the victims. Moreover, the 
indictments increasingly reflected a historical record of the systematic nature of the 
violence during 1999. This in itself should be considered an achievement. 
Notwithstanding these achievements, the disaffection caused by the perception that 
primarily the wrong people were bearing the responsibility of 25 years of brutal 
occupation, including its final months, must be taken seriously. The serious crime 
regime, in the final analysis, will not have contributed to a real sense of justice or in 
building the confidence of the people of Timor-Leste in the institutions of justice. An 
important opportunity – to substantially correct the lack of public trust in the rule of 
law that persisted through the Indonesian occupation – may ultimately have been lost. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND  
PROSECUTORS IN KOSOVO 
 
4.1 Brief History of the Conflict 
Kosovo is a small, landlocked territory in center of the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, bordering Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, and Serbia and Montenegro. 
Since the conflict, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10, 
1999, Kosovo has been designated an autonomous part of  Serbia and Montenegro 
(within the state of Serbia) under the administrationof the United Nations. Kosovo 
has a population of approximately 1.9 million, of which an estimated 90 percent are 
ethnic Albanians108. An additional 550,000 Kosovars are estimated to live in the 
diaspora, mostly concentrated in Germany, Switzerland, and Serbia proper109. 
Residents are 60 percent rural, with an estimated population of 400,000 in the capital 
city of Prishtinë/Pri tina.  Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe, with a 
median age of 22.5. Moreover, it is one of the poorest territories in Europe. The 
economy was virtually destroyed duringthe war. The Gross National Disposable 
Income is estimated to be Euro 1000 per capita. 
Kosovo’s ethnic tensionis symbolized in Serbian myths surrounding the Battle of 
Kosovo in 1389, during which Serb forces allegedly fought nobly and lost toTurkish 
forces, with whom the Albanians chose to align. While historians generally conclude 
that various Serb and Albanian factions fought onboth sides of the conflict, the Serb 
legend has remained a rallying cry for nationalists ever since110. In the centuries 
between the Battle of Kosovo and the late 1980s, most Serbs migrated north into 
Serbia, and an increasing number of Muslim Albanians emigrated from the mountains 
of Albania. When Serbia gained independence in 1878, Kosovo remained under the 
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Ottoman Empire. In 1912, Serbs and other European forces forced out the Turks, 
liberating many Serbs within Kosovo but also massacring many Albanian 
“collaborators.” For the next four decades, Kosovo repeatedly changed hands, and 
with each new regime, the ethnic group coming into power usually exacted vicious 
retaliation against other groups. 
In 1974, Tito granted Kosovo a form of autonomy similar to – but distinct from – that 
enjoyed by the six states comprising the federation of the former Yugoslavia. The 
ambiguity of this sovereignty created increasing tension after Tito’s death. Kosovo was 
approximately 90 percent Kosovar Albanian, but minority Kosovar Serb populations 
claimed strong historic ties. Kosovar Serb populations are concentrated in a few key 
communities (mainly enclaves), including for instance the northern section of 
Mitrovica, and they claim certain religious sites within Kosovo, such as the Serbian 
Orthodox monastery in the western province of Pec/Peje, as historically vital. 
Slobodan Milosevic became the leader of the Serbian Communist Party in 1987 and 
was elected President of Serbia in 1989 on a nationalist platform that deemed control 
over Kosovo a central tenet111. In June 1989 and on the 600th anniversary of the Battle 
of Kosovo, Milosevic held a massive rally near Pristina to celebrate Serbia’s control 
over Kosovo, a process that he had initiated years earlier. Milosevic spoke of battles 
won and yet to come, his first attempt to consolidate control over Yugoslavia and 
encompass Serbian minorities within a “Greater Serbia.” In essence, it heralded the 
reverse of Kosovo’s autonomous status. 
During the 1990s, Serbian authorities ruled Kosovo with repression and abuse. 
Discrimination was widespread and many Albanians were summarily dismissed from 
their jobs. The Albanian leaders forced out of power in 1989 initially resisted 
peacefully by setting up a parallel government in exile. However, other Kosovar 
Albanians banded together to form the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and by the 
summer of 1998, tensions betweenthe KLA and Serb authorities hade scalated into a 
full-scale armed conflict. 
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Serbian forces repeatedly responded to small-scale KLA attacks on Serbian targets 
with excessive force, launching a government offensive to crush civilian support for 
the rebels. Government forces attacked civilians, systemically destroyed towns, and 
forced hundreds of thousands of  people to flee their homes. In return, Serb civilians 
were victims of abductions, beatings, and executions at the hands of ethnic Albanian 
paramilitary forces such as the KLA, which also targeted ethnic Albanians suspected 
of collaborating with Serbs112.  
For the first eight months of 1998, the internal armed conflict between government 
and KLA forces resulted in an estimated 2,000 Albanian civilian deaths113. The 
October cease-fire brought Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) monitors as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission, but violent incidents 
continued. Then, on January 15, 1999, Serbian paramilitaries attacked the village of 
Racak, killing 45 persons. Human Rights Watch reported that although the attack 
might have been provoked by a KLA ambush of three Serbian policeman a few days 
earlier, government forces responded by indiscriminately shooting civilians, torturing 
detainees, and committing summary executions. After the Racak massacre, the 
international community began to increase pressure on Serbia. 
Talks in February and March 1999 in Rambouillet failed to resolve the status of 
Kosovo through means of diplomacy. Subsequently, Serbian paramilitary forces 
engaged in a full-fledged campaign of ethnic cleansing against civilians, killing many 
and causing massive displacement that forced some 850,000 Kosovar Albanians to flee 
the province. On March 24, NATO began an air campaign against Serbian forces that 
would last 11 weeks. During the bombing, the ethnic cleansing intensified. 
On May 27, 1999, in the midst of the fighting and to the chagrin of members of the 
diplomatic corps, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), Justice Louise Arbour, announced the indictment of Slobodan 
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Milosevic and others on charges of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws 
of war114.  The indictment dealt exclusively with crimes committed in Kosovo from 
January through late May 1999115.  
The NATO bombing campaign ended with anagreement calling for the withdrawal of 
Serbian military and police from Kosovo within 11 days.  On June 10, 1999, one day 
after the suspension of NATO’s air strikes, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1244 (1999), which established the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and turned Kosovo into a UN protectorate116. In the spirit of Rambouillet 
and in the light of international concerns about setting a  precedent for ethnic self-
determination, Resolution 1244 deferred the question of Kosovo’s status by 
reaffirming the existing territorial boundaries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) and calling for “substantial autonomy” and “meaningful self-administration of 
Kosovo.”117 In the six years since the end of the conflict, Kosovo has been under UN 
administration. UNMIK has engaged in building state institutions, including the 
legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, both at national and local levels. However, 
Kosovar Serbs maintain their own parallel structures, particularly for health and 
education, and refuse to participate in political structures that have  been established 
while maintaining close links with Belgrade. Significant concerns still exist regarding 
the ability of national authorities to protect minorities, specifically in the aftermath of 
widespread violent riots in March 2004. 
The economy remains bleak, and nationalist politics are rife in Kosovo. The slogan 
“no to negotiations, yes to self-determination” is found on many walls. The ICTY has 
indicted Kosovo’s erstwhile Prime Minister and former KLA commander, Ramush 
Haradinaj. Many former KLA leaders continue to be very powerful, and politics 
between powerful clans combined with organized crime and corruption create a sense 
of impunity and put pressure on the local judiciary. All these factors combine to create 
an inhospitable environment for Kosovo’s fledgling legal system.  
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In October 2005, a report prepared by Special Envoy to the Secretary-General Kai 
Eide was released that recommended commencing the process to determine the future 
status of Kosovo118. Martti Athissaari was appointed Chief Negotiator for the UN, and 
in late November he made his first visit to the region to open talks. The status 
question will be difficult to resolve. While the vast majority of Kosovar Albanians 
believe they deserve independence, most Serbs inside and outside Kosovo vehemently 
oppose it. 
 
4.2 Establishment of UNMIK 
UNMIK was entrusted with a broad mandate, including promotion of the rule of law 
and human rights119. The mission comprises four components (Pillars), each led by a 
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). Three international 
organizations operate under the four pillars. Pillar I, “Police and Justice,”120 was set up 
in May 2001 to establish the rule of law, encompassing the police force and the 
establishment of the judiciary and penal system. This work is directed by the UN. (For 
the first year of UNMIK’s mandate, Pillar I, was focused on Humanitarian Assistance 
under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.) Pillar II, “Civil 
Administration,” is also directed by the UN121.  Pillar III, “Democratization and 
Institution Building,” aims at developing civil society and human rights institutions, 
media, and political parties. It is led by the OSCE. Pillar IV, “Economic 
Reconstruction,” is led by the European Union (EU).  
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) is head of UNMIK 
and is vested with “maximum civilian execution powers”122 that involve sole executive 
                                                 
118
 UN Doc. S/2005/635, with Annex, “A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo.” 
119
 SC Res.1244/1999, supra note 11, at para.11. 
120
 The Police and Justice Pillar (PillarI) was established in May 2001 as a new Pillar I. At the end of the 
emergency stage, Pillar I (humanitarian assistance) intended to provide humanitarian aid and facilitating the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons, which was led by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, was phased out in June 2000. The new Pillar I also incorporated the two 
departments of law enforcement and judicial affairs, which had been part of UNMIK’s Pillar II, Civil 
Administration. 
121 The police and judicial components, the Departments of Police and Judicial Affairs (later redesignated as 
Department of Justice) of the civil administration under Pillar II were transferred to the new Pillar I, Police and 
Justice,on May 24, 2001. 
122
 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of June 12, 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/779, at para. 
44. 
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and legislative authority to “change, repeal, or suspend existing laws to the extent 
necessary” and “issue legislative acts in the form of regulations.” The SRSG also has 
the authority to appoint and remove any person to the interim civil administration in 
Kosovo, including the judiciary.  
Besides establishing a civilian administration, Resolution 1244 also established the 
Kosovo Force (KFOR), a multinational peacekeeping force under NATO command 
that was charged with ensuring “public safety and order until the international civil 
presence can take responsibility for this task.” KFOR operates within a unified military 
control and command structure separate from UNMIK123.  As the UN started to take 
control of the region, retaliation by Albanians against remaining Serbs and perceived 
Albanian collaborators was widespread. For example, there was a wave of arson 
against Serb homes throughout the country and widespread harassment by Albanians, 
with strong indications of KLA involvement124.  The situation in the divided northern 
city of Mitrovica was particularly tense. 
Most of the police, prosecutors, and judges in Kosovo were Kosovar Serbs, as 
Kosovar Albanians had been purged from these positions during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Albanians who remained in their positions under Milosevic after the war 
were seen as collaborators. The withdrawal created a power vacuum with regards to 
law enforcement125. Resolution 1244 offers explicit authority to ensure “public safety 
and order” and establish “local police forces”, but makes no mention of judicial 
authority. However, re-establishing law and order in the province has been a priority 
for UNMIK.  
In March 2004, Kosovo experienced a violent anti-Serbian riot, the worst inter ethnic 
violence since 1999. Instigated by misleading information that Serbs were responsible 
                                                 
123 The multinational brigades (which initially included NATO forces as well as Russians) fall under a single 
chain of command under the authority of the KFOR Commander. 
124 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999. An international human rights officer in Pec/Pejes aid that 100 
percent of Serb homes in that area were destroyed during this period. Others report that 250,000 Serbs and 
other minorities were displaced after June 1999. See International Crisis Group, “Finding the Balance,” Sept.12, 
2002, at 3. 
125 See Michael E.Hartmann, “International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New Model for Post 
Conflict Peacekeeping,” United States Institute of Peace, Oct. 2003. See also David Marshall and Shelley 
Inglis,“The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo,” 
Harvard Human Rights J., Spring 2003, at 101. 
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for the drowning of three  young Albanian children126, the riot was initiated to drive 
Serb, Roma, and Askhali communities out of Mitrovica. The violence resulted in 21 
deaths (split almost equally between Serb and Albanian communities); more than 900 
injured (more than 20 gravely); over 700 Serb, Ashkali, and Roma homes; up to 10 
public buildings, 30 Serbian churches, and two monasteries damaged or destroyed; and 
4.500 Kosovar Serbs displaced. The disturbance revealed the continued precarious 
situation in Kosovo, including its deep-rooted ethnic divisions and continued 
vulnerability of minority populations, aswell as the frustrationat lack of progress of the 
majority population. 
 
4.3 The establishment of Internationalized Tribunals 
4.3.1 UNMIK’s Approach on the Rule of Law 
The creation of hybrid judicial panels in Kosovo was largely a response to urgent 
needs on the ground. UNMIK’s mandate to maintain peace and security in the 
territory included a directive to maintain “civil law and order, including establishing 
local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police 
personnel to serve in Kosovo.” While UN officials interpreted this as a mandate to re-
establish the justice sector in general and, in particular, to seek accountability for war 
crimes and other atrocities committed during and after the conflict, the resolution’s 
language was vague on this point. The task of re-establishing rule of law and criminal 
justice in Kosovo is shared by the UN and the OSCE. Under the UNMIK structure of 
Pillar I (Police and Justice), the Department of Justice (DOJ) and UNMIK police have 
been brought into one administration to maximize coordination of criminal 
investigations. Mandated primarily to build and oversee the functioning of an 
independent, impartial, and multi-ethnic judiciary, the DOJ is also responsible for 
administering the correctional system in Kosovo, ensuring access to justice for all 
communities and providing assistance and advocacy services for victims. For example, 
Kosovo’s new police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), has specialized units to 
                                                 
126 The investigation into the drowning deaths of two Albanian children in Cabra, led by an international 
prosecutor, concluded that there was no evidence showing that Serb youths had played part in this accident, 
although it did not find the cause that led to the children’s drowning. BBC Monitoring Europe, “Probe into 
drowning of Albanian children in Kosovo completed,” April 28, 2004. 
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provide protection to vulnerable witnesses, to counter human trafficking, and tofight 
other forms of organized crime.  
The work with the local legal community to promote human rights, develop legal 
capacity, and build legal institutions falls under OSCE’s efforts as Pillar III. In 
particular, the OSCE established or supported a range of programs and institutions for 
monitoring and capacity building, particularly the Legal System Monitoring Section 
(LSMS). It also monitors the justice system. Furthermore, the Criminal Defence 
Resource Centre (CDRC), a non governmental organization (NGO), was established 
to support the defense; support has been provided for the Kosovo Chamber of 
Advocates (KCA); the Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI) was created to train local judges 
and prosecutors; and the Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law provides 
assistance in the reform of a variety of legal issues. Responsibility for rebuilding the 
justice sector and building the capacity of local actors therefore lies with different 
actors. Pillar I managers did not consider capacity building part of their mandate. 
Rebuilding the justice sector is an enormous challenge that is not easily fulfilled127.  
Much of the physical infrastructure of the judicial system - court buildings, law 
libraries, and equipment - was destroyed or severely damaged duringthe conflict. Local 
lawyers and judges were hard to find; most fled as the Serb forces withdrew, and those 
who remained generally refused to serve under UNMIK. In addition, few Kosovar 
Albanians had legal experience, as many were forced out of the judiciary a decade 
earlier, although some kept their practice as defense counsel. In addition, law classes 
were offered only in the Serbian language and the bar exam was offered only in 
Belgrade, so the better part of a generation of Albanian lawyers had been lost. 
Another major issue was the lack of a legal framework. One of the first UNMIK 
Regulations, 1999/1, declared that the pre-1989 FRY laws, as well as some laws 
                                                 
127 For an overview of efforts to establish the rule of law in post-conflict Kosovo, see Wendy S. Betts, Scott N. 
Carlson, and Gregory Gisvold, “The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the Lessons 
Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and the Rule of Law,” 22 Mich. J. Int’l L. 371, 2001; Jean-Christian 
Cady and Nicholas Booth, “Internationalized Courts in Kosovo: An UNMIK Perspective,” Internationalized 
Courts and Tribunals, PICT, 2004; Hansjörg Strohmeyer, “Making Multilateral Interventions Work: the United 
Nations and the Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and EastTimor,”Fletcher For. World 
Aff.,2001; Strohmeyer,“Collapse,”.  
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introduced between 1989 and 1999, continued to be applicable128, unless they 
contained an element of ethnic discrimination or otherwise violated standards of 
international law. The decision to revive the Serbian laws imposed by Milosevic since 
1989 offended much of the Albanian population and alienated members of the 
Albanian legal community, many of whom were familiar only with pre Milosevic-era 
legal codes. UNMIK was also under pressure because detainees suspected of 
committing atrocities were crowding prison facilities, with little prospect of a speedy 
trial. Devastated by the conflict and years of discrimination against the ethnic Albanian 
minority, the local judicial system didnot have the capacity to conduct such trials, nor 
were they perceived as able to be independent vis-à-vis Serbs accused of crimes. The 
ICTY Prosecutor made it clear that the tribunal could try only those who had 
committed the worst atrocities on the widest scale129. As the detainees continued to 
languish in prison, many argued that the continued detention violated international 
human rights standards. Frustration among the Kosovar Serb population regarding the 
failure of the judicial process may have contributed to increased ethnic violence130. A 
combination of the above factors ultimately led to a hunger strike by Serb detainees.  
This began to reach a crisis point in December 1999, when the six-month deadline for 
pre-trial detention was approaching for many of the detainees. The SRSG initially 
responded by amending the law to allow for one year of pre-trial detention, but this 
did nothing to depopulate the prisons. Other measures KFOR used included the so-
called “COMKFOR hold,” a procedure for extra-judicial detentions used when KFOR 
authorities believed that the detainee posed a  danger to public safety and security. The 
SRSG also commenced using so-called “Executive Detentions” that he ordered. Both 
measures were decried by the OSCE’s LSMS and others as unjustified and in violation 
of international norms.  
 
                                                 
128 The applicable law before 1989, when Albanians could still practice, was the Criminal Law of the Socialist 
Autonomy Province of Kosova (from1977), the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(July 1,1977), and the Yugoslav Law on Criminal Procedure (June 30,1977). 
129 See Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the ICTY, “Statement on the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed in Kosovo,” The Hague, Sept. 29,  1999 
130 See Strohmeyer, “Collapse”, at 49. When the UNMIK issued a regulation allowing for longer pre-trial 
detention of suspects, the OSCE’s Legal System Monitoring Section concluded that the new regulation was a 
“clear breach” of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on 
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4.3.2 The Proposed Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court 
To address what was rapidly becoming a crisis of justice and accountability, in late 
1999 UN and member state officials, as well as the national judiciary, began 
negotiations for the creation of a stand alone criminal court in Kosovo131. The 
proposed court, referred to as the Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court 
(KWECC)132, was to be an international-led, ad hoc tribunal sitting in Kosovo, but 
largely modeled on the ICTY. Planning for KWECC, which was never realized, 
reached an advanced stage. KWECC was to have concurrent, primary jurisdiction with 
domestic courts of Kosovo over serious violations of international humanitarian law as 
well as other serious crimes committed on political, ethnic, or religious grounds since 
January 1, 1998, including: war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and other 
serious crimes committed on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, or 
association to a minority ethnic or political group. It had no termination date. This 
means that any serious crime involving any ethnic  minority could be included in its 
subject matter jurisdiction. While KWECC would have simultaneous jurisdiction with 
the ICTY, the tribunal would have primacy and KWECC was to focus on the lower-
profile offenders that the ICTY lacked the capacity to try.   
According to the proposal, KWECC would have panels composed of international 
and local judges133.  KWECC was to be staffed by multi-ethnic national and 
international judges, prosecutors, and staff. The president was to be an international 
judge. Local staff, including judges, prosecutors, and other personnel, were to be 
provided by the Department of Judicial Affairs. It was assumed that international 
judicial personnel, such as judges and prosecutors, would be seconded by donor 
countries or organizations. In addition, a Witness Protection Unit and an Office for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). OSCELMS, “Kosovo: Report No. 6: Extension of Time Limits and the 
Rights of Detainees: the Unlawfulness of Regulation 1999/26,”April 29, 2000. 
131 In its first report of December 13, 1999, the Technical Advisory Commission (TAC) on Judiciary and 
Prosecution Service, which was established pursuant to UNMIK Regulation No 1999/6 ofSeptember 7, 1999, 
and composed of both Kosovar and international experts,recommended the establishment of such a tribunal. 
The international and local Kosovar legal members of the TAC voted unanimously to create such a court. US 
Mission to Kosovo, “Kosovo Judicial Assessment Mission Report,” April 2000, at 20, available at 
pristina.usmission.gov/jud.pdf. 
132 The name originally proposed was Kosovo Tribunal for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, but it 
was later renamed KWECC. 
133 UNMIK, “Kosovo: Reconstruction 2000,” April 2000, available at 
www.seerecon.org/kosovo/documents/reconstruction2000/index.html. 
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the Defence were to be established. KWECC was expected to be functional in the  
summer of 2000, and an appointed chief, Fernando Castanon, had already arrived in 
Kosovo. After SRSG Bernard Kouchner signed the regulation, the process of 
appointing the president and other international and local judges began. 
The concept of KWECC gave rise to some concerns among the Kosovar Albanian 
legal community about the potential drain it might cause to the fledging Kosovar 
judicial system, and the potential complications of having an additional judicial layer 
between the domestic system and the ICTY134.  Conversely, the Kosovar Bar was 
skeptical of an international tribunal that might be less likely to employ local lawyers. 
Some of those with ties to the political parties feared a system that was “too 
independent” and thus more likely to pursue Albanians for war crimes. There were 
also fears that KWECC would exacerbate ethnic tensions135.   
In September 2000, the idea of KWECCwas abandoned. Member states had become 
increasingly concerned about the cost of a free standing court136  and feared that it 
would be impossible to provide the necessary security.  One American diplomat called 
this a “classic clash between UN idealism and U.S. cynicism,” as the UN refused to 
provide projected costs and the United States refused tohouse the court within its 
high-security base. Some of those involved believe that an additional, if not primary, 
hurdle was U.S. concern that an independent court might investigate war crimes 
committed by NATO forces, a controversial subject during the time of these 
negotiations. In retrospect, Albanian lawyers regret that a more independent court did 
not emerge, because of concerns about the SRSG’s influence over the system that did 
develop. Ultimately, the international judges and prosecutors program, once it started 
to function in September 2000, was the final “nail in the coffin” that led to the 
abandonment of KWECC.  
 
 
                                                 
134 John Cerone and Clive Baldwin, “Explaining and Evaluating the UNMIK Court System,” in André 
Nollkaemper Romano and Jann K. Kleffneretal.,Internationalized Criminal Courts, December 2004. 
135 Michael A. Newton, “War Crimes Research Symposium: ‘The Role of Justice in Building Peace’: ‘A View 
from the Trenches’: The Military Role in the Pursuit of Justice,” Case Western Reserve J. Int’l L., Spring 2003, 
n.100. 
136 The start-up cost of the court for six months was estimated to be DM 12.59 million.The cost of establishing 
the detention facility and operating it for six months was estimated at DM 1.17 million. 
 108 
4.4 The establishment of the Internationalized Panels 
Simultaneously to planning for KWECC, UN authorities also set up an interim 
program to bolster trust in the judiciary by taking controversial cases out of the hands 
of Serb or Albanian judges without building a new international court. A wave of 
violence in Mitrovica in February 2000, sparked by the bombing of a local café and a 
rocket attack against a UNHCR bus carrying Serbs, prompted this action. UNMIK 
police arrested several Kosovar Albanian suspects for brandishing weapons, but a 
Kosovar Albanian judge released them. The outbreakof violence led the SRSG to re-
evaluate the judiciary situation. 
Inpart as a result of this event, the UN recognized the need for ethnically neutral 
judges and prosecutors to hear cases. With virtually no consultation with the local 
population on February 15, 2000, the UN issued UNMIK Regulation 2000/6. This 
provided for  the appointment of an international judge and an international 
prosecutor to work within the existing domestic judiciary along with their local 
counterparts. The Regulation gave the SRSG the power to make such appointments, 
and by February 17, 2000, the first IJ and IP were in place137.   
Initially, this arrangement was meant only for the Mitrovica District Court and other 
courts within its territorial jurisdiction (e.g., Municipal and Minor Offences Courts in 
Mitrovica). However, a number of Serb and other minority (mostly Roma) detainees 
initiated hunger strikes to protest their prolonged pre-trial detention138.  In addition, 
UNMIK realized that the problem of Kosovar Albanian judges’ lack of perceived 
impartiality was a general issue. As a result, the introduction of IJPs was subsequently 
extended to cover courts throughout Kosovo, including the Supreme Court, by means 
of Regulation 2000/34 in May 2000139.  By the summer of 2000, six IJs and two IPs 
were appointed to serve in mixed panels in the courts of Mitrovica, Pristina, Gnjilane, 
and Prizren.   
                                                 
137 UNMIK Regulation 2000/6, on the Appointment and Removal from Office of International Judges and 
Prosecutors, Feb.15, 2000; see OSCELSMS, “Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials:A Review,” Sept. 2002, at 11; Press 
Releases UNMIK PR/159 and UNMIK/PR/161, available at www.unmilonline.org. 
138 UNMIK, “Pillar I: Police and Justice,” June 2004, available at 
www.unmikonline.org/justice/documents/PillarI_Report_June04.pdf 
139 UNMIK Regulation 2000/34, Amending UNMIK Regulation 2000/6, OntheAppointment and Removal 
fromOffice of International Judges and Prosecutors, May 27, 2000. 
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While KWECC was conceived as an independent transitional justice mechanism to 
boost the rule of law, the temporary introduction of IJs was motivated primarily by 
pragmatic and immediate security needs. The hope was that the infusion of foreign 
experts would jump-start the judicial reform process, providing badly needed capacity 
and independence.  Despite the lack of consultation with the local population, many 
welcomed the appointment of IJs because it made it possible for trials to proceed in 
the Kosovo courts without a grave risk of bias or “violent blow back.”  
At the end of 2000, UN authorities made further revisions to the regulations allowing 
for the appointment of IJs and IPs. The OSCE and NGOs had criticized Regulations 
2000/6 and 2000/34 because, while they did assure a measure of impartiality, they did 
not go far enough. Specifically, they did not ensure a majority of IJs in a given case 
(e.g., one international judge on a panel of three) and thus were “insufficient to remedy 
the lack of an objective appearance of impartiality in trials involving allegations of 
serious war crimes.”  Indeed, in practice IJs were often outvoted by the lay and 
professional Kosovar judges, leading to unsubstantiated verdicts of guilt against some 
Serbian defendants and questionable verdicts of acquittal against some ethnic Albanian 
defendants.  In addition, Kosovar Albanian prosecutors were accused of initiating 
criminal investigations and proposing detentions of  Serbs based on insufficient 
evidence, while abandoning cases and refusing to investigate ethnic Albanians.  In 
addition, because of the large volume of cases, IJs were spread too thin. As a result, 
cases were often tried before panels of varying composition, some with no IJs. 
Ultimately, many of these early verdicts in war crimes cases were overturned on appeal 
and sent for retrial.   
Responding to these concerns, the UN in December 2000 promulgated UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/64140.  This grants the SRSG the authority to appoint a special panel 
of three judges with international majority, the so-called “Reg. 64 panel,” as well as the 
authority to assign IPs141.  Consequently, a special section, the International Judicial 
                                                 
140 UNMIK Regulation 2000/64, On the Assignment of International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of 
Venue, Dec. 15, 2000. The Regulation was initially enacted for a12-month period, but was subsequently 
extended by UNMIK Regulations 2001/34 and 2002/20. For a further discussion regarding UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/64, see the OSCE LSMS, “Review of the Criminal Justice System,”. 
141 It is worth noting that UNMIK Regulation 2000/6 gives IPs and IJs the right to select and take 
responsibility for cases they deem appropriate for the international judiciary. The difference is that when the 
SRSG appoints a Reg. 64 judicial panel, the entire panel can be international, while in practice, a Regulation 6 
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Support Section (IJSS), was established within the DOJ142  in order to support this 
initiative. Although the IJSS initially supported both IJs and IPs, subsequently the IPs 
were supported by a newly created Criminal Division. With the advent of the “Reg. 64 
panels,” which are international only, the mixed panel formation of Regulation 6 was 
virtually abandoned. 
Regulation 2000/64 continues in force in Kosovo today. Trigger mechanisms for a so-
called “Reg. 64 panel” include appointment by the SRSG on his own motion, or upon 
the request of prosecutors, the accused, or defense counsel where “necessary to ensure 
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary or the proper administration of 
justice.”  Although no clear criteria have been laid out in the Regulation, in practice the 
primary reasons for relying on IJs are either fears about perception of bias or concerns 
about intimidation of local judges.  As a result, IJPs were used mainly in cases 
involving inter-ethnic conflict.  In such cases, the DOJ makes a recommendation to 
the SRSG, who takes the formal decision to assign a prosecutor or a panel of majority 
of IJs to a specific case. Parties who request a Reg. 64 panel therefore make their 
request to the DOJ, which forwards it to the SRSG. International prosecutors and 
judges may also take cases at their own discretion.  (The March 2004 riots ushered in a 
new period in which local judges also heard cases involving ethnic conflict.) 
Appointing a Reg. 64 panel may take place at any stage in the proceedings, except 
where the trial is in session or if an appeal has already commenced. It was felt that this 
would be unduly disruptive to the conduct of proceedings, and that any bias emerging 
at this stage couldbe cured by the assignment of an international panel to hear an 
appeal or an extraordinary legal remedy against appeal. Even so, it is a far-reaching 
power that has led to some resentment from the local professionals whose cases have 
been removed, sometimes in an overtly demonstrative manner. IJs sit as judges on the 
regular courts of Kosovo and IPs work as national prosecutors, both applying the 
same domestic law as their local counterparts.  However, IJs do not receive case 
assignments from the president of the court in which they sit. Rather, they receive 
                                                                                                                                                 
panel is either one or two international judges out of three.With respect to IPs, Reg.64 hardly ever is used,as 
IPs routinely take over cases under Regulation 2000/6. 
142 DOJ comprises five sections: the Judicial Development Division (JDD), the International Judicial Support 
Division (IJSD), the Criminal Division (CD), the Penal Management Division (PMD), and Office for Missing 
Persons and Forensics (OMPF). 
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assignments from the DOJ or can petition to take the case under Regulation 2000/6 
or 2000/64. In practice, the IJPs function de facto as a parallel judicial process for 
cases that the DOJ or IJPs themselves deem inappropriate for their national 
counterparts. 
 
4.5 Prosecutorial strategy and issues of case selection143 
4.5.1     Lack of Criteria for Referral 
What distinguishes Reg. 64 panels from other systems involving international judges 
and prosecutors is their broad discretion to take on any national pending cases. The 
lack of clear direction in terms of where to concentrate internationals remains an issue 
of great controversy and criticism. As mentioned, the SRSG can approve a Reg. 64 
panel for any case - from war crimes to petty theft - if it is deemed “necessary to 
ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary or the proper administration 
of justice.144” Using this rationale, the IJPs initially focused on indictments of war 
crimes against Serbs, partly because of the large number of Serbs in detention when 
internationals arrived. They inherited 43 such cases that had commenced before local 
panels of Albanian judges.  The IJPs also took on war crimes cases against Kosovar 
Albanians, most notably the Llapi case, which involved high-profile former KLA 
leaders.   
However, gradually the focus shifted from cases deemed inappropriate for local judges 
and prosecutors to cases that local judges and prosecutors did not want to try because 
of security concerns or other political pressures. The IJPs’ primary focus is now 
organized crime and corruption cases.  For their particular nature, these categories of 
cases are often interrelated, because criminal power structures, including organized 
crime, are also involved in terrorism and inter-ethnic violence.  On the other hand, 
organized crime is a regular feature not only of many other post-conflict contexts, but 
also of other Eastern European States. Some complain that the shift in focus 
represents European and American, rather than local, priorities (The IJPs have also 
handled a number of cases involving UN personnel).  
                                                 
143
 Many of the information reported below have been the object of interviews at UN/UNMIK Staff and 
ICTJ level. 
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4.5.2 Concerns regarding independence 
A major criticism of the IJP system has been that its structure gives the SRSG the 
ultimate executive power to appoint international judges and prosecutors and choose 
cases in which they are to be involved. Moreover, UNMIK’s DOJ is the supervising 
authority over international judges and prosecutors, extending their contracts. 
International judges are not subject to the  Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council 
(KJPC), the body that appoints and disciplines local judges, and there is no local 
involvement in the oversight of IJPs. In its Review of the Criminal Justice System, the 
OSCE LSMS stated, “the very short contractual periods for international judges and 
prosecutors, and the fact that each extension of these contracts is solely dependent on 
UNMIK’s executive branches – DOJ and, ultimately, SRSG - create an appearance of 
executive control over these officials.”145 The LSMS recommended that, to ensure 
independence, decisions on hiring an extension of IJPs should be under the auspices 
of an empowered KJPC. This recommendation was never implemented, and 
international judges and prosecutors are seen as subject to the UN supervising 
executive power.  This appearance of lack of independence has led many to question 
the impartiality of the hybrid process. 
Among the war crimes and inter-ethnic cases that constitute the bulk of the IJP 
caseload to date, the primary controversy has been whether the SRSG’s and DOJ’s 
selection of cases has been politically biased. Many observers, including both Kosovars 
and internationals, believe the UNMIK executive exerts too much influence on the 
criminal justice process. Regardless of whether it is justified, there is a local perception 
that political interference has disproportionately protected potential Serb defendants, 
and many allege that UNMIK has a pattern of “caving in” to Serb demands. Some 
argue that many cases initially brought against Serbs before local panels resulted in 
dramatically reduced charges, sentences, or acquittals when the IJPs took over. 
Furthermore, some Kosovar Albanians perceive a systemic bias on two fronts.146 First, 
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 UNMIK/Reg/2000/64 at 1.2, “On Assignment Of International Judges/Prosecutors And/Or Change Of 
Venue,” Dec.15, 2000. 
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 OSCE LSMS, “Review of the Justice System,” at 26. 
146
 A smaller number of Albanians charged UNMIK and DOJ without right ethnic bias, citing the disrespect 
with which internationas treat them. 
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Serbia is a nation, while Kosovo is not, and Albanians fear that UN officials feel more 
comfortable in the diplomacy with Serbia. Second, some Albanians believe that 
UNMIK’s a version to threats against stability has given radical Serbs an effective veto 
over UN policies, including prosecutions.147  
DOJ officials have asserted that case selection is not political. As one put it, “We 
would never consider ethnic balance in deciding which cases to pursue or how the 
decisions are handed down. The only question is whether there is a prosecutable case. 
The SRSG exerts no influence.” The DOJ identifies the limiting factors in 
prosecutions not as political, but as the lack of support for  witness protection and 
weak extradition options.  
 
4.5.3 Lack of Cooperation by Serbia 
Many of those who had committed atrocities in 1999, including Serbs and Kosovar 
Serbs, retreated into Serbia when the conflict was over. Many remain at large in Serbia 
and Montenegro as well as other countries in Europe. As one IP noted, “We have not 
beenable to convict some key people - those who escaped, those we indicted and 
could not arrest, and those we have not indicted. These matter to people here, 
particularly because there are so few successful prosecutions of Serbs that we can 
point to.”  Moreover, the general perception is that more is done to bring Albanians to 
trial than Serbs.  
Extradition has been difficult to negotiate, partly because Kosovo is a UN protectorate 
and not an independent state. UNMIK, in accordance with its sui generis status, 
negotiates  and enters into bilateral agreement with states on the two-way transfer 
(extradition) of foreign nationals and Kosovo residents. These negotiations are 
complicated by internal Serbian politics, including the recent success of more 
nationalistic candidates and the continuing problem of missing Kosovar Albanians 
believed to be held in Serbia. Presumably some of these issues will form part of 
Kosovo’s final status determination. 
                                                 
147 The examples most often cited are the escapes of large number of Serb detainees under what are considered 
dubious circumstances, the low number of successful war crimes prosecutions against Serbs, the failure to 
prosecute the“Bridge Watchers” (at least until they injured internationals), and the inability or unwillingness to 
push for extradition of key Serb suspects hiding in Serbia. These examples, along with perceived discrepancies 
in sentencing (see below) are reported continually in the local news. 
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4.5.4 Structural Adjustments to the IJP System 
There have been some attempts to put a more deliberate and centralized structure into 
the IJP program to allow for more strategic deployment. In March 2003, a Criminal 
Division was established. A Chief International Judge and Prosecutor were put in 
place, all answerable to the DOJ.148  The Head of the Criminal Division monitors 
developments of all cases, determines the importance of each case, and devises 
proceeding measures with the IP. The Criminal Division, which was composed 
exclusively of IPs and international lawyers supporting the prosecutors, worked in 
parallel to domestic prosecutorial services. Further steps were taken in 2005 to 
establish the Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office (KSPO). As of September 2005, 
funding had been secured from the European Agency for Reconstruction, vacancy 
notices had been drafted, and a draft Regulation establishing the KSPC was being 
revised by UNMIK’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the DOJ in late 2005. The 
KSPC will fall within the Office of the Public Prosecutor. The proposal is that the 
KSPO’s mandate will include taking over the high-profile cases that the Criminal 
Division currently covers. It will begin with two or three local prosecutors and will 
expand until it reaches full strength. Initially there will be a number of IPs assigned to 
the KSPO, which will provide on-the-job training. As the KSPO increases in size and 
ability, local prosecutors in the unit will begin to train other local prosecutors in other 
offices throughout Kosovo. Simultaneously, international judges have relocated to 
Pristina but will be allowed to try cases from around the country from there (the so 
called “single jurisdiction” approach). It remains to be seen what the impact of these 
measures will be in terms of refocusing strategic direction and capacity building. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
148
 The IP must obtain the consent of the division’s head prior to filing an indictment or appeal. 
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4.6 Legal Framework 
The applicable law in Kosovo constitutes a blend of UNMIK regulations, including 
the Constitutional Framework149 and domestic laws. As mentioned above, initially the 
UNMIK authorities declared the applicable law in Kosovo to be Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia Serbian law, modified to conform to international human rights 
standards.150 This decision outraged many Kosovar Albanians, who refused to apply 
the law, resulting in widespread confusion. In response, UNMIK issued new 
resolutions describing the applicable law to be the law in force in Kosovo prior to 
March 22, 1989, insofar as it is not in conflict with international human rights 
standards.151 The European Conventionon Human Rights is directly applicable in 
Kosovo and is applied increasingly both by IJs and local judges (although some 
international practitioners have commented that the local practitioners will simply 
reference such provisions rather than reason their citation).  
The jurisdiction of the internationalized panels in Kosovo is that of the domestic 
courts. The crimes that have been tried are therefore encompassed in domestic law. 
Only genocide and war crimes have been encompassed in domestic law through the 
FRY Code, and in practice only war crimes have been tried. War crimes constitute 
approximately 10 percent of the cases initiated by international prosecutors since 
March 2003. Recently there have been fewer prosecutions for war crimes and post-war 
inter-ethnic violence, especially abuses committed duringthe period of late 1999 and 
2001. The ability to pursue further war crimes was severely limited by “the difficulty in 
collecting evidence in the immediate aftermath of the conflict in 2000-01.”152 
Nonetheless, there has been some notable progress in prosecuting war crimes and 
ethnically motivated violence.153 In late 2003, a verdict was delivered in the first 
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 The Constitutional Framework incorporates by reference and makes directly applicable in Kosovo several 
international human rights instruments, including Universal Declaration on Human Rights, European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (with protocols), International 
Covenanton Civil and Political Rights (with protocols), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
150
 UNMIK Resolution 1999/1. 
151
 UNMIK Resolutions 1999/24 and 1999/25. 
152
 UNMIK,“Focus Kosovo,” Feb.2004, at 10. 
153
 SG Report, S/2004/907, para.17. 
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domestic war crimes trial to charge Kosovar Albanians for war crimes within Kosovo 
itself - the so-called Llapi case. The trial attracted widespread public attention.154 
In practice, judges (IJ and local alike) have often failed to refer to any legal sources 
outside the FRY criminal and criminal procedure statutes and the UNMIK 
Regulations. These sources, such as the ICTY’s relevant decisions, do not constitute 
precedent, but couldbe used as persuasive jurisprudence. They are rarely cited.155 In 
2002 the OSCE characterized Supreme Court judgments as being marked by “brevity 
(the average length of decisions is three to four pages), poor legal reasoning, absence 
of citations to legal authority, and lack of interpretation concerning the applicable law 
on war crimes and human rights issues.”156 As a result, the OSCE concluded that the 
international judges’ decisions “are not useful tools for providing guidance to the local 
legal community in the complex field of war crimes and international humanitarian 
law.” Moreover, the decisions are generally not published or otherwise made available 
beyond the  parties, so their reach will likely be very limited. 
Some have commented that on occasion IJs and IPs are to owedded to their own 
traditions to adequately adapt to legal processes in Kosovo. For example, common law 
prosecutors may draft indictments that are considered too brief for civil law standards. 
Verdicts have been criticized for brevity, but also praised for being concise. 
Furthermore, the differences in IPs’ backgrounds can lead to a lack of congruency in 
charges and sentencing.  
On April 6, 2004, the new Provisional Criminal Code157 and Provisional Criminal 
Procedure Code of Kosovo,158 which had been promulgated on July 6, 2003, came into 
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 The Public Prosecutor’s Office v. Latif Gashi, Rrustem Mustafa, Naim Kadriuand Nazif Mehmeti. It was 
the first time that the UN-administered court convicted anyone from the Albanian side of war crimes. The 
accused were indicted for war crimes under domestic applicable law for acts perpetrated against predominantly 
Kosovar Albanian victims; of 26 victims listed in the indictment, one victim was a Kosovar Serb. The four 
accused were charged for allegedly participating in the unlawful detention, torture, and murder of civilians from 
August 1998 to June 1999. For a summary of the Llapi case, see OSCE LSMS, “Case Report: The Public 
Prosecutor’s Office vs Latif Gashi, Rrustem Mustafa, Naim Kadriu and Nazif Mehmeti, The ‘Llapi Case,’ ” 
Dec.2003. 
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 The case against Momcilo Trajkovic (Kosovar Serb) “Trajkovic.” The decision was made by international 
majority. The case against Cedomir Jovanovic and Andjelko Kolasinac “Jovanovic/Kolasinac.” Both 
defendants are Kosovar Serbs. The trial verdict was made with a panel of international majority. 
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 OSCE Report Sept.2002, at 48. 
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 UNMIK Reg. No. 2003/26, On the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, amended by UNMIK Reg. 
No.2004/19, June 16, 2004. 
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effect,159 effectively replacing the domestic applicable criminal laws. These codes were 
drafted by a working group of a wide variety of legal practitioners and were 
consolidated by UNMIK’s Office of Legal Affairs. These new codes have the basis of 
criminal law in Kosovo, along with subsequently promulgated Regulations. The 
Juvenile Justice Code was promulgated on April 20, 2004, and entered into force on 
the same date.160  
This crucial milestone brings the law in Kosovo into conformity with regional and 
European standards and ensures[s] consistency with modern principles of international 
law, in particular international human rights law. The new codes introduce substantial 
reforms to Kosovo’s procedural law, for example, incorporating criminal offenses 
under international law and sexual offenses, increasing the efficiency of the 
proceedings (by reallocating responsibilities at the pre-trial stage), enhancing the 
protection of the right of accused, particularly during detention, and strengthening 
prosecutorial power. Despite some complaints about drafts manship and lacunae, the 
Codes have been universally welcomed as an improvement on the old system, under 
which provisions were applied from numerous different instruments.161  
The new codes transform the criminal structure into a system more adversarial in 
nature, and many local Albanian lawyers express pride at a new, “more European” 
code that has no link to Serbia. As mentioned, the Codes contain a number of new 
features, including guilty pleas and cross-examination at trial. However, there is 
widespread concern about insufficient training for  this dramatic shift within the 
national courts. Features such as guilty pleas and cross-examination are foreign to 
lawyers in Kosovo, who have been trained in a civil law tradition, as well as to IJs from 
civil law systems.  
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 UNMIK Reg. No. 2003/25, On the Provisional Criminal Code and the Provisional Criminal Procedure 
Code for Kosovo. 
159 UNMIK Reg. No. 2003/26, and UNMIK Reg. No. 2003/25. Both were promulgated on July 6, 2003. 
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 UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK/PR/1161, “Speech of DSRSG/Pillar I Jean-Christian Cady in the 
Seminar ‘On Combating Crime with the New Provisional Criminal Code,’” at the Kosovo Judicial Institute, 
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 23 OSCE LSMS, “Review of the Criminal Justice System,” states: After years of drafting and re-drafting, a 
completely revised set of criminal codes entered into force on April 6, 2004. The codes have their own 
problems in terms of drafting style, inconsistencies, and lacunae, but are nonetheless a very welcome 
development. Certainly the codes’ emphasis on the applicability of international human rights standards sends 
an important message. With the help of bold judicial decisions interpreting and applying the law, it is hoped 
that the new codes will develop into a more refined judicial instrument (13). 
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In addition, the new Criminal Procedure Code also introduced the use of video and 
audio recording at the pre-trial and trial stages. The code also provides for the transfer 
of Kosovo residents who are wanted in foreign jurisdictions, although this provision 
should be supplemented by a bilateral agreement with the requesting country. Thus 
far, UNMIK has signed specific ad hoc transfer agreements of Kosovo residents to 
the UK and Norway. 
 
4.7 Defense and issues of Fair Trial 
The defense teams in cases involving IJPs comprise mostly local lawyers. They are paid 
by the Department of the Judicial Administration (DJA) under the Ministry of Public 
Services (MPS). For certain high-profile cases, such as those against senior KLA 
officers, private funds have been raised to hire leading defense lawyers. Dozens of 
Albanian and Serb lawyers have been retained as counsel for such defendants. A 
notable feature of the Kosovo system has been that national lawyers have had to“raise 
their game” to face off in these situations. Many observers speak of improvements in 
the skills of local lawyers, who are adjusting to the adversarial nature of the trials, both 
in facing IPs and practicing under the new code.  
The quality of defense counsel has also been improved through assistance by the 
CDRC, an NGO staffed by national and international lawyers with support from the 
OSCE. The CDRC provided direct legal assistance in war crimes cases, including 
advice and case assistance by international lawyers. Almost all Serb and Albanian 
lawyers commented on the value of trainings and resources for their efforts. However, 
although the CDRC was originally meant to significantly bolster the local Bar, it has 
reduced its programs due to lack of funding.  
Defense lawyers may be paid privately by their clients, but when they are court-
appointed or ex officio, counsels receive a maximum of around 250 Euros a month, 
regardless of hours worked. Payments for ex officio lawyers are also often delayed. 
Moreover, because the payment has a maximum ceiling, there is little incentive for 
defense lawyers to devote more than a few hours to their cases.   
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4.8 Relationship with ICTY and other Transitional Justice mechanisms162 
The ICTY retains the authority to take any case involving genocide, war crimes, or 
crimes against humanity that took place within the former Yugoslavia after 1991,163 
and its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the national courts. ICTY prosecutors 
have made it clear, however, that they are focusing on the most senior perpetrators, 
and UNMIK authorities early on concurred in this division of labor. In addition to the 
case against Slobodan Milosevic, the ICTY has initiated several cases involving 
atrocities committed in Kosovo, against both Serbs and former KLA.164 The ICTY 
eventually charged Ramush Haradinaj, then Prime Minister in Kosovo, who was 
immensely popular as head of one of the leading political parties. He was indicted 
along with two other former KLA members, Idriz Balaj and Lah Ibrahimi, for crimes 
against humanity committed against Serbs, Roma, and suspected Serb collaborators 
during the conflict. Haradinaj was granted provisional release by the ICTY and was 
also allowed to engage in public political activities in so far as allowed by UNMIK, for 
the sake of “peace and reconciliation.”  
UNMIK justice sector officials have described the relationship with the ICTY as 
collaborative and “complementary,” noting that UNMIK regularly assists the ICTY 
with its investigations. The Limaj case, for example, began within the Kosovo courts, 
pushed by local lawyers, and was eventually handed over to the ICTY. For the most 
part, UNMIK officials have not viewed the ICTY as interference, but rather welcome 
any help they can receive from the tribunal and note that the ICTY is focused on only 
the highest level of cases. 
Furthermore, Kosovar Albanians complain that the tribunal’s sentences for Serbs are 
too light, particularly in comparison to local sentences, and they contend that the 
ICTY has not taken on the  biggest crimes that have occurred in Kosovo. Periodically 
policy makers in Kosovo have also discussed the potential utility of a truth 
commission for Kosovo. They often point to the lack of a forum for public 
acknowledgement and reconciliation, both in terms of political leadership and at the 
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community level. The historical aspects of the conflict make it difficult to determine 
the period that a truth commission should address. International prosecutors have 
pointed to the need for an alternative mechanism to fill the “impunity gap” in terms of 
cases they are not able to try. The issue of missing persons features prominently in 
transitional justice  issues in Kosovo. Unlike Bosnia, which has a Human Rights 
Chamber, Kosovo has lacked strong human rights institutions that can be used for 
transitional justice questions, including property return and reparations. 
 
4.9 Conclusions 
Kosovo is entering its eighth year in the aftermath of intensive ethnic conflict and 
longstanding systematic discrimination and it has been five years since the deployment 
of internationals into its legal system. The creation of the various aspects of the 
Kosovo system of international judges (IJs) and international prosecutors (IPs) has to 
be understood as a series of reactive developments to the needs and political reality of 
the immediate post-conflict situation, as opposed to any planned or strategic 
transitional justice initiative to deal with past crimes. The system has made halting 
steps forward, although its contributions have been limited by continuing security 
concerns, concerns regarding independence, ad hoc planning, and poor 
implementation including the absence of any concrete plans for hand-over. 
While many expected that infusing the legal system in Kosovo with international 
capacity through the IJP program would have had a more widespread impact, its effect 
has been limited mainly to substituting for, rather than bolstering, domestic capacity. A 
key factor has been the exclusion of local actors from policy issues relating to justice. 
In effect, the IJP program functions very much as a parallel system with a  particular 
focus on sensitive cases, including organized crime, drug trafficking or  corruption, 
perpetrated by networks supported through Kosovo’s powerful clans, which local 
judges are reluctant to try themselves. 
In addition, although the IJP system has inspired a certain level of trust in the legal 
system, this is mainly in the international handling of cases, rather than in the domestic 
system in general terms. It has to be noted that nationals have been excluded from the 
design of the program and key decisions made in the course of its implementation. As 
a result, while the IJP program itself and the efforts of individual internationals have 
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enjoyed a measure of credibility in Kosovo, the wide discretion of UNMIK’s executive 
over judicial matters has clouded perceptions of independence and beena stumbling 
block to establishing respect for the law. A proper framework elucidating the 
boundaries of these powers would have assisted in diminishing perceptions of 
arbitrariness and inappropriate interference. 
To conclude, inadequate resources and finding suitably qualified (and trained) 
international staff are significant obstacles, although this is perhaps a product of the 
manner in which the IJP evolved and developed. Some would argue that a more 
centralized system of international capacity could have avoided some of those 
problems by improving conditions of service and making internationals feel less 
isolated. On the other hand, the Kosovo hybrid model of jurisdiction is another 
example of how the internationalization of the national legal system may bring about 
benefits in terms of capacity-building, despite the fact that interaction between 
internationals and nationals could have been more strategic and effective. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE EXTRAORDINARY  
CHAMBERS OF CAMBODIA 
 
5.1 Brief history of the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge 
On 17 April 1975, Cambodia’s capital Phnom Penh fell to the forces of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea, popularly known as the Khmer Rouge. From then 
until 1979, the Cambodian people endured horrific abuses of international 
humanitarian and human rights laws.These atrocities were generally not the isolated 
acts of individual officials, but rather resulted from the policies of the Khmer Rouge 
and its leaders. A shadowy group of persons functioned as Angkar (“the 
Organization”) and the victory over the pro-US Lon Nol regime was trumpeted as 
ending thousands of years of subjugation of the Khmer peasantry at the hands of 
foreign and class enemies.The exact nature of the Khmer Rouge movement has been 
controversial — there has been much debate over whether this was a “complete 
peasant revolution”, a Marxist-Leninist experiment or a uniquely Cambodian 
phenomenon driven by a perverse concept of a superior race165. What is clear is that 
the movement brought unspeakable horror and suffering to millions of Cambodians. 
Having finally seized power,the new leaders of Cambodia directed their energies 
towards eliminating those regarded as internal enemies, who threatened the vision of a 
fully independent, socially and ethnically homogeneous Cambodia. Within days of the 
Khmer Rouge seizure of power, hundreds of thousands of urban dwellers were 
forcibly deported from the cities. Those that did not die or get murdered along the 
way were dispatched to work camps in the rural areas to be re-educated through 
enslavement. Countless persons were murdered or died of starvation, overwork or 
sickness and disease. Purges of urban dwellers (who became known as “New People”) 
continued hroughout the reign of the Khmer Rouge and there were also waves of 
internal purges of Khmer Rouge cadre considered to have become threats to the 
system. Entire villages suspected of harbouring enemies of Democratic Kampuchea 
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were decimated. “To counter the perceived threat and build a ‘clean social system’, the 
regime launched a uniquely thorough revolution whereby all pre-existing economic, 
social and cultural institutions were abolished, all foreign influences were expunged 
and the entire population was transformed into a collective workforce, required to 
work at breakneck speed to build up the country’s economic strength.”166 On 6 
January 1979, an invading Vietnamese Army liberated Cambodia from the Khmer 
Rouge but did not leave until 1989.  
In percentage terms, Cambodia had endured one of the worst genocides in history: 
between a quarter and a third of the population (estimated in 1975 at almost 8 million 
people) died in less than four years167. About three-quarters of the survivors were 
women.168  This has led many to describe the acts of the Khmer Rouge as genocidal. 
Within months of the fall of Democratic Kampuchea, many Khmer Rouge cadres fled 
to the jungles and abroad. Others remained in Cambodia, moved to other parts of the 
country, and changed their names. The new Vietnamese–and Russian-backed 
government–the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, headed by former Khmer Rouge 
official Heng Samrin–held trials of Democratic Kampuchea’s Prime Minister Pol Pot, 
Deputy Prime Minister Leng Sary, and President Khieu Samphan, among others, and 
sentenced them in absentia. A few lower-level cadres were jailed.  
For their part, the unrepentant Khmer Rouge leaders were able to elude the 
Vietnamese-led forces and established bases in Thai territory, aided by China and 
Thailand. Funded by smuggled gemstones and timber, they continued to terrorize local 
populations throughout Cambodia, who they often forced to march into camps in the 
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jungle. The campaign of destabilization by the Khmer Rouge ensured that Cambodia’s 
civil war continued throughout the 1980s. 
In the meantime, the political situation in Cambodia began to take a convoluted and 
politically expedient shape when three factions aligned to form the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982. They were the royalist 
FUNCINPEC party under Prince Sihanouk; the KPNLF under Son Sann, who had 
served as Cambodia’s prime minister from 1955 to 1979; and the Khmer Rouge Army, 
which made up the largest fraction of the coalition. In light of increasing public 
resentment over the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the CGDK put forth its 
platform: ‘to mobilize all efforts in the common struggle to liberate Kampuchea from 
the Vietnamese aggressors.’ 
The United Nations continued to allow Democratic Kampuchea’s representative 
(through the CGDK) to occupy Cambodia’s seat in the General Assembly until 1990, 
a year after Vietnamese troops had withdrawn from the country. By recognizing this 
government as the only legitimate representative of Cambodia, the world bestowed a 
measure of credibility on the Khmer Rouge and bolstered its political strength. 
After years of negotiations, all of the parties to the ongoing conflict in Cambodia 
signed a peace agreement in Paris on 23 October 1991 and agreed to organize a 
national election under the supervision of the United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC). But later, the Khmer Rouge boycotted the UN organized 
election and refused to demobilize their forces. For several years, Khmer Rouge 
soldiers continued to fight against the troops of the government formed as a result 
ofthe 1993 elections: the Royal Government of Cambodia,which is still in power 
today. This coalition government was headed by Prince Norodom Ranariddh of 
FUNCINPEC as first prime minister and Samdech Hun Sen ofthe Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP) as second prime minister169. 
By 1996, the power of the Khmer Rouge was clearly on the wane170,6despite its 
continued military activity in the north and northwest of the country. Both 
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FUNCINPEC and the CPP, in an effort to stem the guerilla war the Khmer Rouge 
was waging in rural areas and bring a measure of stability to the country, made 
tentative contacts with members of the movement, offering them a generous package 
of concessions if they would ‘join the government.’ These included ranks in the 
Cambodian military, continued control over some of the territory held by the Khmer 
Rouge, natural resources concessions, and even villas in Phnom Penh. The 
government also offered something that proved irresistible to the former leaders of 
Democratic Kampuchea: de facto amnesties. 
The first to accept the offer of amnesty was former Deputy Prime Minister Leng Sary, 
who defected with a few thousand of his followers in August 1996. As a reward, he 
was pardoned and his 1979 in absentia death sentence revoked171. While this defection 
split an already weakened Khmer Rouge movement, it also created a huge outcry from 
survivors of Democratic Kampuchea and forced the issue of justice for the regime’s 
crimes to the fore.  
The pursuit of political agendas during this time worked against the pursuit of justice. 
Both the CPP and FUNCINPEC were competing to attract Khmer Rouge defectors 
into their ranks and thus increase their political capital. The CPP, in particular, which 
held the upper hand, was reluctant to push for trials, fearing that defecting troops 
would join the ranks of FUNCINPEC and shift the balance of power. 
 
5.1 The long road to the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers 
The first official movement toward trials was a tentative one: in April 1997, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 1997/49. It allowed the Secretary-
General to examine any request for assistance in responding to past serious violations 
of Cambodian and international law. In June of the same year, First Prime Minister 
Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen requested assistance from 
the UN and the international community ‘in bringing to justice those persons 
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responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity’ during the Khmer Rouge 
regime. Their letter to the Secretary-General laid a potential foundation for an 
international-style tribunal: “Cambodia does not have the resources or expertise to conduct this 
very important procedure. Thus, we believe it is necessary to ask for the assistance of the United 
Nations. We are aware of similar efforts to respond to the genocide and crimes against humanity in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and ask that similar assistance be given to Cambodia”.172 
According to Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg, who was instrumental in negotiating 
for the Tribunal from 1997 to 2000, the letter was circulated to the Security Council, 
but the response from member states and the secretariat was less than enthusiastic, in 
particular from the Chinese delegation who made clear that they did not want the topic 
on the Security Council agenda.173 
During this period, the Khmer Rouge movement continued to disintegrate: in 1997, 
Pol Pot ordered the execution of former Democratic Kampuchea Minister of Defense 
Son Sen and his wife Minister of Culture and Information Yum Yat. In July of that 
same year, Pol Pot himself was tried by a Khmer Rouge ‘people’s court’ and sentenced 
to life detention. He died on 15 April 1998 in the jungle near the Thai border, of 
unknown causes.  
Two weeks later, the US delegation to the United Nations presented a draft resolution 
to establish an ad hoc tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge leaders in the Netherlands, 
similar to the Tribunal on former Yugoslavia. It too faced stiff opposition from the 
international community. 
 
5.2 Negotiating the Structure of the Extraordinary Chambers 
5.2.1 The UN Group of Experts’ Format for the Tribunal 
Little progress was made in moving towards a tribunal until November 1998, when the 
UN sent a Group of Experts to assess the feasibility of bringing Khmer Rouge leaders 
to justice. Their February 1999 report recommended the creation of an international 
tribunal to judge the crimes of the Khmer Rouge period. They noted that ‘the 
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Cambodian judiciary presently lacks three key criteria for a fair and effective judiciary: 
a trained cadre of judges, lawyers, and investigators; adequate infrastructure; and a 
culture of respect for due process.’174 It continued: “Cambodia still lacks a culture of 
respect for an impartial criminal justice system. Criminal justice receives only a fraction 
of a per cent of the national budget, with judges paid as little as $20 per month. As a 
result, despite the presence of persons of character in parts of the judiciary, it is widely 
believed that judges can easily be bought by defendants or victims. The vast majority of 
judges are also closely associated with the Cambodian People's Party. Powerful 
elements in the Government such as important political figures, the security apparatus 
and the Ministry of Justice are widely believed to exert overt and covert influence over 
the decisions of investigating judges and trial courts. These include threats and physical 
attacks on judges; or simply the realization among judges that their tenure, and often 
their prospect of future livelihood, depends upon the approval of political elements”.175                             
It was partly as a result of these concerns that the Group of Experts strongly 
recommended the establishment of an international ad hoc tribunal following the 
models of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). This was flatly rejected by the 
Cambodian Government, and it is difficult to imagine that, after experiencing the 
spiralling budgets and lengthy delays associated with the two existing ad hoc tribunals, 
the member states of the UN would have been prepared to agree to such a course. The 
Group’s position that trials be held in the Asia-Pacific region, but not Cambodia, was 
also clear.                                                              
 
5.2.2 The UN Negotiating strategy 
Prime Minister Hun Sen, meanwhile, began speaking of the inclusion of other crimes 
in the UN ‘package,’ including the American bombings of the 1970s and Chinese 
support for the Khmer Rouge. While there was no denying this historical context, 
Hammarberg repeatedly stressed the need for the Tribunal to stick to the Khmer 
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Rouge atrocities. Both of Cambodia’s major political parties were also battling with 
accusations that they had collaborated with the Khmer Rouge. This impression was 
not dispelled with the December 1998 defections of Khieu Samphan (who had 
officially succeeded Pol Pot as the leader ofthe Khmer Rouge in 1985) and Nuon Chea 
(the deputy secretary ofthe Communist Party of Kampuchea, who is widely believed to 
have been Pol Pot’s right-hand man).Hun Sen received the two men in his private 
residence, a gesture that indicated that the Prime Minister was moving toward 
reconciliation, rather than justice. His now-infamous quote on the occasion – that ‘the 
time had come to dig a hole and bury the past’ – certainly seemed to contradict his 
earlier support for the Tribunal. 
In March 1999, Cambodia’s foreign minister flew to New York to meet with the UN 
Secretary-General. He delivered an aide-memoire reminding the UN that Democratic 
Kampuchea was allowed to occupy Cambodia’s seat at the UN until the 1991 Paris 
Peace accords, which gave the movement legitimacy. But the government was not 
quite finished, and added a statement that did not bode well for the future of a 
tribunal, noting that: with the total military and political collapse of the Khmer Rouge, 
Cambodia would now ‘focus on other priorities, primarily on economic development 
and poverty alleviation.’ In what appeared to be a final blow later that month, Hun Sen 
announced in a meeting with Hammarberg that there would be no international 
tribunal, either within or outside Cambodia because Cambodian law did not allow for 
the participation offoreigners either as judges or prosecutors. A statement by the 
foreign minister gave emotional force to this position: “The international community 
talks about finding justice for the Cambodian people. Cambodia agrees to find justice 
for Cambodians and for humanity. But what has the international community been 
doing vis-à-vis the Khmer Rouge lately? Once the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime was 
toppled, the so-called international community continued to support the Khmer 
Rouge. The so-called international community forced Cambodia to accept the Khmer 
Rouge as partners in the Paris peace talks and in the Supreme National Council (SNC). 
It said nothing about responsibility of the Khmer Rouge, let alone prosecution of 
them. But now that Cambodia has achieved peace and reconciliation, they call for an 
international tribunal. Can we trust them? 
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Negotiations followed, but were not concluded when the Law was promulgated by the 
Cambodian Government on 10 August 2001. At this stage, final agreement had not 
been reached between the UN and the Cambodian Government on the matter of the 
structure and composition of the CEC.  
The Law provided for a three-tiered structure of Trial Court, Appeal Court and 
Supreme Court, composed of five, seven and nine judges, respectively, with a 
Cambodian majority and a Cambodian President in each Chamber. It also included the 
provision that there should be a super-majority required for any decision in any 
Chamber — i.e. a simple majority plus one. The intention was that this would mean 
that no decision could be taken without the agreement of at least one international 
judge. This unusual provision was intended to be a compromise between the UN's 
strong preference for a majority of international judges, and the Cambodian insistence 
on a majority of national judges. The compromise appears to have surfaced in the 
course of negotiations in the summer of 1999. In an internal UN memorandum 
written about that time, Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg, Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, wrote: It would of course be 
safer to have a foreign majority among both prosecutors or judges. This will probably 
be difficult for the Cambodian side to accept (this is why the point about decision-
making rules might be important). The essential point is that it should not be possible for the 
Cambodians — even if appointed from outside — to outvote the foreigners. There is of course a 
dynamic aspect here — the awareness that the Cambodian judges themselves cannot 
alone decide will reduce the risk of pressure176. 
In February 2002, the UN abandoned negotiations with the Cambodian Government. 
The principal area of disagreement was over the legal status of the proposed agreement 
between the Cambodian Government and the UN on the establishment of the CEC. 
However, as the statement by the UN Legal Counsel Hans Corell at the time of the 
pullout makes clear, the UN was also concerned that ‘the Extraordinary Chambers, as 
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currently envisaged, would not guarantee the independence, impartiality and objectivity 
that a court established with the support of the UN must have’177. 
Over the following year, at the urging of member states, a rapprochement was 
effected, and in March 2003 the Secretary-General was able to report to the UN 
General Assembly that an acceptable draft agreement had been negotiated, and to 
invite the General Assembly to adopt it. He noted in his report that ‘[t]here still 
remains doubt in some quarters about the credibility of the Extraordinary Chambers, 
given the precarious state of the judiciary in Cambodia’178. As far as the structure of the 
courts was concerned, the Secretary-General had advanced a number of proposals in 
renewed negotiations with the Cambodian Government, with the aim of simplifying 
and expediting the trial process, and ensuring fair and independent trials. These 
proposals included a simpler two-tier structure, with a Trial Chamber composed of 
three judges, and an Appeals Chamber composed of five judges; one prosecutor and 
one investigating judge, both of whom would be ‘internationals’, instead of two co-
prosecutors and two co-investigating judges; a majority of international judges in each 
chamber; and the use of a simple majority voting system. 
With the exception of the reduction of the number of instances from three to two, the 
Cambodian Government was not prepared to contemplate any changes to the 
structure and composition of the courts as set out in its Law of 2001. This was made 
clear in a statement by the Cambodian Delegation to the UN at the resumption of 
negotiations in January 2003: “Several years of negotiation have formulated the 
personal, temporal and material jurisdiction for the Extraordinary Chambers. We 
should resist any proposal to change the nature of this jurisdiction by altering the 
balance in the relationship of the number of judges, prosecutors and investigating 
judges, the super-majority, or the Pre-Trial Chamber to settle any differences between 
them. When we commenced these negotiations in 1999 our two positions were far 
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apart. It would be unthinkable now to return to these positions and abandon our hard-
won gains in the jurisdiction179”. 
The Secretary-General expressed concern in his report that there had been no 
movement with regard to these provisions, echoing the sentiments originally voiced by 
the Group of Experts in February 1999: “... in view of the clear finding of the General 
Assembly in its Resolution 57/225 that there are continued problems related to the 
rule of law and the functioning of the judiciary in Cambodia resulting from the 
interference of the executive in the independence of the judiciary, I would very much 
have preferred that the draft agreement provide for both of the Extraordinary 
Chambers to be composed of a majority of international judges. I was, and continue to 
be, of the view that international judges, who would not be dependent in any way on 
the executive authorities of Cambodia, would be much less likely to be influenced by, 
or to yield to, any interference from that quarter. In addition, it would not have been 
necessary to apply the problematic ‘super-majority’ formula, which was introduced into 
the negotiations by member states, and not by the United Nations Delegation. ... 
Doubts might therefore still remain as to whether the provisions of the draft 
agreement relating to the structure and organization of the Extraordinary Chambers 
would fully ensure their credibility, given the precarious state of the judiciary in 
Cambodia. 
 
5.2.3 The Agreed Outcome 
The Agreement which was approved on 13 May 2003 reflects the UN's acceptance 
of the Cambodian Government's refusal to agree to significant changes to the 
structure and composition of the Chambers180. Article 3 provides for two Chambers, 
a Trial Chamber and a Supreme Court Chamber, consisting of five and seven 
judges, respectively. The Supreme Court Chamber serves as both an appellate 
chamber and a court of final instance. In all other significant respects, the 
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composition and structure of the Chambers is as provided in the Law of January 
2001. The Law, with Amendments promulgated on 27 October 2004, also reflects 
this181. The weakness of the UN's position is shown by the fact that only one of the 
Secretary-General's proposed modifications to the structure and composition of the 
courts — one which did not affect the Cambodian dominance of the system — was 
accepted182. So keen were the member states to conclude an agreement that the UN 
was prepared to concede all these points rather than risk a further breakdown in 
negotiations. It is a reflection of doubts on the part of the UN that the Agreement 
which was approved on 13 May 2003 included the provision in Article 28 that: 
Should the Royal Government of Cambodia change the structure or organization of 
the Extraordinary Chambers or otherwise cause them to function in a manner that 
does not conform with the terms of the present Agreement, the United Nations 
reserves the right to cease to provide assistance, financial or otherwise, pursuant to 
the present Agreement.  
The negotiations had been conducted in an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust that 
the conclusion of the Agreement did not end. Article 28 reflects a queasy lack of 
confidence with which the Agreement is viewed by the UN. Doubts as to whether 
these trials will really produce any measure of justice are widespread. 
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5.3   Legal Framework 
5.3.1 Temporal Jurisdiction 
Under the Agreement and the Law, the temporal jurisdiction of the Extraordinary 
Chambers, extends from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979. The period covered is the 
height of the reign of the Khmer Rouge. It is not unusual for an internationalized 
judicial body to have jurisdiction only in respect of crimes committed during a specific 
period of time. Yet it needs to be kept in mind that crimes such as the ones within the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers have been committed 
before and after this period.  The Cambodian conflict, in reality, engulfed the country 
in violence from at least the end of the 1960s to the early 1990s and if a more 
expansive approach were to be taken to the conflict, similar events in Laos, Thailand 
and Vietnam would also have to be considered. 
The choice to limit the temporal jurisdiction to the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 
January 1979 was, at least in part, a pragmatic one, founded on the wish not to 
overburden the Extaordinary Chambers, the wish to enable the Extraordinary 
Chambers after their establishment to start their work promptly and the wish to limit 
the financial and the human resources needed. 
 
5.3.2 Subject matter Jurisdiction 
The Agreement reapeatedly and in different levels of detail enumerates the crimes that 
are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Extraordianry Cahmbers. In the third 
preambular paragraph it is stated in a general way that these are: “crimes and serious 
violation of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom and 
international conventions recognised by Cambodia”. This is repeated in Article 1 of 
the Agreement, while Article 2, paragraph 1, provides that Extraordinary Chambers 
have subject matter jurisdiction consistent with that set forth “in the Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers…” as adopted and amended by the 
Cambodian Legislature under the Constitution of Cambodia. 
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The reference to the Law in Article 2 notwithstanding, Article 9 of the Agreement 
gives a more detailed description of the crimes in question and lists: 
the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, crimes against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC and 
graves breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and such other crimes defined in Chapter II of the 
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers as promulgated on 10 August 2001. 
The international crimes mentioned in the Agreement (genocide, crimes against 
humanity and graves breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions) can also be found in 
the law. However, the definitions used in the Law are not identical to the definitions 
referred to in the Agreement. 
The definition of genocide in the Law duplicates the definition of Article 2 of the 1948 
Genocide Convention. However, when the Law tries to duplicate Article 3 of the 
Genocide Convention, it is not identical. Contrary of the Article 3 of the Genocide 
Convention, the Law does not allow for acts of “direct  and public incitement to 
commit genocie” and “complicity in genocide” to fall under the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers. On the other hand “participation in acts 
of genocide” in not mentioned in Article 3 of the Genocide Convention, but it does 
fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers. 
As to crimes against humanity, the Law is somewhat more limited the the Statute of 
the ICC, referred to in Article 9 of the Agreement. More specifically, the Statute inter 
alia states as crimes againts humanity: 
• imprisonment or other serious deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
funadamental rules of international law; 
• rape, sexual slavery, foreced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforces sterilization 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, and 
• persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jursidiction of the Court. 
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The Law, on the other hand, refers to, respectively: 
• imprisonment; 
• rape, and 
• persecution on political and religious grounds. 
 
Moreover, the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance of persons is not in 
the Law at all. However the use of the word of “crimes against humanity…such as” in 
the next of the Law indicates that its enumeration of crimes is only indicative and 
therefore not exhaustive. 
When the more detailed description of the subject matter jurisdiction in Article 9 of 
the Agreement is compared with the subject matter jurisdiction as formulated in the 
Law (Chapter II), it is possible to argue that the two are not identical. In respect of 
two of the three categories of international crimes (genocide and crimes against 
humanity) the Law lacks of clarity. The enumeration of crimes in the Law does not 
match with the international legal instruments referred to in the Agreement. 
In order to make the Law consistent with Article 9 of the Agreement, either the 
enumeration in the Law should be eliminated and replaced by a rule of reference or 
the enumeration should be made fully consistent with the international legal 
instruments specified in Article 9 of the Agreement. The former approach was 
adopted in the Law with regard to the other remaining crimes under international law, 
namely the destruction of cultural property and crimes against internationally 
protected persons: these are not defined separately in the Law, but the Law relies on 
the international definition of these crimes instead. 
 
5.3.3 Personal Jurisdiction 
The Agreement and the Law are identical as to which persons should be brought to 
justice, namely “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most 
responsible for the crimes and serious violations”. This formulation of the Chambers’ 
personal jurisdiction is open to different interpretations and shows the high political 
and practical decisions that had to be made to get supprt within Cambodia for the 
Extraordinary Chambers. 
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Questions that arised when reading this definition are how seniority shall be defined 
and how it can be established that a person is “most responsible” (as opposed to, for 
example, “more responsible” or “substantially responsible”). These delicate issues have 
to be decided by the Extraordinary Chambers on a case by case interpretation. A 
comparative analysis of the Extraordinary Chambers judges on how the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone has dealt with this specific issue (for Sierra Leone the approach was 
based on ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility) is desirable and might pave the 
way to the consolidation of a principle of international law.  
 
5.3.4 Amnesty 
In 1979 a trial in absentia was held in Cambodia in which Ieng Sary and Pol Pot were 
convicted for genocide. In August 1996 the Cambodian king granted Ieng Sary 
amnesty, not only from his 1979 conviction for genocide, but also from prosecution 
under a 1994 Cambodian Law which outlawed the Khmer Rouge. 
The United Nations at fist held the position that an amnesty decreed on a national 
level could not apply to international crimes such as genocide. The Cambodian 
governmet, however, refused to repeal the amnesty for Ieng Sary. It had therefore 
included in the law that it would not request any further amnesty or pardon for 
persons investigated or convicted of one or more of the crimes under the jurisdiction 
of the Extraordinary Chambers. This implied that the existing amnesty for Ieng Sary 
would be maintaned. A compromise was found for the text of the Agreement, with 
the effect that is would have been a matter for the Extraordinary Chambers to decide 
to what extent Ieng Sary’s amnesty will serve to bar his prosecution or conviction. On 
November 12, 2007, Ieng Sary has been arrested and charged with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes after a warrant was issued by the co-investigationg judges of 
the Extraordinary Chambers and the Law changed accordingly. 
 
5.4 General Principles of Criminal Law 
5.4.1  Statute of limitations 
The Agreement does not contain any provisions on a statute of limitations for the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers, not does it claim the 
non-applicability of a statute of limitations. The drafters presumably took the position 
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that for crimes against humanity, as well as other international crimes, no statute of 
limitations applies. However, for the crimes under national criminal law of homicide, 
torture and religious persecution, the situation is different. The 1956 Cambodian 
Criminal Code has a statute of limitations of 10 years and the Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Cahmbers has extended the limitation period fot 
these crimes with 20 more years. 
This extension of the statute of limitations raises two questions, to which the legal 
available instruments do not provide an answer. First, can the law have any effect on 
crimes for which the limitation period had already ended before the Law came into 
effect (under the 1956 Criminal Code the possibility to judge these crimes ended 
between 17 April 1985 and 6 January 1989)? Has the possibility of trying these crimes 
simply revived by the entry into force of the Law? It is questionable whether 
affirmative answers to these questions are in conformity with the criminal law 
principle of non-retroactivity. 
Secondly, it appears to be the intention of the Law that the extention of the limitation 
period only applies in respect of the crimes of homicide, torture and religious 
persecution when they are tried by the Extraordinary Chambers, since the Law extends 
the statute of limitations for the crimes of homicide, torture and religious persecution 
“which are within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers”. If this is true, it 
means that a person falling within the personal jurisdiction of the Extraordinary 
Chambers can be tried for homicide, torture and religious persecution for 20 more 
years than any other person who committed such crimes during the same period (who 
cannot be brought before the Extraordinary Chambers). One could argue that this is 
not consisitent with the principle of equality before the law. 
 
5.4.2 Individual responsibility 
The Agreement implies that acts within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary 
Chambers engage the individual responsibility of the perpetrators but it does not detail 
the conditions and modalities of such responsibility. Article 29 of the Law does 
elaborate on the individual responsibility of those who fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Extraordinary Chambers. 
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Those who plan, istigate, order, aid, abet or commit the crimes are individually 
responsible. This provision is comparable to Article 25 of the Statute of the ICC, but 
is less elaborate. To name just two differences: the Law does not explicitly make 
punishable the act of providing the means for the commission of a crime and the Law 
does not make punishable the attempt to commit a crime. 
Position or rank in the Khmer Rouge organzation will not per se relieve a person of 
criminal responsibility and does not preclude that a relatively low-rankinf officer can 
be most responsible. The responsibility of a low-ranking officer does not dissolve 
because of the fact that he or she committed a crime while following an order, and a 
high-ranking officer has full criminal responsibility if a subordinate committed a crime 
under his or her effective command and control and his or her authority and control, 
if the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit 
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measuress to prevent or punish such acts. 
The provision in the law that the fact that a low ranking officer was following an order 
does not take away his or her responsibility, introduce a standard that is more strict 
than, for example, the Statute of the ICC, and somehow more strict than the 
Regulation on the Special Panels in East Timor. 
 
5.5 The Organization of the Extraordinary Chambers and problems arising 
from the Super-majority Arrangement 
As described above, a recurring source of conflict between the United Nations and the 
Cambodian Government has been the organization of the Extraordinary Chambers. 
At the end, the structure and composition that has been finally agreed for is unique 
and may pose some problems.        
The Sierra Leone and Timor model of hybrid tribunals have used chambers consisting 
of national and international judges with a majority of international judges and a simple 
majority voting system. International judges have been used in a minority within the 
existing legal structure in Kosovo, without significantly improving the standards of 
justice, but the situation is too different to afford any real comparison. As a result, the 
super-majority requirement is unique to the CEC. It is therefore difficult to argue with 
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reference to parallel situations, because no real comparisons exist. However, it is clear 
that there are inherent problems in the structure as provided.  
The super-majority provision is drafted under Article 14 of the Law as follows:  
1) The judges shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decisions. If this is not 
possible, the following shall apply:  
• a decision by the Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court shall require the 
affirmative vote of at least four judges; 
• a decision by the Extraordinary Chamber of the Supreme Court shall require 
the affirmative vote of at least five judges. 
2) When there is no unanimity, the decision of the Extraordinary Chamber shall 
contain the opinions of the majority and the minority. 
It is in this provision that the real problems lie. Ambassador Hammarberg writes:  
The ‘super majority’ notion is clearly a compromise and not without problems. It 
carries an implicit notion of there being two categories of judges — which would be an 
unfortunate perception even in more normal circumstances. Such a notion of two 
‘sides’ seems to be based on a lack of trust which ought to be handled more directly. 
Also, the model could in real life lead to stalemate situations in which there would be a 
majority, but not a large enough one for a decision183. 
This possibility is a very real one. Whilst in most court systems in which issues of fact 
are determined by a panel of professional judges, a decision is guaranteed, as in cases 
of disagreement a simple majority will prevail; however, under the system in the CEC, 
if the Trial Chamber is split 3-2, or the Appeals Chamber 4-3, no decision is possible. 
Trials may therefore end in an unsatisfactory limbo, where there is neither a conviction 
nor an acquittal, and in such cases, accused persons will presumably have to be freed 
without any decision being made.  
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This situation is an unhappy one, and the fear of many commentators is that it may 
lead to the release of defendants who, on evidence and in the view of the international 
judges, should be convicted. This would result in the process being seen as a costly and 
time-consuming charade.  
It should be noted that, undesirable as this may be, such uncertain conclusions to trials 
are not without parallel — for example, in some court systems (such as Scotland), a 
verdict of ‘not proven’ has a similar effect. So too does the situation in jury systems 
where a jury has been unable to reach the required majority for a decision, and a ‘hung’ 
jury results in the defendant being freed without a verdict184. 
But the CEC have an even greater potential problem, which may surface long before 
the stage at which verdicts are considered. The super-majority voting system applies to 
all decisions, not simply to decisions as to guilt or innocence. There will, therefore, be 
many decisions that are required on motions filed by the parties during the course of 
the trial which may be impossible to resolve. The problem, arising from the fact that 
this rule must apply to all decisions, and not simply to the final one, is acknowledged 
by the existence of a special rule concerning proceedings in the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
Here the Agreement stipulates at Article 7 that ‘[i]f there is no majority, as required for 
a decision, the investigation or prosecution shall proceed’185. 
It would not be possible to formulate a simple rule like this in respect of the many 
varied matters on which the Trial Chamber or the Supreme Court Chamber may have 
to decide, and no attempt has been made to do so. Such issues include, for example, 
the protection of witnesses, the disclosure of documents, and the admissibility of 
evidence. These issues can be matters of fundamental importance to both parties. If 
there is no decision, for example on whether a piece of evidence should or should not 
be admitted, it may be effectively impossible for a trial to continue.  
Two simple examples illustrate the point: suppose the prosecution wants to produce as 
part of its case documents — e.g. the notes of meetings at which it alleges the 
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defendant was present — which provide evidence of the defendant's guilt. The defence 
argues that the evidence is inadmissible. The judges are unable to reach a decision, as 
they are split 3-2. How then can the trial continue? There is no decision, so the 
evidence is neither in, nor out. The prosecution does not know whether it can rely on 
it, or not. The defence does not know whether it needs to counter it, or not. Most 
importantly, the judges cannot get to the stage of making a final decision, as there is no 
preliminary rule as to whether or not the evidence in question can form a part of the 
evidence on which they must give their judgment.  
Similarly, there may be arguments with regard to disclosure. The defence may request 
the judges to order that the prosecution disclose a certain document — e.g. the record 
of a conversation between prosecution lawyers and a witness. The prosecution argues 
that the defence has no right to it. Again, the judges are split 3-2, and there is no 
decision. What happens then to the document? Should the prosecution be entitled to 
retain it, despite the fact that there is an outstanding request for its disclosure on which 
there has been no decision? How does this impact on the rights of the defendant? If 
the defence considers the document may be vital to its case, how then can it continue, 
without a decision?  
The continuation of the trial in such cases is, therefore, left in limbo. The system is 
likely to be seriously debilitated, leading to a process that is at best slow and 
cumbersome, at worst inoperable. If proceedings suffer breakdown in the early stages 
due to this provision, the question of unsatisfactory conclusions to trials may never 
even arise.  
It should also be noted that, where there is no unanimous or super-majority decision, 
there is no provision under which the opinions of the judges shall be published; Article 
14.2 of the Law186 provides only for the publication of the opinion of the majority and 
the minority where there is a decision, in the event of a Chamber being split 3-2, there 
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is no decision, and therefore no provision for the conflicting opinions to be 
published187. 
So, if super-majority decisions are not reached, there may be no official information as 
to the division of opinions among the judges. Given that such divisions may cripple 
the court process, the omission is a serious one for the openness of justice.  
There is one further serious problem. Under Article 36 of the Law:  
The Extraordinary Chamber of the Supreme Court shall decide appeals made by the 
accused, the victims, or the Co-Prosecutors against the decision of the Extraordinary 
Chamber of the trial court ...188 
There is no provision under which non-decisions can be appealed; if the trial court fails 
to reach a decision, that is the end of the matter. Therefore, issues of fundamental 
importance (including the issue of guilt) which have caused division, but not decision, 
in the trial court, will never reach the Supreme Court at all. It is difficult to believe that 
such an outcome was intended by the drafters of the legislation. Its effect is to deal a 
devastating blow to the effectiveness of the Appeals System, and therefore the system 
of the CEC as a whole.  
The disagreements between the UN and the Cambodian Government concerning the 
structure and composition of the Chambers were, from the beginning, fundamental. It 
is clear from the final ‘compromise’ that these disagreements have been resolved 
almost entirely in line with the position taken by the Cambodian Government. Without 
this capitulation on the part of the UN, there would have been no agreement, as the 
Cambodian Government was unwavering in its refusal to countenance a court in which 
its nationals were not in the majority.  
The answer to the question as to whether the Secretary-General's preferred course 
involving international dominance of the Chambers would have been better is, 
therefore, both obvious and otiose, as this scenario would never have arisen. The only 
real question is, whether the Agreement as it stands is better than a breakdown in 
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decisions come under the same rule, they would have included words to that effect. 
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negotiations which would have led to there being no international support for the CEC 
at all. The UN's answer to this question is contained in its signature of the Agreement 
on 13 May 2002; its reservations are contained in the ‘get out’ clause it included in 
Article 28 of that Agreement.  
The answer given by history may be a different one. The view that any form of justice, 
however unsatisfactory, is better than nothing is not one that is likely to stand the test 
of time. It seems certain that the structure and composition of the CEC is such that 
their operation will be under constant threat of  incapacitation and breakdown. It is a 
cheerless prospect for what may well turn out to be a thoroughly unsatisfactory 
experiment in justice. 
 
5.6 Latest developments 
(…) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
INTERNATIONALIZED COURTS: ADVANTAGES AND PITFALLS 
 
6.1 Potential Advantages of Hyrbid Courts 
The success of any effort to confront past atrocities, whether through criminal trials, truth 
commissions, civil compensation schemes, vetting of public officials, or some combination 
thereof, will depend on the particular social, political, and cultural context. The need for such 
an effort to confront the past, and the role it might play in establishing peace and democratic 
institutions of governance, likewise varies considerably depending on the unique 
circumstances of each case: there are no cookie--cutter solutions to these highly complex 
problems. The Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia cases share enough 
similarities, however, that one can use them to draw a few tentativeconclusions about the 
promise that hybrid courts hold in other settings. In particular, hybrid courts may offer at 
least partial responses to the problems of legitimacy, capacity, and norm--penetration 
discussed previously. 
In Kosovo and East Timor, for example, the addition of international judges and 
prosecutors to cases involving serious human rights abuses may have enhanced the 
perceived legitimacy of the process, at least to some degree. In both contexts, the initial 
failure of UN authorities to consult with the local population in making governance 
decisions generally, and decisions about the judiciary specifically sparked public outcry. 
Without normal political processes in place, of course, such consultation is inherently 
difficult. When no elected officials exist to give advice, and civil society is badly damaged by 
years of oppression and conflict, it is not at all clear precisely which people should be 
consulted without creating impressions of bias. Thus, in both Kosovo and East Timor the 
appointment of foreign judges to domestic courts to sit alongside local judges and the 
appointment of foreign prosecutors to team up with local prosecutors helped to create a 
framework for consultation that may have enhanced the general perception of the 
institution's legitimacy. By working together and sharing responsibilities, international and 
local officials necessarily consulted with each other. 
The appointment of international judges to the local courts in these highly sensitive cases 
may also have helped to enhance the perception of the independence of the judiciary and 
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therefore its legitimacy within a broad cross--section of the local population. In Kosovo this 
was most apparent, as the previous attempts at domestic justice had failed to win any 
support among Serbs. Indeed, Serbian judges refused to cooperate in the administration of 
justice and the verdicts in the cases tried by ethnic Albanians were regarded by the ethnic 
Serbian population as tainted. In contrast, the verdicts of the hybrid tribunals garnered 
considerable support, even among Serbs.  
The sharing of responsibilities among local and international officials is not a complete cure 
for legitimacy problems, of course. Indeed, such hybrid relationships can raise new questions 
about who is really controlling the process. When international actors wield more power 
than local officials - when the majority of judges on a given panel is international, for 
example, or when the local prosecutors merely serve as deputies to international prosecutors 
- some may charge that the international actors control the process and that such control 
smacks of imperialism. In East Timor, some local actors involved in the criminal justice 
process criticized the hybrid court on these grounds. On the other hand, too little 
international control may lead to concerns about the independence and impartiality of overly 
locally controlled processes.  And the devil is, of course, often in these details. Nonetheless, 
the shared arrangement does offer more promise of working out these difficulties than a 
purely international or a purely domestic process. 
The hybrid process offers advantages in the arena of capacity--building as well. The side-by-
side working arrangements allow for on-the-job training that is likely to be more effective 
than abstract classroom discussions of formal legal rules and principles. And the teamwork 
can allow for sharing of experiences and knowledge in both directions. International actors 
have the opportunity to gain greater sensitivity to local issues, local culture, and local 
approaches to justice at the same time that local actors can learn from international actors. In 
addition, hybrid courts can serve as a locus for international funding efforts, thereby 
pumping needed funds into the rebuilding of local infrastructure. 
To be sure, hybrid courts also face difficulties in capacity--building. A lack of resources has 
proven to be the most serious problem so far. For example, in both Kosovo and East 
Timor, the hybrid courts have been given an enormous mandate without receiving sufficient 
funding. Court personnel lack even the most basic equipment necessary for them to do their 
jobs; translators and other administrative personnel are in short supply; and, perhaps most 
significantly, the courts have had trouble attracting and retaining qualified international 
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personnel to fill posts as judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. To the extent that hybrid 
courts are touted as a means of doing justice on the cheap and are then deprived of even the 
most basic resources, they cannot fulfill their potential. Nonetheless, such concerns about 
funding are issues more of implementation than conception. And, of course, lack of 
resources can be a problem regardless of the legal framework adopted. 
With respect to the penetration and development of the norms of international humanitarian 
law, hybrid courts potentially offer still further benefits. Because the personnel of such 
institutions include both international and domestic judges, the opportunities are much 
greater for the cross--fertilization of international and domestic norms regarding 
accountability for mass atrocity. In a sense, the hybrid courts themselves create a network of 
international and domestic legal professionals, providing a setting in which they can interact, 
share experiences, and discuss the relevant norms, both in and out of the courtroom. Of 
course, the argument that this network will result in the better use and richer development of 
international norms (and of domestic ones) assumes that the foreign judges will be experts in 
the jurisprudence of the international tribunals, an assumption that has not been borne out 
in the Kosovo case, where the hybrid courts often have failed even to cite relevant cases 
from the ICTY. In East Timor, the difficulty in attracting qualified international personnel 
has led to similar problems.  
Yet again, these problems stem more from resource constraints than from structural 
problems with the hybrid model. Because international and local legal professionals can work 
together in the hybrid court setting, there is at the very least an opportunity for the kinds of 
interactions that can result in the local application of existing international humanitarian law 
as well as the local development of mass atrocity norms. In Sierra Leone, for example, the 
Secretary—General has emphasized that the hybrid court should be guided by the 
jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY. To the extent that some of the judges appointed to 
the court are aware of this jurisprudence, they are more likely to apply it and share their 
knowledge with the others. In turn, the Sierra Leonean legal professionals involved in the 
work of the court will be more likely to use and develop these principles, not only within the 
hybrid court but perhaps in future cases in domestic Sierra Leonean courts as well. The 
international humanitarian law norms are thus more likely to penetrate into Sierra Leonean 
legal culture than norms applied in a remote tribunal by foreigners. 
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 Indeed, the establishment of hybrid courts may not only aid in the penetration of norms 
within the transitional countries affected, but in the growth of regional human rights norms 
as well. For example, it is significant that many of the judges on both the ICTR and the 
Sierra Leonean hybrid court are African. Because the hybrid court will be applying norms 
from the ICTR, the interaction among the various judges will create a cadre of African jurists 
who have become familiar with international humanitarian and human rights law as well as 
international legal procedures. Ultimately, these judges will return to their various countries, 
bringing their experience and knowledge with them. Moreover, the hybrid court in Sierra 
Leone may well develop and apply these norms in an African context and perhaps contribute 
to regional mass atrocity jurisprudence. 
 
6.2 The Relationship between Hybrid Courts and International Courts 
Some critics have suggested that hybrid courts are mere second best alternative to 
international courts. So, for example, it could be argued that the hybrid courts established in 
East Timor and Sierra Leone arose only because of "tribunal fatigue" and that the existence 
of an international tribunal with applicable jurisdiction would have made these courts 
unnecessary. On the other hand, the experience in Kosovo demonstrates that hybrid courts 
need not be a replacement for international justice (or for local justice either). Rather, the 
hybrid courts in Kosovo were a necessary complement to international tribunals. Indeed, the 
use of hybrid courts in Kosovo, in the shadow of the ICTY, may have implications for the 
relationship of such courts to the newly established ICC. The ICC's complementarity regime 
ensures that, in general, the ICC can only assume jurisdiction if national courts are unwilling 
or unable to investigate. Yet, it is precisely in these circumstances that large numbers of cases 
cannot adequately be resolved by local courts, and the volume of these cases is likely to far 
outstrip the ability of the ICC to adjudicate them. In these circumstances, hybrid courts can 
play a useful role by addressing the less high profile cases, thereby providing a forum to try 
those accused of committing mass atrocities, who might otherwise languish in prison for 
many years awaiting trial or escape accountability altogether. Indeed, as noted previously, the 
United Nations established hybrid courts in Kosovo precisely because the ICTY could not 
handle the volume of atrocities cases from the region. 
In addition to serving simply as a supplemental adjudicatory body, the potential advantages 
of hybrid courts that have already been discussed - fostering broader public acceptance, 
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building local capacity, and helping to disseminate norms - may also help the ICC to 
function. Hybrid courts may help the international court gain legitimacy among local 
populations because, operating in tandem with the ICC, hybrid courts can ground the 
pursuit of individual accountability for atrocities more squarely within local legal and popular 
culture. Of course, reciprocity can work in both ways: if a hybrid court were plagued with 
problems - such as perceived bias toward specific political or ethnic groups or excessive 
delay due to lack of resources - those problems might taint the entire international justice 
effort. And turf battles between 
the two types of institutions, including disputes about evidence sharing and the appropriate 
division of cases among the two institutions, might lead to difficulties. Nonetheless, it is easy 
to envision ways in which both institutions might help to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
other. Likewise, the interaction between the ICC and a hybrid court could help in the 
development of the local justice sector. Finally, with respect to norm penetration, the 
existence of a hybrid court is more likely to foster the regional and domestic implementation 
of the norms articulated and interpreted in the jurisprudence of the international court. 
One difficult question is whether the successful operation of hybrid courts might strip the 
ICC of jurisdiction because of the complementarity regime. As mentioned previously, the 
ICC's complementarity principle generally deprives the court of jurisdiction unless domestic 
courts are "unwilling" or "unable" to prosecute a given case. This presents a dilemma with 
regard to hybrid courts. After all, if a domestic court system otherwise without the ability to 
prosecute a case is able to do so only because of the creation of a hybrid court within that 
system, as in Kosovo or East Timor, does the establishment of the hybrid court strip the 
international court of jurisdiction? If so, then we might worry that the creation of hybrid 
courts could endanger the effective deployment of the ICC. 
Nevertheless, while the answer to this question is not obvious, I believe the existence of 
hybrid courts need not divest the ICC of jurisdiction under the complementarity regime for 
several reasons. First, the existence of hybrid panels might render the domestic court system 
capable of handling some cases but not others. For example, the existence of a hybrid court 
might make it possible for the local justice system to handle the trials of lower level 
subordinates, but even a hybrid court might have difficulty trying the leaders most 
responsible for mass atrocities. Admittedly, this is not the model of the Sierra Leonean 
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Special Court, which was created specifically to try those bearing the "greatest 
responsibility."  
However, in the Sierra Leonean case, no international forum existed with which to share 
cases.  In contrast, once the ICC is in operation, an international forum would be available, 
and a hybrid court would not need to try the high level leaders. Thus, a more likely model of 
coexistence with international tribunals is the Kosovo example, where the hybrid court and 
the ICTY have divided cases in this way. 
Second, even apart from the argument about ability, a state that does not wish to prosecute a 
given case and would prefer ICC involvement might well be deemed "unwilling" to 
prosecute. Thus, a state could choose to leave some cases for the international forum to 
resolve, even if a hybrid court existed. 
Third, it could be argued that the ICC jurisdictional test must be applied based on the 
capacity of the domestic court system prior to international involvement. Thus, even if a 
hybrid court had been established, with international judges and prosecutors playing key 
roles, such activity would not necessarily alter the inquiry regarding whether the domestic court 
system was willing and able to prosecute. This is because, regardless of the formal label, the 
hybrid court is not truly part of the domestic court system; by definition, it is a hybrid 
domestic/international court. 
Finally, as a practical matter, the decision to establish a hybrid court will most likely be made 
at the same time that the ICC is considering its jurisdiction, rather than at some prior point. 
Thus, one would expect that, after order is established in the wake of a series of human 
rights violations, various actors both domestically and internationally would consider how 
best to ensure accountability. At that point, the ICC would evaluate its jurisdiction, while the 
possibility of a hybrid court would also be considered. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that a 
hybrid court option would supplant ICC jurisdiction. Rather, from the very start, they could 
be viewed as complementary processes. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
A hybrid court is not a panacea, of course. Indeed, one of the important lessons of the 
scholarship on transitional justice is that no mechanism is perfect, and none is appropriate in 
all contexts. Moreover, many accountability and reconciliation processes can operate in 
tandem and complement one another. Thus, the use of one approach almost never excludes 
other possibilities. This ecumenical perspective may be one of the primary reasons that the 
field of transitional justice continues to be a font of on--the--ground creativity and 
innovation. 
Hybrid courts are merely the most recent step in this endless process of creative adaptation. 
Responding to significant shortcomings in both purely international and purely domestic 
approaches, hybrid courts have been devised in at least four settings and are under 
consideration elsewhere. These courts, though often hampered by underfunding and other 
logistical difficulties, at least have the potential to address three serious drawbacks of both 
international and domestic tribunals. First, they may be more likely to be perceived as 
legitimate by local and international populations because both have representation on the 
court. Second, the existence of the hybrid court may help to train local judges and funnel 
money into local infrastructure, thereby increasing the capacity of domestic legal institutions. 
Third, the functioning of hybrid courts in the local community, along with the necessary 
interaction----both formal and informal----among local and international legal actors may 
contribute to the broader dissemination (and adaptation) of the norms and processes of 
international human rights law. 
Moreover, any fears (or hopes) that these hybrid courts will serve as a complete substitute 
for purely international or purely domestic courts are misplaced because the hybrid courts 
are best viewed as a complement to both. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that hybrid 
courts will divest the ICC of jurisdiction. Rather, because the ICC will never be able to try 
more than a few cases in any given setting, the hybrid courts may continue to be a necessary 
part of any transitional justice process. 
In any event, simply by highlighting hybrid courts as a new transitional justice mechanism to 
be recognized and considered, I hope to encourage further study of their strengths and 
weaknesses both in theory and in practice. While the heartbreaking reality of this field is that 
atrocities continue to occur, the saving grace is that people continue to innovate and create 
new models to address the brutality of the past and help to build a more peaceful future. 
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Hybrid domestic/international courts are merely the most recent creative adaptation, and 
those who work in this area should soberly assess the promise and pitfalls of hybrid courts, 
while celebrating the innovative spirit that has led to their creation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
